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1.1 INTRODUCTION
The use of mobile phones and an increase in the number of Internet subscribers in the 
global South have been perceived as a game changer in relation to the way citizens and 
governments communicate, interact, and share information in this era. As stated by the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), there were more than 650 million mobile 
cellular subscriptions and about 162 million mobile active broadband subscriptions in 
Africa by the year 2015. Some authors believe that mobile phones are likely to cause an 
increase in political participation (Ponder & Haridakis, 2015; Sarrazin, 2011) while others 
(Chari, 2013; Otienno & Mukhongo, 2013; Olorunnisola & Douai, 2013) argue that this 
phenomenon may not change the political landscape. Various studies (Papacharissi, 2010; 
Cohen, Kahne, Bowyer, Middaugh, & Rogowski, 2012) were conducted in the global North 
with specific emphasis on political participation and democracy. One of their findings is that 
young people consider contemporary politics as disengaging. They cannot relate to older 
politicians and to the current political establishment, and hence they feel excluded (Otienno 
& Mukhongo, 2013; Van Belle & Cupido, 2013).
Some contemporary researchers claim that young people are actively engaged 
in political, social, and economic discussions carried out on social media platforms 
(Kahne, Middaugh, Lee, & Feezell, 2011; Cohen et al., 2012; Bartlett & Miller, 2011; Mattes 
& Richardson, 2015; Quintelier & Vissers, 2008) as a result of an increase in mobile phone 
ownership. However, Chadwick (2011) explains that an increase in the ownership of mobile 
phones does not automatically guarantee the owners’ full and active participation in public 
affairs. Similarly, applying Habermas’ public sphere theory, Mattes and Richardson (2015) 
conducted research in South Africa in order to explore the active participation of youths 
in local politics and public affairs. To their surprise, the findings indicated that only few 
youths were participating in public debates, attended community meetings, or showed 
any interest in political engagement. This supports Loader, Vromen, and Xenos’ (2014) claim 
that young people in South Africa view physical attendance to political meetings as not 
being constructive enough and as failing to guarantee them full freedom of speech and 
expression. Hence it is safe to assume that the young prefer to use new media when they 
wish to discuss freely and actively issues that affect their lives. Furthermore, Cohen et al. 
(2012) reported that, in the United States, 55 per cent of youths under the age of 30 were not 
interested in civic or political life and 64 per cent of those of voting age (18–29-year-olds) 
said that they were ‘not at all’ interested in campaign news for the 2008 elections in America.
In a nutshell, various studies have been conducted with regard to political engagement, 
youth activism, mobile phones, social media, youth digital citizenship, e-governance, and 
political consumerism worldwide. Most of these studies investigated the use of mobile 
phones among the general population and in the western world rather than in the global 
South (Simone, 2005; Archambault, 2013; Van Belle & Cupido, 2013; Moyo, 2011). Very few 
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studies focused specifically on mobile phone-related citizen engagement in regional and 
local politics in the global South, and none so far explored this issue for Namibia. This 
dissertation fills precisely that gap. It looks at political participation among members of 
the Ohangwena Region Youth Forum (ORYF) and at their engagement in regional and local 
politics via mobile phones. For the purposes of this dissertation, political engagement can be 
defined as active involvement in political discussions, public debates, and other democratic 
processes concerning the betterment of living standards through political representatives.
The Ohangwena region is the second densely populated region in Namibia; more than 
40 per cent of its population is under 35 years of age and has a low socioeconomic status 
(NSA, 2014).
It is high time to open this (largely) unexplored line of enquiry, because its findings will 
prove valuable both to the new media and to the political domain. Although there are now 
studies yielding insightful comments on mobile phones, the precise use of these devices 
by young people, as tools of engagement in regional and local politics in the global South, 
has remained unexplored. In consequence, the central question asked in this dissertation 
concerns how 18–35-year-olds engage in regional and local politics with the help of the 
mobile phone; and, taking into account everything that has been said so far, the general 
question that has led this research can be formulated as follows:
How do young people engage in politics through mobile phones in Namibia, in 
particular in the Ohangwena region?
1.2  UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND DIGITAL MEDIA: 
A GLOBAL NORTH PERSPECTIVE
Papacharissi and Rubin (2000), García-Albacete (2014), and Mossberger, Tolbert, and 
McNeal (2007) are among the researchers who examined political engagement, political 
participation, social media and elections, mobile phones and the public sphere in the West. 
Their main findings and conclusions were that the Internet, the social media, and mobile 
phones can be complementary tools for the active political engagement of citizens at 
different levels and can be said to strengthen digital democracy. The increase in Internet 
and mobile phone usage among young people motivated the recommendations made in 
these studies. Their authors propose, among other things, that new media can be used to 
transform the virtual sphere into an environment more conducive to public debate and to 
attract greater numbers of young people to political discussions in both the global South 
and the global North (Valenzuela, Arriagada, & Scherman, 2012).
In the same vein, Ward (2009) conducted a comparative analysis of youth political 
engagement facilitated through websites or social media of various youth organizations 
in the United Kingdom. Ward’s research revealed that, in spite of aspirations to increase 
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interactivity – particularly of the co-productive type, geared at co-opting young users to 
content creation – the vast majority of the 21 organizations in the sample did not attain that 
goal. Moreover, only one third of these organizations had established a presence on social 
media platforms. The social media users among the youth organizations were primarily 
employing these media for top-down dissemination. But if institutions and organizations 
in the global North are struggling to engage young people more actively, what about their 
counterparts in the developing world, which do not have the same resources?
Moreover, there has been a rapid growth of initiatives from private companies – such 
as Politics.com, Vote.com, and SpeakOut.com, and generally led by the United States – that 
offer political information and communication through the use of mobile social media. 
Politics.com was launched in October 1999 with the aim of becoming ‘the place where 
politics happens on the Internet’ (Ward, 2009: 67). However, the engagement of citizens 
was perceived not to be satisfactory. Another study examined 400 youth engagement 
websites in the United States, reporting that youth civic culture on websites deals with 
traditional political matters, placing a minimal focus on global issues and on civic activism 
(Montgomery, Robles, & Larson, 2004). However, there have hardly been any follow-up 
studies designed to investigate whether the presence of youth online via mobile phones 
leads to more involvement in online political actions worldwide. This provides justification 
for exploring the theme of young people’s participation in politics, in the global South, 
through the use of mobile phones.
1.3  THE GLOBAL SOUTH: YOUNG PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND DIGITAL MEDIA
In the global South many studies have been conducted on the subject of political 
participation, social media, and the digital divide (Kahne et al., 2011; Cohen et al., 2012; 
Bartlett & Miller, 2011; Mattes & Richardson, 2015; Quintelier & Vissers, 2008; Mpofu, 2013; 
Peters, Winschiers-Theophilus, & Menecke, 2015). However, these studies are mainly 
devoted to finding out how governments and political parties engage citizens in the 
political processes. Most of them do not consider grassroots initiatives from citizens; for 
example, they do not investigate how citizens can and do use mobile phones as tools that 
enable them to take part in political debates at a regional level (Javaru, 2013). And, as far as 
Namibia is concerned, even the ways in which civic and political leaders attempt to engage 
young citizens in regional and local politics with the help of the mobile phone remained 
unexplored. 
No empirical research has been conducted so far in the Ohangwena region, Namibia, 
specifically exploring how the young use mobile phones in order to engage regional 
councillors in regional and local politics for effective public service delivery and inclusive 
democracy. The present dissertation will fill in this gap.
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Interestingly, Sey and Ortoleva (2014), in their research on the usage of mobile social 
media for youth protest in Chile, observed that millions of Internet and new media users play 
games for entertainment rather than engaging in civic discussions. This accords with the 
findings of many other studies: much of what users do on the Internet and on social media, 
even in the global South, is leisure-oriented – play, entertainment, gaming, and sociality 
(Arora, 2014). Arora further argued that leisure is a critical area of technology infusion 
that improves digital literacy and leads to great discoveries on the use of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) in the political processes. Active engagement of citizens 
through the use of new media can strengthen citizen participation in some of the processes 
of socioeconomic development.
Additionally, with the narrowing of the digital divide in the global South (West, 2015), 
young people in Africa have become avid social media users and most of them have 
access to mobile phones. In view of their lack of engagement in politics offline and their 
high presence on online platforms, many researchers have tried to find out what type of 
communications these youth engage in, both online and offline (Mpofu, 2013). However, 
very few studies investigated how young people use mobile phones to engage in local 
politics in the global South. 
This is precisely the purpose of this dissertation. It aims to fill in this gap and hopes 
to serve as a basis for studies in political engagement through the mobile phone – a 
severely under-researched area of political communication, journalism, and media studies 
in Namibia.
1.4 WHY STUDY YOUNG PEOPLE’S MOBILE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION?
Increasing numbers of young people around the world have been found to use new media 
such as Facebook, Twitter, and the mobile phone as avenues for political engagement, 
social leisure, and entertainment (Arora, 2014; Arora & Rangaswamy, 2014; Mpofu, 2013; 
Wasserman, 2011; van Zoonen, 2005; Sarrazin, 2011). Studies reveal that these new media 
are becoming a site where young people can share ideas and stories, watch and take part in 
political games and videos, boycott and protest against national leaders, be active members 
of online communities, suggest and recommend developmental projects, advise and assist 
each other academically, disseminate information, and socially interact with others freely 
(Kahne, Lee, & Feezell, 2012).
But, although young people use the Internet intensively, not everyone uses it in the 
same way (see, e.g., Quintelier & Vissers, 2008). Some youngsters use the Internet as a source 
of information and news or for entertainment purposes (e.g., to play online games, to watch 
movies, and the like), whereas for others the Internet has a more social function, which 
can take the form of chatting, blogging, or networking on websites such as MySpace. This 
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differentiated use of the Internet seems to be correlated with levels of education such that 
highly educated youths use the Internet more often as a source of information, whereas less 
educated youths prefer the entertainment functions of the net (Shah, Kwak, & Holbert, 2001; 
Van Dijk, 2005; Ward, 2010; Ward, 2008).
In 2014, writing about Namibia’s celebrations of the international day of democracy in 
Windhoek, Bandora (2014: 5) claimed: ‘yet, studies show declining faith among young people 
in politics participation in elections, in political parties and traditional social organizations’. 
Nevertheless, this observation does not imply that youths are apathetic and indifferent 
to social and political causes. Other researchers argue that, at regional and local levels of 
government, the main point of focus in political education and public debate should be 
the young and how they engage in various political activities using new media (Mattes & 
Richardson, 2015). Pătruţ and Pătruţ (2014) stated that citizen engagement offers a possible 
escape from top-down politics, in which political parties make policies with low levels of 
citizen participation or involvement. This means that new media can provide the means for 
high differentiation of political information, ideas, theoretical possibilities of participation 
and high level of citizens’ involvement in negotiations and feedback between leaders and 
followers.
Different types of citizen engagement have been identified so far in the literature on 
regional and local authority politics in Africa: citizen engagement through the websites of 
political parties, government bodies, ministries, and so on; citizen engagement through 
participation in regional and local authority issues such as improvement and town/village 
projects; and citizen engagement through voting, petition drives, and hearings (Kang & 
Gearhart, 2010). Political participation can thus take different forms – for example voting, 
which is regarded as the most common and most basic form of political action. Electoral 
participation encompasses various other forms, such as citizen involvement in election 
campaigns, attendance at meetings, or attempts to access information about different 
political parties. Other forms of participation include citizens’ engagement in grassroots 
politics within their local communities through attendance at community gatherings 
and interaction with local political representatives (Goddey, 2016). In addition, political 
participation involves actions such as attending civil protests, signing petitions on different 
issues, and joining interest groups that engage in lobbying or political advocacy. For this 
reason, Quintelier and Vissers (2008) posited that the youth can carry out political activities 
digitally either by forwarding e-mails with political content or by voting online.
Having said all this, there is a noticeable decline in young people’s participation 
in political activities in Namibia and, concomitantly with it, an increase in mobile phone 
subscriptions throughout the whole of Africa. The present dissertation explores this 
convergence especially in relation to the Ohangwena region, trying to see to what extent 
this situation prevails there and why.
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1.5  AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND 
DIGITAL CITIZENSHIP
To increase the level of citizen participation and engagement in political processes in the 
global South, governments have implemented various e-governance initiatives. Namibia 
has introduced an e-governance policy in 2005 (Office of the Prime Minister, 2005). Most 
African countries, including Namibia, are struggling to move from the e-government to 
the e-governance stage, simply because most government leaders and politicians are still 
looking at the issue of digital accessibility and literacy rather than empowering citizens to 
engage actively in political discussions at the national level (Mudhai, Tettey, & Banda, 2009; 
UN-DESA, 2008; Republic of Namibia, 2008, 2014).
For e-governance to be a reality and to contribute positively to e-democracy and civic 
engagement, African citizens need to look at the potential of mobile phones and of social 
media such as Facebook and WhatsApp for political engagement. Given the rise of digital 
media platforms and the use of mobile phones, especially among youths in African countries 
(Mudhai et al., 2009; Misuraca, 2007; UN-DESA, 2008; Funda & Mbale, 2015), e-governance 
initiatives should be geared at the potential of these sites and at devices for contributing to 
digital democracy in Africa as a whole. If such potential exists, it should be released.
Namibia scored 2.2 out of a total of 4 on the overall e-readiness index for this country 
in 2014 (Republic of Namibia, 2014). This is in line with Namibia’s scores of 40–5 per cent 
(‘average’) on the United Nations’ e-readiness index for 2013 and on the World Economic 
Forum’s (2014) index for 2013. E-governance readiness level in Namibia does not correspond 
to the level of citizens’ e-participation in politics and decision-making. Hence there is 
an opportunity for new media to nurture this transition (Banda, Mudhai, & Tettey, 2009), 
ensuring that citizens’ active participation in political activities is realized.
Only a few researchers in the field of e-governance studied new media in conjunction 
with citizen engagement in regional and local politics and linked this subject to that of 
e-governance initiatives in African countries as a whole (Heeks & Stanforth, 2007; Heeks, 
2004; UN-DESA, 2008; Bellany & Taylor, 2003). Their discussions were concerned with 
political communication and had a narrow focus on how mobile phones are used by young 
people to engage in local politics and public debates to improve service delivery. The 
present study aims to fill our knowledge gap in this area by looking more broadly at how 
the young people connect with their government officials in Namibia and at how – and 
how much – the mobile phone facilitate this interactivity. Mattes and Richardson (2015) 
highlighted that citizen engagement in local politics that can be measured in the form of 
individual contact with local councillors was low in South Africa by comparison to other 
African countries. Their findings revealed that individual participation in local politics and 
in protests and demonstrations such as lobbying for the removal of regional governors or 
councillors, or expressing disappointment with public service delivery, is mainly to be found 
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among citizens of low socioeconomic status and that neither dissatisfaction nor satisfaction 
with local politics provides an adequate account of this participation (Mudhai et al., 2009). 
However, this thesis still has to be put to the test for Namibia, where young people are more 
likely to participate in political protests and demonstrations.
Politicians and government leaders around the world still presume that citizens have 
a natural predisposition (Quinton, & Geißel, 2018) to participate in public affairs. However, 
Mattes and Richardson’s (2015) findings showed that young people are less committed to 
politics than their parents or grandparents were. Adding to this is Evalistus’ (2015) study of 
the political participation of university students in Namibian elections, which indicated that 
much needs to be done, as (even) highly educated young people appear to be less engaged 
in traditional politics and most of them are not interested in political change.
On the basis of the statistics released by the Electoral Commission of Namibia in 2015, 
85 percent of the Namibian youths have registered to vote in 2014, against a total Namibian 
youth population of about 600,000. It is reported that 44 per cent of the 1,151 million who 
registered during the first phase fall into the group of 18–32-year-olds (ECN, 2015). However, 
the voter turnout was reportedly lower than expected (ECN, 2015). This situation challenges 
politicians to come up with ways in which to sustain the youths’ interest and inspire them to 
go out and get really engaged in national elections in Namibia.
In the same vein, the last regional and local authority elections were held in November 
2015. A total of 1,267,335 voters registered for the 2015 regional council (RC) elections, while 
418,544 voters registered for the 2015 local authority (LA) elections (ECN, 2015). Out of this 
total number of voters for both RC and LA, 44 per cent are youths. This makes it the largest 
number of young people who registered for elections after independence in 1990 (ECN, 
2015). Surprisingly, the voter turnout for RC and LA elections was relatively low: 39.8 per cent 
for the former and 36.6 per cent for the latter (ECN, 2015). This has been a concern in Namibia; 
in fact only the first round of RC and LA elections, in 1992, recorded a high voter turnout – 
82 and 81 per cent respectively. All subsequent elections have seen very low figures. For 
example, in 2010 the voter turnout was 33 per cent for LA and 38 per cent for RC elections.
In terms of ICTs, the majority of Namibians, namely 69 per cent, have access to the radio; 
this access is slightly greater access in urban (74 per cent) than in rural (65 per cent) areas 
(NSA, 2014). As for mobile phones, of the 52.6 per cent Namibians who have access to them, 
68.6 per cent are located in urban and 40.6 per cent in rural areas (NSA, 2014). In July 2016, 
Namibia had more than 2.35 million mobile phone customers – a figure that exceeded 
that of the entire population (we should bear in mind that one user may have more than 
one mobile and several sim cards). Currently over 470,000 users (23.4 per cent) access the 
Internet via mobile phone daily (IWS, 2016). There are over 570,000 Facebook subscribers 
(IWS, 2016), and most of this population is aged between 18 and 24 years. The number or 
Namibian men on Facebook (50.1 per cent) is only marginally higher than that of women (All 
in 1 Social, 2015). Of the nine political parties with seats in parliament, five have functioning 
Introduction | Chapter 1
9
1
websites, and six have a social media presence on Facebook or Twitter or both (IPPR, 2015b).
In the Ohangwena region, where I conducted my study, mobile phone subscriptions 
have been increasing lately. In 2011, out of the 43,723 households in the region, 23,247 
(53.1 per cent) owned a mobile phone, which is a good indicator of mobile acquisition. 
According to the census report, out of 37,404 households in the rural areas, 19,263 (51 per 
cent) own a mobile phone (NSA, 2014). In relatively recent years some constituencies, such 
as Omundaungilo, rated very low in mobile phone ownership per household: in 2011 only 
370 (32 per cent) out of 1,169 households reported owning a mobile phone (NSA, 2014).
Given the low voter turnout in local regions such as Ohangwena against the high 
turnout at the national level, there have been strong attempts among local politicians to 
devise strategies for engaging young people. The exponential uptake of mobile phones, 
and particularly the increasing use of Facebook by young people, present an opportunity 
for the council people in this region to leverage the new social media platforms so as to 
reach out to young citizens and connect with them on matters of political concern.
On the other hand, informal, youth-led movements for democratic change are on 
the rise in Namibia, as can be seen for example in the formation in 2014 of the Affirmative 
Repositioning movement, which is protesting and demanding a fair process of land 
distribution to the landless, especially the youth (New Era Reporter, 2014). It is believed that 
the youth is likely to make its mark on democracy-building processes through an increase 
in social media usage, with the help of these digital affordances. In light of the availability 
of the new media and their proliferation among Namibian youths, this dissertation seeks 
to qualify the type and level of political engagement that this technology stimulates and 
inspires in this population. It also aims to increase our understanding of the kinds of issues 
that young people get involved in and the ways in which they capitalize on their mobile 
media in dealing with them.
1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Let me return now to the main research question that has led my study: How do young 
people engage in politics through mobile phones in Namibia, in particular in the Ohangwena 
region?
To answer this research question, I set out to provide answers to the following 
subordinate questions:
 ∙ RQ1: What kinds of young people participate and what motivates them to engage 
in regional and local politics?
 ∙ RQ2: What is the nature of their political participation through mobile phones?
 ∙ RQ3: To what extent and in what ways do young people connect with the 
government and other stakeholders through the use of mobile phones?
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1.7 RESEARCH PLAN AND METHODS
1.7.1 Research Design
In this study I have used an exploratory qualitative research design in order to investigate 
the attitudes, opinions, feelings and experiences of 18–35-year-old members of the ORYF as 
they relate to the use of the mobile phone as a tool for engagement in political life. According 
to Godhard and Melville (2001: 34), ‘qualitative research undertakes a commitment from the 
researcher to see the world through the eyes of the author, other person or the subject’. 
Others, such as Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2003) and Cooper and Schindler (1998), posit 
that a qualitative researcher interprets the data by giving them meaning, translating them, 
and making them understandable and relevant to the study.
Qualitative content analysis of Facebook pages and WhatsApp groups, focus group 
discussions with representative youths from regional youth forums, semi-structured 
interviews with government officials, participant observation in community meetings, 
and semi-structured interviews with representative youths were used for the purpose of 
collecting the relevant data for this research. Numerous interviews were conducted on the 
attitudes and perceptions of young people and on their various engagements in regional 
and local politics. These interviews were recorded in a reflective diary and tape-recorded. 
The questions for the semi-structured interviews were designed in such a way that they are 
easy to understand and can be grouped both according to the objectives of the study and 
according to the categories indicated by the literature review.
1.7.2 Research Ethics
I informed the participants and negotiated with them a formal agreement (see Appendix C) 
in which I clearly stated their right to withdraw from this research at any time. This was done 
through their chairperson, as well as through the regional council’s office at Eenhana. On 
Facebook pages and WhatsApp groups, I asked the group administrator to inform members 
of my presence. I was myself a participant in all the discussions, since I, too, came from the 
region. Participants were assured that the information provided will be kept confidential 
and their identities will not be divulged. They all had the opportunity to verify the data 
before publication. Thus confidentiality and anonymity were assured. No names were taken, 
so responses could not be linked to individual participants. 
1.7.3 Dissertation Overview
This dissertation is structured as follows.
Chapter 1 (‘Introduction’) gives a historical overview of the use of new media for 
engagement in politics in different parts of the world. The chapter also highlights some of 
the concerns, disagreements, and topical issues of various researchers. This material led to 
the identification of gaps in the literature and hence to the formulation of the main research 
question.
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Chapter 2 (‘Literature Review’) attempts to be a comprehensive survey of the main 
literature on citizen engagement, political participation, public sphere and the emerging 
markets, shifting notions of citizenship in the digital age, and politics in relation to the social 
media in the global North and South. The chapter also gives a general outline of the use of 
social media by the youth. It starts from a global perspective, which then narrows down to 
the African context and finally focuses on Namibia. The chapter criticizes current studies, 
locating their weaknesses; but it also presents their strengths and explains how they inform 
this research. Gaps and missing avenues of enquiry are identified in the existing literature, 
along with concerns and disagreements among researchers that this dissertation aims to 
address. Additionally, the chapter highlights some studies on the relationship between 
young people’s political engagement and the new media, especially in Africa and, even 
more specifically, in Namibia. The research carried out there contributes to the growing 
body of literature in the area of effective public service delivery.
Chapter 3 (‘Methodology’) focuses on the methodological principles followed in the 
collection, analysis, and interpretation of the data discussed in these pages. The dissertation 
used a qualitative approach, making content analysis its key method. Semi-structured 
interviews, focus group discussions, and participant observation were used in collecting 
the data.
Chapter 4 (‘Old and New Media’) focuses on traditional mass media versus new media 
as sources for youth political information and on the normative understandings of their 
relationship at regional and local levels of governance. It highlights how mobile media are 
slowly taking over from the traditional media as a political participatory platform, owing to 
the portability and mobility of mobile phones among the youth population.
Chapter 5 (‘Offline and Online Political Networks’) examines youth forums and gatherings 
and face-to-face (offline) participation among their members. Drawing from participant 
observations of meetings, the chapter also looks at forums as offline and online political 
networks for the youth, investigates how young people struggle to expand these networks 
via mobile connectivity (online), and discusses the challenges they face in their attempt 
to enhance democracy. Overall, the chapter looks at youth forums as network political 
platforms for employment, political identification, dialoguing, and re-energizing youth 
morale – given that, to these young people, politics is all about sociopolitical issues such 
as empowerment, teenage pregnancy, HIV/AIDs, alcohol and drug abuse, and mobilization.
Chapter 6 (‘Engaging Citizens from Below and Above’) deals with how young people and 
political leaders use mobile phones as a tool for engaging in regional and local politics. The 
chapter highlights the digital accessibility and availability of political leaders. It considers 
specific challenges and obstacles experienced both by the young and by political leaders 
during engagement via digital platforms and shows how both parties try to resolve these 
issues in order to nurture political intimacy and an inclusive politics.
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Chapter 7 (‘Mobile Social Media and Digital Literacy’) looks at how young people 
learn to use mobile social media for political networks and how, at times, they become 
effective publics. Here digital politics manifests itself through new forms of literacy and 
through entertainment that enhances direct and indirect democracy, enriching the political 
spectrum of the region – and of the country at large.
Chapter 8 (‘Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations’) concludes the dissertation 
by reflecting on the aim that led this study, on the main research questions and their 
findings, and on larger implications for further research.
The next chapter presents the relevant literature on young people’s political 
participation in relation to the use of social media, gradually bringing this subject within a 
Namibian compass.
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CHAPTER 22
Theoretical Perspectives on the Role 
of Mobile Phones in Youth Political 
Integration
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
Extensive research has been conducted in the past few decades, especially after the 
proliferation of mobile phones in both the global South and the global North, on citizen 
engagement in politics and public debates (Papacharissi, 2010; Van Belle & Cupido, 2013). A 
lot has been written, debated, discussed, and reviewed on the influence that mobile phones 
have on political participation. Scholars in political communication, journalism, and media 
have been struggling with questions such as how citizens use the digital media in order to 
participate in politics and civic debates. Some studies found that the digital media have a 
positive effect on political participation, while others reported that they caused a decline 
in political activity, especially among the young population, in both the developing and 
developed world.
This chapter focuses on the main theoretical perspectives, concepts, areas of study, 
and ongoing debates to which this dissertation attempts to contribute. By doing so, the 
chapter implicitly addresses the theoretical and conceptual relevance of this dissertation, 
which will be further elaborated upon. It gives a concise outline of the various theories that 
are believed to encourage citizen participation in politics, especially in relation to the use of 
new media such as mobile phones and the social media, but also in relation to traditional 
media in democracies across the world. It covers, among other things, Jürgen Habermas’ 
public sphere theory, Papacharissi’s theory of the virtual sphere, John Rawls’ theory of 
liberal democracy, and direct democracy and political entertainment theories. 
2.2 THE PUBLIC SPHERE THEORY AND THE EMERGENCE OF A VIRTUAL 
SPHERE THEORY
In the past decades several studies were conducted with the purpose of finding ways in 
which conventional media such as radio, television, newspapers, and magazines could be 
supplemented so as to engage citizens, and especially the youth, in in the public sphere, more 
specifically in political processes at regional and local governance levels (see Papacharissi & 
Rubin, 2000; Rangaswamy & Cutrell, 2013; Mossberger, Tolbert, & McNeal, 2007; Habermas, 
2006). Conceptualized by Habermas, the public sphere is a discursive arena where private 
people come together as a public, in order to discuss freely matters of shared interest. 
Examples of the public sphere at the time of Habermas’ writing were saloons, coffee shops, 
or magazines – spaces where white men belonging to local or national elites could join in 
the discussion of commercial, political, social, and other public affairs topics advanced in 
the newspapers of the day, and did so for the benefit of the society. Although the notion of 
a public sphere of this sort is now criticized on account of its exclusion of minority groups 
such as blacks, women, youth groups, and the underprivileged, the theory is still applicable; 
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and the formulation of a concept of the public sphere that emphasizes the collectivism of 
individuals or their capacity to create a unitary space for the common good remains valid. 
Theoretically, new media, including mobile phones, may be regarded as tools that can 
be used by citizens to engage in discussions that touch on issues of national concern – such 
as land distribution, corruption, political ideologies, and other social issues; and, through 
these devices, they do so within a public space or ‘sphere’ redefined as ‘the virtual sphere’ 
(Papacharissi & Rubin, 2000; Papacharissi, 2010; Mudhai, 2013). However, according to 
Papacharissi (2010), the virtual sphere has been dominated by advertisements and public 
relations instead. Political leaders, local government leaders, and businesses alike are selling 
their interests to citizens, while citizens are regarded as consumers of those products. This 
phenomenon is sometimes termed ‘digital political consumerism’ (DPC) (Kyroglou & Henn, 
2017). By contrast, other authors, for example Hart and Henn (2017), highlight how digital 
media facilitate civic engagement and enable citizens to inform, guide, and direct leaders 
and managers on the matter of what is needed and how they want it. This is one of the 
background reasons why the goal of this dissertation is to explore how young people and 
political leaders at regional and local levels of governance use these new media, especially 
mobile phones, as engagement tools. They nurture a digital democracy; and it is very 
important to explore this process.
In his research on democracy building and civic responsibility in Namibia, Evalistus (2015) 
has revealed that, so far, the Namibian public sphere has been dominated by politicians and 
government leaders. Citizens, especially the youth, are being guided by the government 
on what their plans should be and how their issues could be solved. It is now expected that 
this state of passive reliance will be disrupted, since the majority of young people possess 
information and communication technology (ICT) devices with Internet access. Most of 
the political leaders and government officials participate in online communities, yet we 
know little about how they engage in such forums and about the new discursive forms that 
emerge as they address citizens in their constituencies through these novel channels. 
Recent decades witnessed a decline in young people’s interest in attending public 
community meetings, political rallies, and consultative meetings of stakeholders (Mycock 
& Tonge, 2014). Such traditional platforms for political engagement are reportedly being 
used only by older people and children. It has also been observed that most of the young 
people who attend these platforms are from politically well-off families, which show signs 
of political exclusivity. Thus replacing the traditional public sphere by, or transforming it 
into, a virtual sphere has every chance of being a more inclusive option in the context of 
rural Namibia, given that many of the young people here are already online. Additionally, a 
public sphere in Habermas’ (2006) understanding of the term should be free and open and 
should offer a meeting point for all the people interested in discussing political and societal 
matters, national or international, regardless of their age, sex, political affiliation, or cultural 
background. If these elements are not present, then we cannot talk about a ‘public sphere’. 
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The situation demands a widening of the notion of the public sphere in Africa, where 
citizens, through cheap, portable mobiles and low-cost pre-paid data plans, have begun to 
carve new spaces to engage political leaders in debates around social issues that concern 
them (Ndavula & Mueni, 2014). This process opens more opportunities for citizens to 
interact with the community. It also makes it possible for them to inform their politicians 
as to what needs they have and how they should be fulfilled – unlike in the past, when 
citizens’ programmes were designed top-down by government representatives, while 
citizens, supposedly the direct beneficiaries of these programmes, were not even consulted 
(Evalistus, 2015).
Interestingly, in Namibia and in other African countries the traditional public sphere 
is still dominated by black elites, politicians, and a few black women, most of them of 
advanced age (Habermas, 1991; Lister, 2015; Virmasalo, 2017). For this reason the present 
study sets out to examine the phenomenon of interest – acquisition and proliferation of 
mobile phones among citizens – regardless of the latter’s social class or economic status. 
In a nutshell, this dissertation looks at the emergence and the potential of a virtual sphere 
as opposed to the public sphere and defines the former as a space where young people, 
women, the less educated, members of minorities and of political parties in opposition, the 
homeless, the jobless, the landless, and the less cared for are likely to meet and deliberate 
on issues that affect their lives, and to do so without fear of intimidation or threat from 
anyone. Such a sphere consists of, or is created by, new media whereby citizens may use 
their mobile phones for messaging (SMSs) or for being active on social network sites such 
as Facebook and Twitter. 
Although the virtual sphere theory has been criticized for not accounting for physical 
contacts (Chigona, Chigona, Ngqokelela, & Mpofu, 2009), a virtual sphere is indeed emerging 
as a public sphere, especially for younger generations (Papacharissi, 2010) around the globe. 
To give an example, in Kenya, during the violence eruptions after the 2007 elections, Kenyans 
have used social media to report cases of violence, intimidation, and the like via the Ushahidi 
platform. Ushahidi is a platform that was created by the Kenyan community with the main 
aim of reporting cases of violence, threats, and corruption during election time (Wasserman 
& Garman, 2014) and is accessible via mobile phone. This platform is now adopted in Namibia, 
Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and most other African countries. In Namibia it was adopted by the 
National Society for Human Rights (NSHR) to monitor the 2014 presidential and National 
Assembly elections and is reported to work very well (Evalistus, 2015). That being said, 
platforms such as this one enable data aggregation around political participation, but are 
less involved in ongoing processes of relationship building and communication sustenance 
on political and social issues. However, while several studies have already been devoted to 
data systems of this type, whose aim is to hold governments accountable, there are far fewer 
studies on how governments and their young citizens engage politically through digital 
forums in regular, day-to-day fashion. As already explained, the present dissertation aims 
at filling in this gap for Namibia by contributing to this important but underexplored topic.
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2.3 SHIFTING NOTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Citizens around the globe in the twenty-first century are no longer relying on the 
government to supply to them information or data. Young people are not happy with the way 
governments engage them in public debates (Mattes & Richardson, 2015). This upward trend 
in young people’s dissatisfaction with conventional political engagement is not occurring 
just in developed democracies such as the United States, Germany, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom, but also in other parts of the world, including Africa (Henn, Oldfield, & Hart, 2017; 
Reichert, 2017). Citizens have been found to disconnect themselves from governments 
in different ways (Reichert, 2017; Whiteley, 2012; Tormey, 2015; Norris, 2011). For example, 
young people are frequently negative about politics and its processes, the tone of the press 
is often cynical, political candidates seldom succeed in appealing directly to young voters 
and do not attempt to address them in their own terms about their concerns, politicians 
have poisoned the public well (particularly in the United States) with the vitriol of negative 
campaigning, and young people see the media filled with inauthentic performances from 
officials who have been staged by professional communication managers (Bennett, 2008a). 
The tendency to transform the digital space into a new space of political activity should 
be seen as a compensatory move, in response to this general deterioration of the traditional 
spaces. On the one hand, Bennett (2008b), Coleman (2008), and Benkler (2006) signal that 
various online practices – ranging from blogging to types of conflict and protest behaviour 
displayed in gaming, fan, and entertainment sites – represent new forms of civic or media 
engagement and that these forms resulted in part from e-democracy initiatives (see also 
Lewis, 2013). On the other hand, while some people may turn to social media occasionally 
and only for a few activities, others, notably young people, make social media an integral 
part of their lives, using them for a variety of purposes and activities such as entertainment, 
debate, political news, and the sharing of national jokes (Hargittai & Walejko, 2008; Arora, 
2014; Arora & Rangaswamy, 2013). 
And here we must introduce the all-important concept of digital citizenship, which 
appeared around the development of Web 2.0: digital citizenship became a vital instrument 
for associating Internet use with the ability to participate in political activities (Shulman, 
Beisser, Larson, & Shelley, 2002; Yang, 2009; Shelley, Thrane, Shulman, Lang, Beisser, & 
Larson, 2004). According to Mossberger et al. (2007: 56), 
 political digital citizens can be defined as those who use the Internet every day 
as frequent use requires some means of access (usually at home or mobile), some 
technical skills, and the educational competencies to perform tasks such as findings 
and using political information on the Web, and communicating with others on the 
Internet on political issues concerning their communities. 
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Additionally, Mossberger et al. (2007) have empirically demonstrated the benefits of 
digital citizenship in the economic, political, and social life of a country. According to Emmer 
and Kunst (2018: 2193) ‘digital citizens can participate in a democratic domestication of the 
digital sphere, extending their established practices and behaviors in the digital sphere and 
developing new forms of activity at the same time’. Other experts in the new field of digital 
citizenship and digital democracy show how Internet access at home, via mobile phones, 
or via Internet cafés in one’s region, village, or constituency promotes digital citizenship, 
since it allows people to use the Internet frequently enough to partake effectively in 
political debates and decision-making processes on social matters that concern them 
directly (Thomas & Streib, 2003; Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006; McNeal, Hale, & Dotterweich, 
2008; McNeal, Tolbert, Mossberger, & Dotterweich, 2003; Edmiston, 2003; Asgarkhani, 2005; 
Chadwick & May, 2003; Edwards, 2008).
 Thus, as citizens gain more experience of being online, they are likely to express 
their views on important issues that affect their lives, such as rape, fraud, corruption, 
or unemployment. Mossberger (2008) contends that having access to new media is a 
precondition for digital citizenship, which in turn may serve as a prerequisite for citizens 
to engage in political life both online and offline. This conclusion is highly debated and 
contested by researchers (Ignatow & Robinson, 2017; Vromen, 2017; Hintz & Brown, 2017). 
Some advance an ethnocentric notion of citizenship, whereby citizens are likely either to fear 
or to neglect using digital technologies as tools for engagement. Such critics point out that 
in some countries (including Namibia) citizens are not necessarily using digital technologies 
as engagement tools, but rather as entertainment platforms. They also claim that many 
citizens in such countries suffer from technophobia because they lack the technical know-
how and, as a result, would not feel safe enough to engage in online debates; they are 
reluctant to take part in any political activity mediated by electronic gadgets.
There are, to be fair, perceived disadvantages to political digital citizenship and 
e-democracy (Hintz & Brown, 2017; Mitchell, 2016) such as lack of control of the content to be 
discussed, lack of proximity among citizens, and poor meeting attendance – during election 
campaigns, and even during the state address by political heads of state. Digital citizenship 
may also be affected by the digital divide (McNeal et al., 2008; McNeal et al., 2003), as not 
all the citizens have equal access to digital tools. The digitally more experienced citizens 
are likely to dominate public debates at the expense of the ones less adept at using these 
digital tools. Despite these drawbacks of digital democracy, a fresh wave of technological 
optimism has more recently accompanied the advent of social media platforms such 
as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, wikis, and the blogosphere through the mobile Internet 
(Chadwick, 2011; Loader, & Mercea, 2011; Arora, 2014). The distinctive feature of this second 
generation of Internet democracy is the replacement of the public sphere model with 
that of a networked, citizen-centred perspective that offers opportunities to connect the 
private sphere of autonomous political identity to a multitude of chosen political spaces 
(Papacharissi, 2010).
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The role of the new media is to focus on the citizen-user as the driver of democratic 
innovation through the self-actualized networking of citizens engaged in lifestyle and 
identity politics (Dahlgren 2009; Papacharissi, 2010). Various scholars have claimed that, if 
citizens are equipped with new media, they may no longer have to be passive consumers 
of political party propaganda, government spin, or mass media news; they would actually 
be enabled to challenge discourses, share alternative perspectives, and publish their own 
opinions. The existent literature regarding the use of social media platforms (see also Van 
Zoonen, 2005) suggests that the most active political users are social movement activists, 
politicians, party workers, and people who are already fully committed to political causes. 
Papacharissi (2010), for example, pointed out how citizen-users can participate in campaigns 
while simultaneously enjoying television or chatting with family in the privacy of their own 
home.
Thus digital democracy extends the effective franchise by creating opportunities for 
people who would not otherwise participate in policymaking; it enables more extensive 
public comment on rule-making, for example. Digital democracy is a way of extending 
participation into civil society beyond its elected representatives (Dryzek, 2000).
2.4 ACTIVISM DEFINED
Darity (2008: 23) defined activism as ‘an action’ undertaken ‘by an individual or group with 
the intent to bring about social, political, economic, or even ideological change in their 
community’, be that ‘village or country’. This change could be directed at single community 
organizations or institutions (e.g. town councils), at more complex systems (e.g. the central 
government or regional or local government such as municipalities), or at the general public. 
In most cases, but not all, activism is directed at supporting or opposing some controversial 
issue – human rights, land distribution, unemployment, the income gap between rich and 
poor – and takes the form of mass demonstrations or protests to this effect. In the digital era, 
such public actions may take place digitally at any time when citizens are free to use their 
devices for this purpose. 
 In Namibia, activism has been rife in the political and social arena, especially around 
issues of land distribution, income inequality, and human rights, since, given current 
social inequalities and inequities in the distribution of public resources, young people 
feel disenfranchised (Namibia, 2008; Keulder, Nord, & Emminghaus, 2010). Activism takes 
very different forms, which can range from civil disobedience, rioting, strikes organized 
by unions, and governmental or institutional lobbying to verbal or physical confrontation, 
various forms of terrorism (Coleman, 2008; Chadwick, 2011; Bakardjieva, Svensson, & Skortic, 
2012), and the use of political games, videos, and other digital media. But the use of new 
media is emerging as a dominant form of activism among youths who wish to draw the 
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attention of political, regional, and local authority leaders to particular issues in the public 
sphere that are directly relevant to their interests. Given the paucity of studies on the nature 
of activism in Namibia, especially at the local and regional level, I will embark upon the 
task set out in this dissertation by looking at the involvement of young Namibian people in 
regional and local politics and attempting to understand what motivates them.
2.5 POLITICAL AND DIGITAL ACTIVISM
The potential of new media to enhance political engagement and the civic participation 
of people in regional and local governance has been examined in numerous theoretical 
and empirical studies (Chadwick, 2011; Edmiston, 2003; Namibia, 2008; Keulder et al., 2010; 
Mattes & Richardson, 2015).
Many scholars have criticized digital political engagement as a new form of consumption 
in this neoliberal economy (McNeal et al., 2008; Mossberger, Tolbert, & Stansbury, 2003; 
Thomas & Streib, 2003). As a type of activity, political consumerism can be defined as a series 
of steps or initiatives taken by citizens towards buying products or paying for services from 
a specific producer or service provider, for political reasons or out of political considerations 
(Stolle, Hooghe, & Micheletti, 2005). As a type of attitude, this kind of consumerism is likely 
to create situations in which citizens buy products that do not suit their needs – for example, 
they may join political parties that do not address their societal problems; as a result, they fail 
to come up with their own political identity. Indeed some studies (Montgomery, Robles, & 
Larson, 2004) analysed how political consumers come to buy the ‘wrong’ political products 
and services by joining or participating in a political activity that is not aligned with their 
interests. Young US citizens appear to be increasingly disconnected, both from each other 
and from public life (Bartlett & Miller, 2011; Montgomery et al., 2004). And this phenomenon 
is not unique to the United States; it is also manifest in African countries. 
But the same study by Montgomery et al. (2004) also reported, by contrast, a very 
different find: youths don’t just consume digital content, they are active participants and 
creators of this new media culture, as they develop their own content, design personal 
websites, and launch their own online enterprises. The proliferation of youth-created web 
pages and message board postings, and the popularity of instant messaging among young 
people (Quintelier & Vissers, 2008), all contribute to the increasing use of new media for 
political communication among the youth. In the United States, digital activism among 
young people can be measured through their participation in community affairs, voter 
turnout, trust in institutions and people, knowledge of public affairs and attention to what’s 
going on, and the quality of their political discourse (Stolle et al., 2005). These measurement 
variables can equally be used in other countries around the globe. 
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2.6  E-GOVERNANCE AND DIRECT INCLUSIVE DEMOCRACY  
IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH
In the reviewed studies (Thomas & Streib, 2003; Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006; Mbale, Ntinda, 
& van Staden, 2015; Republic of Namibia, 2008, 2014) the following two concepts appear to 
overlap, somewhat confusingly: e-governance and e-government. In this section I attempt 
to clarify the difference between them and to show how each one relates to the current 
study. 
Most of the aforementioned studies focus on e-government, which is mainly aimed 
at digitalizing government activities around the globe, in order to ensure that citizens 
have access to these services any time anywhere. E-government activities, especially in 
developing countries, are primarily concerned with e-readiness and place comparatively 
little emphasis on engaging the citizens and prompting them to demand services from their 
government leaders. 
According to Singh, Pathak, Naz, and Belwal (2010: 35), e-governance ‘is a process by 
which the public sector uses information and communication technologies such as social 
media with the aim of improving information and service delivery, encouraging citizen 
participation in the decision-making process and making government more accountable, 
transparent and effective’. Fath-Allah, Cheikhi, Al-Qutaish, and Idri (2014: 805) see the 
e-government, by contrast, ‘as the use of New Digital Media Technologies (NDMTs) by 
government agencies that has the ability to transform relations with citizens, visitors 
and businesses, and between all arms of government’. This tells us, in a nutshell, that 
e-governance is concerned with citizen engagement, while e-government has to do with 
the relations between citizens and the government.
Mudhai, Tettey, and Banda (2009), too, examined the difference between e-governance 
and e-government and defined e-governance differently, namely in terms of engaging 
citizens in policy formulation and in the administration and evaluation of government 
services by openly discussing with them issues pertaining to effective decision-making. But 
e-governance is only the second stage in an e-democracy; before getting there, citizens 
first need to secure access to digital services, which is done through websites, e-mails, social 
media platforms specifically created for the purpose, reduced data costs or government 
sponsorship, libraries, or Internet facilities that allow non-stop participation. This first 
stage is e-government. E-government refers, then, to a process or actions whereby the 
government gives citizens access to its services if they adopt various digital platforms as 
discussion forums. But e-government has little to do with engagement; its aim is to offer 
access to services, but not (or not necessarily) to involve citizens in discussions and debates 
concerning their society. So the key difference between e-government and e-governance 
is this. E-government is a one-way communication protocol whereby government officials 
from different offices keep feeding citizens with information or documents. E-governance, 
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on the other hand, is a two-way communication protocol that encourages the active 
engagement of citizens and government representatives in the process of decision-making 
and policy formulation. 
Some studies revealed that e-government takes more of a top-down approach to 
management, while e-governance takes a rather bottom-up approach. According to Mudhai 
(2013: 23) in a later study, e-government involves ‘e-service delivery of government activities 
to people such as passive automation, data processing, internal workings and back office 
functions, having websites for government ministries and agencies’. This can be treated as 
a first stage in the formation of digital citizenship – a stage where the electorate acquires 
digital power by getting permanent, 24/7 access to public information and documents 
(see Namibia, 2004; Albert, 2009). However, many countries in Africa and elsewhere in the 
world are already beyond this stage. Researchers are now exploring the second stage of 
e-governance, which is concerned with interaction and communication, external workings 
and front-office functions of citizens – all designed to enable them to criticize or praise their 
government publicly, via new digital media such as social media platforms and mobile 
phones (Misuraca, 2007; Heeks, 2004; UN-DESA, 2008). 
The differences between e-government and e-governance point to two versions of 
e-digitalization of government services: in one version, the government is a supplier of 
information and data to citizens (e-government); in the other, the citizens are controllers of 
government activities (e-governance). This is what makes the present research worthwhile, 
as it looks at new media from the demand side – that is, from the perspective of the citizens. 
New media should enable citizens to actively engage the government on social issues that 
affect their lives, instead of feeding them with information on political and public affairs in 
which they have no say.
But the fact that this dissertation introduces the perspective of the citizens into the 
equation does not mean that it neglects the other side of the coin; my study does seek to 
cover both the supply and the demand side of e-governance, though it concentrates on the 
demand side, whereby citizens (mainly the youth) are directing and guiding government 
activities for their benefits, particularly at regional and local authority levels. On the supply 
side, governments around the world decide what to give to communities and how to 
give it through digital platforms. But the demand side requires citizen participation in the 
formulation and drafting of bills or programmes; and it uses online forums, so that no one 
may feel left out. Citizens are the ones to inform their leaders about what they need and 
how they are going to consume (or not) what they receive from the government. Here one 
can see how the new media have a direct and strong effect on the political activism and 
civic engagement of citizens. Hence the power of these new media cannot be overlooked.
Mbale et al. (2015) reiterate that the goal of e-governance in any country is to enhance 
efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency as well as to aid citizen inclusion and participation 
in democracy. In 2012 the United Nations described the evolution of e-services in various 
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countries and their relationship to politics and social media. There seem to be four main 
stages of online service development. Countries typically begin by having an emerging 
online presence through simple websites; then they progress to an enhanced state, with 
deployment of multimedia content and two-way interaction; from there they advance to a 
transactional level, where many services are provided online and governments solicit citizen 
input on matters of public policy; and, finally, they create a connected web of integrated 
functions, widespread data sharing, and routine consultation with citizens through social 
networking and related tools (United Nations, 2012). Although all these processes are real 
and happening, very few countries have adopted online services and use them to engage 
their citizens in public debates. 
In Africa, South Africa was singled out as an example of e-governance in sub-Saharan 
Africa, while Nigeria held the second place in the West Africa region (UN-DESA, 2008). 
However, that region occupies the lowest rank when it comes to e-governance initiatives, 
which indicates that sub-Saharan African countries are not really engaging their citizens in 
democratic processes, even though they rank higher on e-readiness ratings (Funda, 2014) 
and, accordingly, prioritize their e-governance initiatives. This underlines the relevance of 
the present study as to the extent to which new media technologies may accelerate bottom-
up processes of political participation and civic engagement.
Heeks (2002) identified three aspects of e-governance that are of interest to digital 
democracy in Africa and in the world at large when it comes to promoting digital inclusivity. 
First, processes such as e-administration and e-service delivery of government activities 
need to be improved, which involves a transfer of power, authority, and resources for 
processes from their existing locus to new locations. Secondly, connecting citizens is key, 
whether we refer to citizens as voters and stakeholders from whom the African public sector 
should derive its legitimacy or as customers who consume public services (a perspective 
that brings into relief the issue of political consumerism, discussed previously). The third 
aspect concerns building external relations with the citizens. This means that e-governance 
allows citizens and government to be involved in open debates about public issues outside 
their official sites; and citizens can do that at their own convenience, at a time of their own 
choice. These three aspects are crucial for a country’s citizens, but many studies (Heeks, 
2002; Funda, 2014; Mattes & Richardson, 2015) did not really investigate whether and how 
citizens can be (more) in charge of government and political affairs by using digital devices 
such as mobile phones.
For e-governance to be a reality and to contribute positively to e-democracy and civic 
engagement, African leaders need to look at the potential of mobile phones and of social 
media such as Facebook and Twitter. With the advancement of digital media platforms and 
the proliferation of mobile phones, especially among young people in African countries 
(Misuraca, 2007; UN-DESA, 2008; Funda & Mbale, 2015), e-governance initiatives should 
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be geared towards mobile media. This would be the way to ensure that digital citizenship 
contributes to digital democracy in Africa as a whole.
In sub-Saharan Africa, Botswana is one of the developing countries that scored high 
on e-consultation, which is part of its e-governance strategy: Botswana ranks among the 
top 25 nations that employ interactive methods to solicit citizens’ opinions, feedback, and 
input, which comes in the form of online channels, information polls, bulletin boards, chat 
rooms and instant messaging, and weblogs; and there is also formal online consultation 
on interactive methods (see UN-DESA, 2008). Botswana is listed together with countries 
such as Cameroon, Congo, Ghana, Mauritania, and Mozambique. Namibia is not on that 
list. This is a big concern for researchers, though Namibia is reported to have a good 
policy on e-governance and most Namibian government agencies do have social media 
platforms. From the African countries that were listed, Mozambique is the only one that 
publishes citizens’ opinions among its findings or results; and these include e-opinions on 
websites (UN-DESA, 2008). African countries such as Kenya, Algeria, and Tunisia, which are 
top-ranking in terms of e-readiness level, are rated very low in terms of e-participation. The 
coexistence of these divergent aspects stresses the need for specific studies, which should 
examine how the rise of mobile media affects citizen participation and engagement both in 
the entire region and in specific areas – such as Namibia, investigated here (see UN-DESA, 
2008). 
Some studies reveal that the e-governance readiness level does not correspond to 
the level of citizens’ e-participation in politics and decision-making in different countries. 
There is an opportunity here for new media to influence political participation positively 
(Papacharissi, 2010), since the active participation of citizens can be realized through mobile 
Internet or mobile social media. However, the studies reviewed so far do not cover in any 
depth the role of new media in awakening and stimulating citizen engagement in regional 
and local politics; they only mention such a role and link it to e-governance initiatives in 
African countries (Heeks & Stanforth, 2007, Heeks, 2004; Misuraca, 2007; UN-DESA, 2008; 
Bellany & Taylor, 2003).
Interestingly, the Internet was used to communicate polling stations results in both 
South African Elections and the Namibian Elections in 2014 (Funda, 2014). This made 
citizens proud of using this system for the first time in the electoral processes. However, 
the questions of how citizens were engaged in the discussion of the elections results and 
whether their opinions were solicited after elections remained unanswered. Most of the 
studies conducted so far concentrate on the use of the Internet in elections but largely 
ignore the use of social networking platforms like Facebook or Twitter in the context of 
regional and local politics. This is another gap that this study seeks to fill. 
Theoretical Perspectives on the Role of Mobile Phones in Youth Political Integration | Chapter 2
27
2
2.7 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND NEW MEDIA 
2.7.1 Political Engagement in Africa
Conroy, Feezell, and Guerrero (2012) defined political engagement as a conventional form 
in which political knowledge and involvement manifest themselves among citizens in any 
country that promotes democracy. Political democracy entails the participation of citizens 
in activities at local and regional government levels, and this leads to the articulation of 
a participatory politics that strengthens effective e-governance service delivery. Much 
research conducted nowadays is dedicated to finding ways to replace the conventional 
methods of engaging citizens in political processes and decision-making at local levels. 
The outcomes suggest that digital civic participation is the main solution (Williamson, 2010; 
Scherer, 2016).
In Kenya, political debates on Twitter became heated in the lead-up to the 2013 
presidential elections, yet less than 5 per cent of Kenyans used Twitter (Kretchun, 2013). 
What is more, Brännström’s (2012) investigation of gender and other social discrepancies in 
accessibility to and use of ICTs in Kenya and Somalia found that the existing official statistics 
did not fully capture the distribution in the use of these new telecommunication systems 
by different social groups. Besides, we cannot claim that having access necessarily enhances 
engagement, or vice versa. On the contrary, in Somalia, for example, as the country 
recovered from civil war, the Internet became a means of promoting group political identity 
within the Somali diaspora, although it also served to amplify political and social divisions 
(Issa Salwe, 2006). 
Whereas most African ICT users appear to fall in the grey area between the groups 
that own ICT devices and groups that borrow them, or access to them, from friends and 
relatives as well as from group-access centres (Funda & Mbale, 2015; Heeks, 2002), there is 
a need for reintermediation models that insert a human intermediary between the citizen 
and the growing digital infrastructure of e-government. Democratic governance could 
be significantly improved through the open and equal deliberation between citizens, 
representatives, and policymakers that is afforded by the new ICTs (Loader & Mercea, 2011; 
Mattes & Richardson, 2015), regardless of the geographical location and socioeconomic 
status of these people.
2.7.2 Uses of New Media in African Politics
Early research on digital citizenship (Hoffman & Novak, 1998; National Telecommunications 
and Information Administration, 1995) examined closely the need for proper ICT 
infrastructures and for accessibility to ICTs facilities. This research revealed that access to 
such facilities does not automatically promote digital activism, though it lifts the digital 
divide between people. Van Deursen and Van Dijk (2014) examined the digital divide and 
the matter of participation and noted that, when citizens wish to engage in social issues that 
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affect their lives, they can use ICTs for this purpose either in their home countries or abroad. 
In Africa, Kenya had the highest number of Internet and mobile users in the sub-Saharan 
region by 2009 (Mpofu, 2011). But, in spite of this high record, it was found that political 
parties and leaders in this country failed to engage actively the electorate. Their relationship 
with the population is still a top-down one, in which discussion and exchanges with the 
citizens are not really on the agenda; leaders do not seek to draw their communities into 
debate to find out their views on various social issues. So Kenya does not seem to use the 
available technology effectively; and it is not the only country facing this challenge.
Certainly the spread of Internet and mobile telephony has led to the emergence of a 
new kind of citizen participation in many sub-Saharan countries: it has enabled citizens to 
form online communities and to meet in online forum groups. While this movement is less 
visible and its impact is more discreet in Africa than in Europe and the United States, vibrant 
online communities do exist in many countries and citizen journalists are increasingly 
using new media platforms such as blogs, SMS, social networks, microblogs, video-sharing 
platforms, and mapping to report and comment on a wide range of topics (Mutsvairo, 
Columbus, & Leijendekker, 2014). But the whole matter of evaluating the effect of ICTs in 
Africa is very complex. Associated with a reshaping of the public sphere, these devices are 
hailed as signalling the revival of bottom-up, participatory democracy in the West. However, 
the consequences of their use in African countries are less clear. The present study aims to 
bring some clarity on this front.
In African politics, democratic citizenship has been regarded for a long time as 
expressed through active attendance or embodied in the presence of citizens at political 
rallies, public meetings, conferences, and similar gatherings. But such forms of participation 
has been on the decline for some time now. Younger generations increasingly choose not 
to attend meetings in person any more, as they can participate in them digitally (Mattes & 
Richardson, 2015). Besides, young citizens claim that going to those meetings is a waste of 
time. They would rather stay at home and do some other constructive work, since they feel 
that such gatherings do not address issues that affect their lives. In these circumstances, 
political parties and political leadership have to rethink their way of engaging citizens in 
the democratic political processes as well as in public debate. In the same vein, regional 
and local authority councillors, too, are struggling to attract a large number participants at 
community meetings, and especially to ensure the presence of young people, but in most 
cases community meetings are attended only by elderly citizens (Lowndes, Pratchett, & 
Stoker, 2001). 
Wasserman and Garman (2014) conducted research on the meaning of citizenship, 
media use, and democracy in South Africa. They explored how South Africans use the social 
media to engage in public debate and how the active public sphere changed as a result of 
their activity. Young South Africans who were interviewed as part of the study appeared to 
be disengaged from politics and felt that the media do not speak to or connect with their 
Theoretical Perspectives on the Role of Mobile Phones in Youth Political Integration | Chapter 2
29
2
everyday lives. This sends a strong message to other political leaders in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) to find innovative and entertaining platforms, capable of 
engaging the youth in political decisions. Young people view the state, both at national and 
at local levels, as not prepared to listen to ideas, consider their experiences, or ponder on 
their conditions of life. Wasserman and Garman’s study dealt with media in general, and – 
unlike the present study – did not look specifically at the use of social media in regional and 
local governance politics. 
Wasserman and Garman concluded that the news media do not succeed in listening 
to the experiences of young South African citizens or in creating enough opportunities 
for them to make their voices heard and participate in policymaking. Thus the media 
contribute to the general sense of disengagement and powerlessness that these young 
people already experience in their relation to the state. However, younger generations 
do not display an amount of media use that is significantly greater than that of the older 
generations (Wasserman & Garman, 2014), nor are the young more active in legal, political, 
or community organizations. In fact, Mattes and Richardson’s (2015) findings suggest that 
the younger, post-apartheid African generation ‘is less committed to democracy than their 
parents or grandparents’ – which is different from what can be said about their respective 
usage of media. One of the questions this dissertation raises is whether this applies to 
Namibia and, if so, to what extent; and I will try to answer this by examining how young 
people get engaged in politics and democracy – and meaningfully engaged – with the help 
of mobile social media. 
It should be said, by way of general background, that on the African continent 
democracy was built around key institutions and processes such as the constitution, free 
media, and regular elections, which were meant to ensure the participation of citizens in 
democracy and that their voices are always heard.
2.8 NAMIBIA, NEW MEDIA, AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT
2.8.1 Demographical Overview
Situated in SADC, Namibia has a population of 2,113,077 according to the latest available 
census results, which date from 2011 (the census is carried out every 10 years). Out of this 
number, 1,091,165 people are female, while 1, 021,912 are male. Over 57 per cent of the 
population is made up of economically active citizens aged between 15 and 59 years, and 
23 per cent are aged between 5 and 14 years. More than half of the total number of citizens 
– 57 per cent – live in rural areas, while 43 per cent reside in urban areas. The country is 
divided into 14 political regions; Khomas, with a population of 342,141, is the most densely 
populated urban region; it is followed by the Ohangwena region, with 245,446 residents – 
the most densely populated rural region. The least populated region is Omaheke, which has 
71,233 inhabitants.
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Namibia gained its independence from the South African colonial regime on 21 March 
1990, after its first UN-supervised democratic elections, which were held in November 1989. 
The winner in these elections, with a two-third majority, was the SWAPO Party – that is, 
the South-West African People’s Organization – and its leader, Sam Nujoma, became the 
founding president of an independent Namibia and its first democratically elected chief of 
state. The presidential and national elections of 1989 were followed by regional and local 
authority elections, which were held for the first time in 1994, after the formulation and 
gazetting of the Regional Councils’ Act and Local Authorities Act in 1993. In both elections, 
conventional media such as television, radio, newspapers, and public rallies served as 
platforms of interaction with electorates. 
 The country is a multi-party democracy; it has 17 registered political parties that always 
take part in national elections at all levels – regional and local authority elections as well 
as presidential and National Assembly ones (ECN, 2015). By act of parliament, all these 
elections are held every five years. The last presidential and National Assembly elections 
were held in November 2014 and, again, the SWAPO Party won with a two-third majority. Its 
candidate, Dr Hage G. Geingob, is the current president of Namibia. The latest regional and 
local authority elections took place in November 2015. 
The SWAPO, which is the ruling party, is also a dominant party in Namibia. Next after it 
in popularity and importance come the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) of Namibia, the 
Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP), the Congress of Democrats (COD), and the National 
Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO). Other parties are not that popular but take part in 
elections, and some of them win a few seats in parliament or at local government level. Here 
is a comprehensive list of them: 
 ∙ the All People’s Party (APP); 
 ∙ the Christian Democratic Voice Party (CDV); 
 ∙ the Democratic Party of Namibia (DPN); 
 ∙ the Monitor Action Group (MAG); 
 ∙ the Namibia Economic Freedom Fighters (NEFF); 
 ∙ the National Democratic Party of Namibia (NDP);
 ∙ the National Unity Democratic Organization of Namibia (NUDO); 
 ∙ the Republican Party of Namibia (RP); 
 ∙ the South West Africa National Union of Namibia (SWANU); 
 ∙ the United Democratic Front of Namibia (UDF); 
 ∙ the United People’s Movement (UPM); 
 ∙ the Workers’ Revolutionary Party (WRP) (Republic of Namibia, 1990, 2004).
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2.8.2 The Postcolonial Legacy and the Media
After independence, Namibian citizens were granted constitutional rights and freedoms 
that they then started to exercise – in particular freedom of speech and the right to belong 
to a political party of their own choice, as stated in the national constitution (Republic of 
Namibia, 1990, 2004). The media are regulated under the Broadcasting Act 9 of 1991 and the 
Communication Commission Act 4 of 1992. The Namibian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC), 
Namibia’s public broadcaster, is a state-funded institution and New Era Newspaper is a state 
newspaper. There have been, and are, many other newspapers and media houses, but the 
most popular newspaper in the country is The Namibian. For many years, this newspaper 
made it its business to bring into the open and expose facts that politicians did not want 
the public to know. For this reason it was criticized by politicians from the ruling party, and 
in the end the government forbade the newspaper to advertise government tenders and 
vacancies for quite some time. This was an infringement of citizens’ freedoms. 
Table 2.1 presents a few results from the national census taken in 2011 (NSA, 2014). As 
mentioned already, this is a government exercise carried out every 10 years and mainly 
designed to keep planners and policymakers abreast of major statistical developments in 
the country. One of the main elements of the census is the socioeconomic status of the 
Namibian citizens. The table shows that the majority of Namibians (69 per cent) have access 
to radio, which is slightly higher (74 per cent) in urban areas. Mobile (or cell) phones are 
much more widespread across the country than landline telephones and access to them 
is about eight times greater than access to telephones. However, access to other ICTs, for 
instance computers and the Internet, was fairly limited, particularly in rural areas.
The census report is not clear about distribution by specific age groups, with the result 
that we cannot tell how many young people have access to social media platforms. However, 
mobile phones appear to be on the increase in Namibia. This prompts an important question: 
Are digital political participation and civic engagement becoming a reality in Namibia with 
the arrival of mobile phones?
Table 2.1 Percentages of the population aged 3+ with access to ICTs in 2011 (by type of service and geographic area)
Type of ICT service Namibia Urban Rural
Radio 68.6 74.0 64.5
TV 36.7 67.1 13.8
Computer 10.5 21.2 2.5
Cell phone 52.6 68.6 40.6
Telephone (fixed) 6.4 12.2 2.0
Newspaper (daily) 8.9 18.2 1.9
Newspaper (weekly) 16.2 26.5 8.5
Internet (daily) 5.4 10.7 1.4
Internet (weekly) 3.4 6.3 1.1
Source: NSA, 2014: 47.
Chapter 2 | Theoretical Perspectives on the Role of Mobile Phones in Youth Political Integration
32
2.8.3 Political Parties and Social Media
Judging from the reviewed literature, all the political parties that participated in the 2014 
elections also campaigned vigorously through new media to sell their political manifestos 
and responded actively to the comments or questions they received from the public. This is 
true of the SWAPO of Namibia, the DTA of Namibia, the NUDO, the RDP, and other minority 
parties (Republic of Namibia, 2014; see also the list of political parties and their social media 
presence in Table 2.2). In 2014 the SWAPO Party still dominated in terms of numbers of 
members. And, for the first time in the Republic of Namibia, the national elections were 
conducted through an electronic voting system.
Table 2.2 reveals presence on social media on the part of some of the political parties of 
Namibia. The number of members and likes on these pages has increased quite significantly 
since 2014. This shows that a ‘digital politics’ is possible in Namibia if we empower citizens 
to become digital citizens and digital political consumers.
Table 2.2 Online presence of Namibia’s political parties
Party Website Social Media Presence
Swapo www.swapoparty.org
www.spyl.com.na
Facebook: Swapo Namibia (4,997 friends); 
SYL* (14,539 members)
Twitter: @SPYL-Namibia (422 followers)  
@ SWAPO Party (93 followers)
Rally for Democracy and 
Progress (RDP)
www.rdp.org.na Facebook: RDP Namibia (3,996 friends) 
(478 likes) Twitter: @RDPNamibia  
(30 followers)
Democratic Turnhalle 
Alliance (DTA), renamed 
Poplar Democratic Movement 
(PDM) on 4 November 2017
no website Facebook: DTA of Namibia, 
also renamed Popular 
Democratic Movement (PDM) on  
4 November 2017 (42 likes, now 5,041; 
5,155 follwers as of 17 June 2019);  
DTA (PDM) Youth League (33 members, 
now 356 members as of 17 June 2019) 
Twitter: @dtaofnamibia (11 followers)
United Democratic Front 
(UDF)
no website No Facebook or Twitter presence
National Unity Democratic 
Organisation (NUDO)
www.nudoofnamibia.org Facebook: NUDO of Namibia (276 likes) 
NUDO Youth League (113 likes)
All Peaple’s Party (APP) www.app.org.na no Facebook or Twitter presence
Congress of Democrats (CoD) no website Facebook: Congress of Democrats  
(104 members)
Republican Party (RP) no website no Facebook or Twitter presence
Swanu www.swanu.org.na Facebook: Swanu of Namibia (137 likes) 
Twitter: @SWANU_Namibia (2 followers)
Note:  There are two apparent SWAPO Party Youth League pages on Facebook. The one headed SWAPO Youth League 
appears to have official backing. Sites were reviewed in April 2014.
Source: IPPR, 2014: 3.
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Although Namibia gained its independence from the colonial regime as far back as in 
1990, one can claim that there is still little genuine freedom in the public sphere in this 
country. This space is heavily dominated by the ruling party in the form of SWAPO policy 
documents and SWAPO coverage of news, for example, and suffers from biased reporting, 
since most of the managers and leaders of public media houses are SWAPO Party members. 
The then minister of ICT made exactly this point at the time (Kaapanda, 2012: 24); and media 
guru Gwen Lister concurred by observing that, if ‘at least 80% of our people want to see 
what government is doing’, this shouldn’t be taken to mean they want to be spoon-fed 
a selective ‘truth’ via government public relations agencies; they would much rather have 
access to incisive and independent reporting about the affairs of state and their real impact 
on the national development agenda. This is a clear message that we have to identify new 
platforms, which citizens can use to discuss public issues freely (Lister, 2015; Namibia, 2008; 
Keulder et al., 2010).
Judging from Lister’s (2015) article, most of the youths who are actively engaged in 
political and public debates are members of the SWAPO Party; only a few signed up to 
minority parties such as the NUDO, the RDP, and the DTA. Those who disagree with SWAPO 
Party leaders are disciplined and suspended, in accordance with the party’s statute (Namibia, 
2008; Keulder et al., 2010). 
It should also be mentioned that there is an observed tendency for political parties’ 
posts to go viral on social media a few months before the elections. However, as a Namibian 
citizen and youth, I had plenty of opportunity to notice that the presence of political parties, 
or even of their leaders, on social media after elections is not that high. What remains to be 
seen is whether citizens, regardless of their socioeconomic status, political affiliation, and 
technological limitations, participate in online discussions at regional and local governance 
level in spite of the constraints of a political environment so tightly controlled by the ruling 
party.
2.9 NAMIBIAN YOUNG CITIZENS AND SOCIAL MEDIA 
Only a little more than 10 percent of Namibia’s population of 2.1 million people is on 
Facebook; and a large part of this percentage consists of 18–35-year-olds. Many Namibian 
political parties have websites (see Table 2.2) and a social media presence on Facebook. Few 
have a social media presence beyond Facebook (Namibia, 2004, 2008; Peters, Winschiers-
Theophilus, & Menecke, 2015). The numbers of ‘likes’ and of members have been increasing 
significantly in recent years see also Figure 2.1).
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According to Peters et al. (2015: 2),
 Namibia’s 2.1 million strong population has a median age of 21 years old; and the 
provisional voter registration results released by the ECN in mid-March 2014 shows 
that 44 per cent of registered voters are Millennials – that is, young people between 
the ages of 18 and 32. With such a large youth vote, indeed, political players should 
be appealing to the audience that could have the greatest say and sway in the 
election outcome.
The fact that political parties and candidates have an online presence, for example through 
a website, and communicate on social media such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram 
allows us to get some insights into how they interact, how they engage and discuss policy 
issues with their electorates, how they respond to questions and criticism in a public space, 
and whether they are moving with the times or not – for example, whether they keep the 
pace with changing trends in digital media technology.
2.9.1 Namibia Facebook Users Statistics 
Figure 2.2 shows the number of Facebook users in Namibia as of 20 June 2015. According 
to this figure, 91.5 per cent of these users were above the age of 18 and the dominant age 
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Figure 2.1  Namibian population: Internet and social media profile 
SOURCE: IPPR, 2015a: 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.9.1 Namibia Facebook Users Statistics  
Figure 2.2 shows the number of Facebook users in Namibia as of 20 June 2015. According to 
this figure, 91.5 per ent of these users were above the age of 18 and the dominant age group 
was 18–24. So much for age. As for gender, 50.1 per cent of users were male while 49.9 were 
female. 
Source: IPPR, 2015a: 4.
Figure 2.1 Namibian population: Internet and social media profile
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group was 18–24. So much for age. As for gender, 50.1 per cent of users were male while 49.9 
were female.
In their research on cultural influences on Facebook users in Namibia, Peters et al. (2015: 
25) found that, 
 in general, Namibian participants indicated that they felt like they had more 
freedom on Facebook to openly express opinions, speak their mind, and use like 
buttons to agree with controversial political topics. Many Namibian participants 
indicated that they discussed controversial government decisions or proclamations 
intensively on Facebook and that this was an extension of their level of comfort 
with discussing such topics openly in the real world. 
This shows that, if the young are active and political leaders develop a good, mutual and 
responsive relationship with them, digital citizen engagement can become a reality. And 
here I should point out that, during the time of writing this dissertation, there was no other 
research on the topic of young people’s participation in politics through mobile phones. 
This is the first study to explore the issue.
Source: All in 1 Social, 20 June 2015.
Figure 2.2 Statistics of Facebook users in Namibia during the months of April, May, and June 2015
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2.10 CONCLUSION
Various studies have been conducted on topics related to the one investigated in this 
thesis – topics such as political engagement, youth activism, social media and youth, digital 
citizenship and e-governance, and political consumerism. Most of these studies either look 
at the general population or infrastructure development or are based on western countries. 
I believe that a specific study on Namibian youth and its use of one type of device can 
contribute to a much clearer understanding of how the implementation of e-governance 
policies in various countries and the proliferation of mobile phones can affect the type and 
level of citizen engagement in regional and local governance politics.
The next chapter focuses on the methods I used to collect, analyse, and interpret the 
data for this dissertation.
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter explains how I conducted my research. It does so by presenting an outline of 
the research design itself and of the methods I used. I begin by discussing the qualitative 
research design together with my chosen strategy of inquiry. Next I describe the larger 
context to which the present study belongs, in order to anchor my methodological approach 
in a wider worldview and make its significance clearer. The chapter ends by presenting the 
tools I used for conducting the semi-structured interviews, the focus group discussions I 
organized, and the guidelines I followed in developing my questions.
3.2 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN AND EXPLORATORY STRATEGY
Qualitative research is primarily concerned with subjective stories and accounts; these 
encompass the understandings, feelings, opinions, values, and beliefs of the people and 
communities that are part of the study. Qualitative approaches gather and work with 
data that are constructed by the research participants and subsequently interpreted and 
structured by the researcher, as part of the analytical process (Jenkins, Bloor, Fischer, Berney, 
& Neale, 2010; Welman & Kruger, 2001). Qualitative researchers use open, exploratory 
research questions and place great emphasis on understanding the phenomena in their 
own right. They use special strategies for enhancing the credibility of the research design 
and data analysis (Maree, 2016).
As already stated and explained in the Introduction, the main aim of this study is to 
answer one broad question: How do young people in rural Namibia engage in politics 
through mobile phones? It also formulates three subordinate research questions, the 
answers to which will lead to this aim. All three questions are related to the specific medium 
under research – the mobile phone; they concern the kinds or people who participate in local 
politics through mobile phones and what motivates them; the nature of this participation, 
especially where young people are involved; and the extent and kinds of connection with 
the government and other stakeholders that these people can make through the use of 
mobile phones. The methods I chose were dictated by the goal of answering these and 
related questions in the best possible way.
My study was exploratory in nature insofar as it tried to discover what participants 
thought and felt about the research topic and, more generally, to gain insight into the 
everyday life experiences of young people. Maree (2016) stated that exploratory qualitative 
research tends to be primarily inductive, as it begins with specific observations from which 
patterns and regularities are detected that enable us to formulate some tentative hypotheses; 
then, if we explore these hypotheses, we may come to develop some general theory on 
their basis. This type of research tends to work with emerging theoretical frameworks rather 
than with established theories or sets of hypotheses deduced from existent theories.
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But the most important feature of exploratory research is that it is more common in 
areas where research is scant or the researcher is trying a new angle or perspective on the 
topic (Maree, 2016). According to Shank (2006), exploration is necessary when the research 
community as a whole lacks a clear picture of what is going on. In the same spirit, Maree 
(2016) observes that researchers ‘explore’ when they have little or no knowledge about a 
phenomenon, group, process, activity, or situation. This suits the context of my research very 
well. We know that very numerous studies of political participation, political engagement, 
mobile phones, social media, and the youth were conducted in Africa and in the global 
North; but very little is known about how young Namibians engage in regional and local 
politics through their mobile phones – and, as I have already argued, it is imperative to 
find out more about these activities, about how youths and their regional councillors 
interconnect, and so on. Hence an exploratory study on this topic recommended itself.
I employed, then, an exploratory qualitative research design in order to inquire into 
a set of attitudes, opinions, and feelings entertained by young citizens aged between 18 
and 35 years towards what constitutes my major theme – how they use mobile phones as 
a tool for engagement in the political processes for effective public service delivery in the 
Ohangwena region – as well as into their corresponding experiences in this area. 
Mobile phone subscriptions in Ohangwena have been increasing in the past few years. 
In 2011, out of the 43,723 households registered in the region, 23,247 (53.1 per cent) owned 
a mobile phone; this was already a good indicator of mobile acquisition. As for rural areas 
in the region, which counted 37,404 households, 51 per cent of these – that is, a number of 
19,263 households – owned a mobile phone, according to the census report for the same 
year (NSA, 2014). But some constituencies ranked rather low: in Omundaungilo, for example, 
only 370 (32 per cent) out of a total 1,169 households reported to own a mobile phone in 
2011 (NSA, 2014). Currently mobile phone access in the Ohangwena region as a whole has 
reached the much higher rate of penetration of 70 percent (NSA, 2014).
In these circumstances, I selected for my research and analysis seven Facebook pages 
and two WhatsApp groups. The Facebook pages relate to the following bodies: 
 ∙ the Okongo Youth Club;
 ∙ the Ondobe Youth Forum; 
 ∙ the Ohangwena Regional Youth Forum (this is an umbrella organization that covers 
all youths in the region);
 ∙ the Omulonga Constituency Youth Forum;
 ∙ the Omundaungilo Youth Group;
 ∙ the Okongo Deltas Youth Trust; and
 ∙ the Oshikunde Constituency Youth Forum. 
The WhatsApp groups relate to the two constituencies of Oshikango and Ohangwena. 
This material was selected because the protagonists involved had high participation rates 
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and carried active discussions on various issues. I requested the administrators to add 
me to their respective groups and organizations, so I could observe both facts related to 
the participation rate and the discussions themselves. My role as a researcher was clearly 
explained to group members; I was introduced to them as a doctoral student and a fellow 
young citizen in search of solutions to the problem of political youth engagement in the 
region. I personally participated in various discussions on these platforms.
Next, in order to establish how participants in my study ‘make meaning’ or draw 
meaning from a specific phenomenon, I followed an interpretive approach based on themes 
and codes drawn from ethnographic data. I did so by analysing their perceptions (Creswell, 
2014), attitudes, understandings, knowledge values, feelings, and experiences, in an 
attempt to approximate their own construction of the phenomenon of interest. According 
to Godhard and Melville (2001: 34), qualitative research requires ‘a commitment from the 
researcher to see the world through the eyes of the author, other person or the subject’. 
Both Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2003: 234) and Cooper and Schindler (1998: 234) posit 
that a qualitative researcher interprets the data by giving them meanings, by ‘translating’ or 
making them understandable, and that this is what makes them relevant to the topic under 
study. In drawing my own methodology, I took all these views on board. When analysing 
descriptions of the participants’ political engagement through mobile devices, I came to see 
that participants had different manners of using such devices; so I took a thematic analysis 
approach to explore these different kinds of engagement and to identify major patterns that 
characterize the relationship between online and offline political participation. Thematic 
analysis was chosen because of its appropriateness for identifying, analysing, and reporting 
patterns that capture salient distinctions in a dataset (see Braun & Clarke, 2006).
3.3 DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS
In order to understand exactly how young Namibian citizens engage in regional and local 
politics by using their mobile phones, I also employed a number of qualitative research 
methods in collecting the material, in analysing the data, and in interpreting my findings. 
The data for this study were collected using participant observations of regional youth forum 
(RYF) meetings, semi-structured interviews with selected members of RYFs, focus group 
discussions with selected members of RYFs, and semi-structured interviews with selected 
regional councillors from the Ohangwena region. The minutes of the RYFs’ meetings and 
the analysis of the two WhatsApp groups generated rich data for this study. Additional data 
were collected through photographic documentation about the participants’ cell phones, 
more specifically the type of mobile phones they owned and the applications they installed 
on them; and I also enquired into the reasons why they had chosen those applications. But 
first I asked for their permission to take pictures of their phones, once they indicated during 
the interviews that they own a mobile phone.
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I also conducted a qualitative content analysis of the constituency youth forum (CYF) 
Facebook pages of seven selected constituencies, as well as of the Ohangwena RYF 
Facebook page. The data collected by quantitative methods were qualitatively interpreted 
using thematic analysis, which relates closely to the inductive analysis design. Thematic 
analysis is a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns or themes within a 
corpus of data or dataset. Minimally, it organizes and describes one’s dataset in rich detail. 
However, it often goes beyond this level and interprets various aspects of the research topic 
– in this case, mobile phone use for political participation. A theme captures something 
important about the data in relation to the research question and represents it as some 
level of patterned response or meaning within the dataset. In an inductive approach of this 
sort, the finds – that is, the themes identified – are strongly linked to the data themselves 
(Patton, 1990), which is why this form of thematic analysis is akin to grounded theory. 
With this method, if the data have been collected specifically for the research (e.g., via an 
interview or a focus group), the themes identified may bear little relation to the specific 
questions that were asked of the participants. Nor would they be driven by the researcher’s 
theoretical interest in the area or topic. Inductive analysis is therefore a process of coding 
the data without trying to fit it into a preexisting frame or into the researcher’s analytic 
preconceptions or preferences. To sum up, thematic analysis involves performing searches 
across a dataset – be that a series of interviews, focus groups, or texts – to find repeated 
patterns of meaning. A compendious discussion of each tool will be found in the sections 
that follow.
3.3.1 Ethnographic Participant Observation
The oldest formal type of participatory fieldwork is ethnography (Hammersley & Atkinson, 
2007). In this type of study, the researcher participates over a longer period of time in the 
lives of the people he or she is studying, in an attempt to see the world from their cultural 
perspectives and to understand the meanings embodied their rituals, cultural artefacts, 
and activities. According to Van Maanen (2011: 220, ‘ethnographical research requires the 
researcher to spend time (sometimes a number of years) immersed within the research 
context, seeing and hearing the data at first hand’. Maree (2016) explained that ethnography 
is concerned with understanding and describing meaning in social life. It involves recording 
social behaviours in as much detail as possible, to capture their complexity. Ethnographers 
try to discover and interpret what is significant about social practices. As a research 
instrument, the researcher stands at the centre of this process by recording and interpreting 
what people say, what they do, and what artefacts they create or leave behind. In this 
type of research the meaning of a message is assumed to be reflected in various modes 
of information exchange, format, rhythm, and style, as well as in context, time, space, and 
other features (Maree, 2016). However, the disadvantage is that researchers may become 
so emotionally involved as to lose the ability to assess the situation accurately (Ellis & Levy, 
2010).
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To begin answering questions concerning how young people engage in political 
discussion, both online and offline, my first methodological port of call in this dissertation 
has been ethnographic fieldwork, in the form of participant observation of RYF meetings in 
the Ohangwena region. Spradley (2016) defined observation as the act of watching social 
phenomena in the real world and recording events as they happened. In social science 
research, observation is divided into participant and simple. Participant observation 
originated in social anthropology and was subsequently used by ethnographers; in recent 
years it has spread more widely, being adopted in social science and new media research 
(Blanche, Durrheim, & Painter, 2006). Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) proposed three main 
reasons for using participant observation in a research study: first, researchers are less likely 
to try to impose their own social reality and interpretations on the social world they are 
studying; second, this method sometimes gives them access to areas that could not be 
studied in normal circumstances; and, third, it can help them to understand very specific 
matters, such as why specific practices occur and how they originate and change over time.
I spent seven months in the field, between March and September 2016, collecting 
relevant data from youths in the Ohangwena region who were members of the RYF or the 
CYF using participant observation as a data collection instrument. In this way I became 
immersed in the everyday life experiences of the people I studied. The advantage of doing 
this is that I gained insights about these people and their behaviours that could not have 
been obtained in any other way. I participated actively in local political discussions online, via 
Facebook and WhatsApp platforms, since I am from the same region. My observations were 
focused on these youths’ discussion of how they used their mobile phones to participate in 
regional and local political activities. As a preliminary, I contacted the chief regional officer 
(CRO) in the Ohangwena Regional Council and obtained permission to conduct research in 
the region. The CRO informed the regional councillors and the RYF chair about my presence 
in the region (see Appendix A).
I have attended a total of six meetings, held at the Eenhana Youth Center (in the Eenhana 
Constituency) and at various locations in the constituencies of Ondobe, Omundaungilo, 
Oshikango (Edundja), and Oshikunde the regular venue was a boardroom in each 
constituency. All participants were actively involved in discussion and debate. The duration 
of a meeting ranged between one hour and three hours, depending on the agenda. The 
participants, who represented their constituencies, were a mixture of men and women. 
Their number per meeting ranged from 8 to 16. 
In that setting, I took a role that allowed me to be a participant observer in the context 
of my research, in other words to be a researcher as well as a participant (for this type of 
participation, see Jenkins et al., 2010). I kept a reflective diary and my reflections became 
part of the data that I worked with. I made descriptive notes about what was happening at 
the meetings I attended. The aim was to investigate how the members of this RYF engage 
in offline and online political discussions and to explore the nature of engagement, the 
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activities it involved, and so on. As stated by Blanche et al. (2006), ethnographical studies 
tend to take a long time. However, it is possible to design a shorter study, which focuses for 
a period of weeks rather than years on an organization or group of which the researcher is 
already a member. My fieldwork was of middling duration; it extend over a period of seven 
months, from March to September 2016. This was possible only because I am a native of the 
region where I collected my data.
Participant observation was carried out during six RYF meetings and during other 
events organized by the RYF in the Ohangwena region. The aim was for me to get a sense 
of these youngsters’ access to traditional and mobile media, of their general interests 
and motives for using all these media, and of any affordances and accessibility issues that 
hampered the specific use of these media for effective participatory democracy. I observed 
both public spaces such as constituency offices, households, roads, shops, petrol stations, 
and crossroads and communal spaces such as villages, for the purpose of creating a record 
of traditional and mobile media usage in the everyday life of the region, and I gathered 
much valuable knowledge in the process. Some participants emerged as key informants 
and guides, providing further insight into, and ideas about, the daily use of media in the 
region.
To ensure validity in the collected data, I only collected what needed to be collected. 
Although participant observation is time-consuming and very complex, I ensured that the 
data collected were sound and reliable by interviewing as many participants from different 
backgrounds as I could, until their stories started repeating. All meetings’ discussions 
were audio-recorded by the research assistant. This measure was intended to facilitate the 
development of proper transcripts that could be used during the stages of analysis and 
interpretation.
3.3.2 Semi-Structured Interviews
Interviewing creates an opportunity for direct interaction between the researcher and the 
research participants; for this reason it is one of the main data collection methods in the 
arsenal of social science researchers. Used as a data collection method, interviews can differ 
according to various criteria, for example in terms of the degree of standardization within 
and between interviews (Creswell, 2014).
The present dissertation used semi-structured interviews with selected RYF 
representatives, other stakeholders that dealt with youth programs, and regional councillors 
in the Ohangwena region. This distribution reflects the intention to make sure that my data 
come from a variety of research settings. Semi-structured interviews are most typically 
associated with the collection of qualitative social material when the researcher is interested 
in people’s experiences, behaviour, and understandings and in how these categories are 
formed, or why the participants experience and understand the social world in this way 
and behave as they do (Blanche et al, 2006). I was int.erested in both the content of the 
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interview conversations and the way participants expressed themselves, especially the 
specific language and words they used.
Between March and September 2016 I interviewed 65 young citizens (45 male and 20 
female) aged between 18 and 35 years. All of them were members of the youth forum. My 
aim was to find out how these young people engage in regional and local politics by using 
their electronic devices, what motivates them, and more generally what is the nature of 
their participation in politics. Using semi-structured interviews with them as part of my 
study gave me the advantage of being able to talk to them about how they managed their 
personal life (Creswell, 2014) and enabled me, as the interviewer, to exercise sensitivity to 
their needs when the conversation veered towards potentially distressing subjects. 
Most youngsters, namely 50 of them (35 male, 15 female) had smart phones with 
Internet access, while a few had simple phones that could be used only for calling and 
messaging. This figure is very high, despite the fact that the majority of people in rural areas 
were unemployed and had limited sources of income, as well as poor network connectivity. 
It is worth listing here some of the more popular brands: Samsung Galaxy Young, Samsung 
Galaxy Core Prime, Samsung Duos, Samsung GTS6312, Huawei y360, Samsung Galaxy Star, 
Huawei Lite, Sony Expedia, Ztecs and Xiaomi 4. Such phones are mainly available from 
businesses, retail companies, and multinational chain stores such as Pep, Dunnes Stores, 
Shoprite, Tusk Mobile & Electronics, Jet, and various Chinese and Indian shops (e.g. Sanzi or 
Shop 10 in Oshikango Plaza; Ezzy or Shop 4 in the Nandan Complex). In Namibian dollars 
(NAD), prices vary between N$200 and N$500 for a brand new phone, but a second-hand 
one can be cheaper.
I further interviewed six regional councillors, which is exactly a half of their group; there 
are 12 of them. Regional councillors had a busy schedule and hence not all of them found 
the time to take part in the research, as I had planned. Most of the interviews with councillors 
took place in their offices; occasionally we used my car, moving alongside the road as they 
were heading to meetings in other constituencies. The interviews took anything between 
25 and 45 minutes, depending on what was discussed. They were all audio-recorded by a 
research assistant, while I was taking notes in the reflective diary. I wanted to find out how 
the councillors connect or communicate with the young people in their constituencies. All 
councillors had smartphones.
I designed an interview guide (see Appendix C and Appendix E) intended to help me 
to conduct the semi-structured interviews. Unlike a questionnaire, an interview guide is not 
simply a list of questions to be worked through (Jenkins et al., 2010); it acts as an agenda for 
the interview and has additional notes and features that should aid the researcher. Semi-
structured interviews present some disadvantages: data gathering is time-consuming, large 
amounts of raw data may be generated, and participants may focus on issues that are not of 
interest to the researcher (Blanche et al., 2006). However, I tried to counteract these features, 
for example by collecting as many relevant data as possible, for quality interpretation. 
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On the positive side, the use of semi-structured interviews further allows the interviewer 
some latitude in how the questions are asked and in what order, while all interviewees are 
still asked the same set of basic questions (Shank, 2006). I prepared a list of eight critical 
questions (see Appendix C), and the most important one was always asked at the start of the 
interview. The remaining questions were used as a checklist. 
I list here some of the questions that were put to regional councillors (see Appendix E). 
Could you share with me the level of your participation in community issues? How do you 
connect or communicate with them? How do you respond to political protests to proposals 
that you are advocating on social issues, if you were involved in any? Supposing you have a 
few minutes to talk to young people about the use of mobile phones as a tool for engaging 
in regional and local politics, what would you say to them? What are the socioeconomic and 
political challenges your region is facing if you initiate political discussions with the youth? 
What strategies do you think need to be developed to overcome these challenges? Do you 
think that mobile phones play a key role in facilitating the interactive relationship between 
citizens (the youth) and political representatives? If so, how?
Interviews with young citizens were held in various constituency boardrooms – except 
at Ondobe, where they were conducted in the building of Ehafo Supermarket, as I obtained 
permission from the shop manager to use a small office inside the shop. The duration of 
an interview varied between a minimum of 20 minutes and a maximum of 30 minutes. 
Participants were recruited through a referral procedure whereby the researcher asks the 
forum’s chairperson to invite active members to come and attend the interviews, after 
having circulated information among them. I explained the main purpose of the interview 
to the chairperson; then the chairperson explained it to members, before they turned 
up for the interview. I also asked the chairperson to invite all the members of the forum. 
I interviewed at least four or five participants a day. Each one received a cool drink and a 
biscuit at the end of the interview. Participants were told to wait outside, as they had to 
come in one by one. When they indicated that they had Facebook accounts, I asked if I may 
invite them as friends and follow their discussions on the platform for two months. They all 
granted me permission to do so.
Here is a selective list of the questions I addressed to young people (see Appendix C): Tell 
me, do you find mobile phones useful for communicating with and connecting to your fellow 
young people? In your opinion, as a young citizen in this region, do you think that the mobile 
phone can motivate you to communicate, interact, and share information with government 
officials and other senior officials in the region? What defines political participation for you, 
both offline and online? Do you think there is a difference in political participation between 
young citizens and adults who were involved in the liberation struggle?1 Do you think that 
other fellow young citizens in the constituency have participated?
1 The latter are those who participated in the struggle for independence of Namibia, both inside and outside the country. 
Namibia became an independent state in March 1990.
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All semi-structured interviews were recorded and transcribed. Where recording was not 
possible, field notes were taken during the interview and then fully written down as soon 
as possible after the interview. All the interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. 
Most of the interviews, meetings, and events were in Oshiwambo2 and were subsequently 
translated in English.
3.3.3 Qualitative Facebook, Mobile Phone, and WhatsApp Pages Content Analysis
Qualitative content data analysis is defined as a research method for the subjective 
interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of 
coding and identifying themes or patterns (Maree, 2016; Creswell, 2014; Badenhorst, McLeod, 
& Joy, 2012). This is supported by Tracy (2012) who explains that content analysis is typically 
performed on various forms of human communication, expressed for example in books, 
newspapers, films, television, art, music, videotapes of human interactions, transcripts of 
conversations, and Internet blog and bulletin board entries. Content analysis has previously 
been shown to be an effective and suitable methodology in the study of Internet-based 
content, including that of political websites and blogs (Trammell & Keshelashvili, 2005). It 
goes beyond merely counting words or extracting objective content from texts in order 
to examine meanings, themes, and patterns that may be manifest or latent in a particular 
text; it allows researchers to understand social reality in a subjective but scientific manner. 
Zhang and Wildemuth (n.d.) contended that qualitative content analysis usually produces 
descriptions or typologies, along with expressions from subjects that reflect how they view 
the social world. It uses inductive reasoning, whereby themes and categories emerge from 
the data through the researcher’s careful examination and constant comparison.
In Namibia, the Mobile Telecommunication Company (MTC) sells recharge vouchers 
with pre-loaded data bundles for Facebook, WhatsApp, and Internet connectivity. This 
means that, if a someone who has a smart phone buys a N$5.00 voucher, that person will 
have free data bundles for Facebook, WhatsApp, and Internet connectivity; and, as already 
mentioned, 50 out of the 65 young people who participated in this study had smartphones. 
Additionally, MTC is running a free hour promotional campaign for Internet usage from 
midnight on. Many young people make use of this opportunity to connect and communicate 
with their friends during this hour. The Facebook application is freely downloadable from 
the Internet. But other helpful Facebook applications, such as Facebook Free Basics, are not 
available in Namibia, hence Namibian users cannot access them from any of their mobile 
phones.
2 Oshiwambo is a language spoken in the Northern Namibia. It is made up of several dialects. In Ohangwena, most people 
speak Oshikwanyama, since they fall under the Oukwanyama Traditional Authority. A ‘traditional authority’ is a type 
of authority where the traditional rights of a dominant individual or group are accepted, or at least not challenged, by 
subordinate individuals (Ritzer 2011: 132). There are 51 recognized traditional authorities in Namibia, and the Oukwanyama 
Traditional Authority (OTA) is one of them. People under this authority speak the same language, which is known as 
Oshikwanyama. 
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This study followed an inductive conventional qualitative content analysis approach, in 
which the coding categories are derived directly and inductively from the raw data. Here is 
how I proceeded.
During semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions, I asked a few selected 
young citizens with smart phones and regional councillors to allow me to access their 
Facebook pages and WhatsApp groups. Once they gave me permission, I sent them a 
‘friend request’ and they added me to their groups through these groups’ administrators. I 
followed these pages from March to the end of September 2016; and I recorded all the issues 
discussed that pertained to my research topic. Additionally, I obtained permission to access 
the Ohangwena RYF page, which I followed over the same period. All in all, I participated in 
discussions carried out on the Facebook pages of the seven groups already listed in section 
3.2 – the Oshikunde Constituency, the Ohangwena RYF, the Okongo Youth Club, the Ondobe 
Youth Forum, the Omundaungilo RYF, the Okongo Deltas Youth Trust, and the Omulonga 
CYF; and I also participated in WhatsApp groups in the region, especially those that were 
targeting the young people under the RYF – namely those of the Oshikango Constituency 
Youth Forum and of the Ohangwena RYF.
The population for this part of my research consisted in the Facebook pages of the 
forums and in the two WhatsApp groups. The unit of analysis was the number of times a 
word would appear in a sentence.
The ethnographic analysis was also enriched with a qualitative content and textual 
analysis of online discussions. It is important to note that there is a certain dynamic around 
membership of Facebook pages and WhatsApp groups, in that members are more likely to 
be supporters of one political party or organization. This means that there is a good chance 
that they are already positively inclined towards the party or organization in question, and 
this may affect comments accordingly. During the period of this research, I identified more 
than 20,000 comments and statuses with around 18,000 likes and 98 videos that were shared 
from these pages and groups. Every status update provided by each member was scraped 
using the netvizz software system, along with every comment made on these pages by any 
Facebook or WhatsApp friend or member. Once texts were scraped, they were exported to 
a database and entered into the text-based sentiment software, WordStat. This program 
made it possible for me to track the most common keywords, terms, and phrases. After 
that, I used ATLAS-ti software to code the data. I also prepared an inductive analysis of the 
data: the main purpose of this operation was to allow themes to emerge from a constant 
comparison (Boeije 2002; Maree, 2016) of the dominant or significant themes inherent in 
the raw data, without the restraints imposed by a more structured, theoretical orientation 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Each interview, Facebook, and WhatsApp group Word document 
was repeatedly compared with other groups or page documents, to show whether other 
themes emerged, until all themes were exhausted (at least to my knowledge). To protect 
the identity of participants, I changed all their names and those of the constituencies they 
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represented. Where constituency names are mentioned, their occurrence reflects the 
researcher’s observation or is based on census results. A note here is in place: since the 
census is made once per decade and the last one took place in 2011, the general statistics 
reported here are those of that year. The next census in not due until 2020.
3.3.4 Focus Group Discussions
Focus group discussion is a qualitative data collection method that usually brings together 
a group of five to twelve people. These people have something in common, namely 
something connected to the research topic, and are invited to take part in a discussion on 
that topic that is facilitated by the researcher (Blanche et al., 2006). Shank (2006) defined the 
focus group as ‘a group of people whom you interview at the same time’ (p. 48). Participants 
join an organized discussion that takes between one and two hours and is often based on a 
single specified topic. The data generated within a focus group are relatively unstructured 
and use the words and concepts of the participants themselves. In most cases focus groups 
are used to find out how people experience and understand the issues raised by the research 
topic. Unlike semi-structured interviews, focus groups provide an opportunity for people to 
explore and challenge the experiences and opinions of others and to reflect on their own 
within a facilitating environment; and much of what happens within the group depends on 
the participants.
Williams (2011), Newman (1994), and Maree (2016) emphasized that focus group 
discussions are especially useful when the time to collect data is limited, when people feel 
more comfortable talking in a group than alone, when interaction among participants may 
be more informative than individually conducted interviews, and when the researcher 
would like other people’s assistance in interpreting something he or she has observed. 
One of the strong points of focus group discussions, especially in qualitative research, is 
that they do not discriminate against people who cannot read and write; hence they 
encourage participation (Maree, 2016). The moderator has the opportunity to encourage 
full participation and interaction among members and may also use probing to steer the 
discussions or to clarify certain aspects (Creswell, 2014; Blanche et al., 2006).
To get the attitudes, opinions, experiences, and views of young citizens in the Ohang-
wena region on how youths engage in regional and local politics with the help of their mobile 
phones and on how they connect and communicate with the councillors, both online and 
offline, the study used focus group discussions with selected members of the Ohangwena 
RYF, in addition to the semi-structured interviews. The interviews were conducted first, as 
they gave me a preliminary picture of the experiences of young citizens and of how they use 
mobile phones and social media as political tools for participation. But in order to reach the 
group’s understanding and use of these devices and of social media for in-depth political 
participation, I have organized focus group discussions. This could be done because all 
participants in the study shared something that was pertinent to the topic at hand.
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Two focus group discussions with representative youths from the RYF were set up. 
Each focus group had 12 participants but not all were present (three youths had other 
commitments at the time of these sessions). Meetings were held during the research period, 
March–September 2016, and only on Saturdays, to ensure that even participants with job 
commitments could attend. Each participant was asked to state his or her first name, so that 
I may keep track of who said what during transcription (Shank, 2006). A microphone was 
placed at the centre of the table, to ensure that the results are quite good. The venue used 
for the focus group discussions with representative young people from the Ohangwena 
RYF was the Eenhana Youth Center located in the middle of the Eenhana Town, which is 
the capital of the Ohangwena region. While in Okongo, I used a room in the constituency 
office. I made sure that the room was prepared well before the arrival of the first participant 
and that the assistant researcher was available to welcome the participants and give them a 
name badge. A flip chart was used to highlight the most important topics and issues during 
the discussions. Reminders were also send to the Okongo Youth Club and to the forum’s 
chairperson every third day. Light refreshments were served after the sessions.
An audio recorder was used to record the proceedings and capture verbal cues that 
may escape the moderator’s notice. Transcripts and reflective notes (Rubin & Babbie, 2010) 
were written in a question-by-question format immediately after each session; they dealt 
with what has been observed during the focus group discussion session. An assistant was 
employed who recorded his own observations; this measure was designed to add value to 
the collected data and to enhance credibility (Maree, 2016) of the study. Although focus 
group discussions can produce rich, detailed data that are otherwise difficult to obtain, some 
participants may experience such groups as threatening (Maree, 2016). Hence I explicitly 
asked group participants to respect the confidential nature of the information shared within 
the group (Jenkins et al., 2010).
3.3.5 Thematic Data Analysis
There are various qualitative analytical methods that can offer different insights into the 
set of data collected by a researcher. Two of the more commonly used methods are the 
thematic approach and the narrative approach. Since they are distinct but complementary 
data analysis methods, combining them can enable a more holistic understanding of the 
phenomena under investigation (Shukla, Wilson, & Boddy, 2014). While thematic approaches 
are particularly useful for looking across cases, as they highlight commonalities and 
differences across a dataset, the strong point of narrative analysis is the analysis of specific 
features, which it sets in more general contexts. This is the reason why I have decided to use 
both these methods for my data, combining them into a thematic narrative analysis (Shukla, 
Wilson & Boddy, 2014).
Thematic analysis is the depiction of a sequence of past events as they appear in the 
present to the narrator, after they have been processed, analysed, and constructed into 
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stories (Creswell, 2014). Narrative analysis is always analytically interpretive, while this is 
not inevitably the case for thematic analysis, which may be interpretive, but can also be 
applied for the purpose of organizing the data and generating rich descriptions. A narrative 
approach aims at investigating not just how stories are structured and the ways in which 
they work, but also who produces them and by what means, the mechanisms by which they 
are consumed, and how narratives are silenced, contested or accepted. 
Narrative data analysis is divided into three sections: narration (telling the story); 
transcription (converting the story from audio format into the written word); and analysis 
(understanding the transcribed data and drawing conclusions). After I collected the 
narrative data in the form of audio recordings of each semi-structured interview and focus 
group discussion, I transcribed these recordings as soon as possible into a word-processor 
document. All audio data were transcribed verbatim. Although this operation was very 
time-consuming, it was extremely important for me to perform it, as it helped me to get 
to know the data and to prepare the story for analysis. I started my analysis of the data by 
reading all the transcriptions, in order to get a comprehensive overview of the narratives 
that I collected. Narrative analysis covers a variety of procedures for the interpretation of 
narratives in research; such procedures include formal and structural means of analysis 
(Maree, 2016). In this analysis I tracked the sequence, causality, stories, or processes in the 
data, keeping in mind that most narratives have to be rewinded so that the researcher can 
unravel in the analysis.
I used an inductive analysis of qualitative data because the main purpose was to allow 
research findings to emerge from frequent, dominant, or significant themes inherent in the 
raw material, without the restraints imposed by a more structured theoretical orientation 
(Shank, 2006). It should be noted that qualitative data analysis is an ongoing and iterative (i.e. 
non-linear) process: this means that in it data collection, processing, analysis, and reporting 
are intertwined, and not merely a series of successive steps. In consequence, researchers in 
this field often find it advisable and even necessary to go back to the original fieldnotes or 
audiovisuals to verify their conclusions, or to return to the participants consulted during the 
research, either to collect additional data and verify the old material or to solicit feedback, as 
stated by Nieuwenhuis in Maree (2016). The goal of analysing qualitative data is to summarize 
what you have seen or heard by using common words, phrases, themes, or patterns that 
would aid your understanding and interpretation of what is emerging.
As mentioned before, I used Atlas.ti to code the collected data. The program enabled me 
to identify, in various ways, text segments such as participants’ names and socioeconomic 
characteristics, or assigned categories such as ‘online political engagement’, ‘online 
political disengagement’, ‘political education’, ‘youth leadership transition’, ‘community 
engagement’, ‘youth volunteerism’, ‘poli-tainment’; and these generated various codes. 
Few of the codes produced at this stage survived my ongoing revisions and collapsing of 
categories and made it to the final analysis. Categories were printed again and coded again 
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by hand; new coding categories were tested by merging several categories and re-examining 
the data (Maree, 2016; Creswell, 2014). The focus of thematic data analysis is on the way 
in which research participants construct their story without the researcher’s intervention; 
the researcher says little and records the story, as told by the research participant to tell it 
(Blanche et al., 2006).
3.4 THE CONTEXT OF THE STUDY
The study was conducted in Ohangwena, which is one of the 14 political regions in Namibia. 
According to the latest census, that of 2011, Ohangwena had a total population of 245,446 
inhabitants – 112,130 male and 133,316 female. The large majority of this population lived in 
rural areas; only 10 per cent lived in urban areas. A high proportion of this population – 46.7 
per cent, almost a half – consisted of people between the ages of 15 and 59 years. The figures 
for those aged between 18 and 35 years were not available at the time of research) (NSA, 
2014; Ohangwena Region, 2016); but, even without this information, one can conclude that 
there is a substantively high percentage of young citizens in Ohangwena. The rural–urban 
distribution among this 46.7 per cent layer shows a higher proportion of city dwellers: 18.7, 
which is more than a third. Still, the remaining 29.7 per cent of live in rural areas (Ohangwena 
Region, 2016). This clearly indicates that a very large number of youths live in rural areas 
outside urban centres.
The Ohangwena region consists of 12 constituencies, which have been the same 
throughout the entire period of this research: Engela, Ondobe, Omundaungilo, Eenhana, 
Omulonga, Ongenga, Okongo, Oshikango, Ohangwena, Oshikunde, Epembe, and Endola 
(see Figure 3.1), having been thus divided through a local authority act (Act 23) of 1992. 
Each constituency has a political head called ‘councillor’. Regional councillors are elected 
democratically, in regional and local authority elections that take place every five years. The 
last round of elections was in November 2015. The political leader of the entire region is a 
governor appointed by the president of the Republic of Namibia to represent the office of 
the president at the regional level (Ohangwena Region, 2016). The administrative head is the 
chief regional officer of the Ohangwena Regional Council. 
The graph in Figure 3.2 shows that, in 2011, 69.9 per cent of the people living in 
Ohangwena had access to the radio, 10.2 per cent had access to television, 2.1 per cent 
had access to a computer, 43.5 per cent had cell phones, 1.3 per cent had access to fixed 
telephone, 12.2 per cent could buy or access online the newspapers, and only 2.6 per cent 
had daily or weekly access to Internet. It is clear that the large majority of residents in the 
region had no regular access to Internet. One should add that, on the whole, residents in 
rural areas tended have less Internet connectivity than urban residents (Ohangwena Region, 
2016). 
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Even if the situation has improved somewhat since 2011, the very low percentage of 
people with Internet access makes it all the more important to look closely at the situation 
of mobile devices and to put mobile telephony at the centre of a study of the relationship 
between old and new media and the circulating discourses and practices across the digital 
and the physical sphere. If only 2.6 per cent of the population had Internet, 43.5 per cent 
had mobile telephony. Also, if we consider the rural–urban distribution again, 63.5 per cent 
of the urban population had cell phones, by comparison to 41.3 per cent in rural areas. 
Participants in my study were from across the whole demographic range – unemployed 
and employed youngsters, full-time and part-time students, rural and urban residents – and 
represented all racial categories in the region.
A few words about these participants and their main forms and structures of organization 
are in order here. My dissertation focused on 18–35-year-olds from the Ohangwena region 
– people who can take part in elections at the regional and local authority level. Some 
participants were voters older than 35 years: these took part in the study in order to present 
their views on how youths use mobile phones to engage in politics. Fixed-term elections 
Source: NSA 2014: ii.
Figure 3.1 Regional map of Ohangwena and the population in each of its constituencies
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give the electorate an opportunity to vote for its representatives at the regional level of 
government, and this should foster development in their respective constituencies. 
The youths in my study were all members of the Ohangwena RYF. The RYF is a structure 
of the National Youth Council and in this capacity upholds the latter’s aims and objectives. It 
is an umbrella body for all the youth groups in the region. The RYF is made up of CYFs, which 
are structures from each constituency in the region. CYFs aim to empower the young people 
through skill development, health education, counselling, and services and by providing 
information. In addition, CYFs are essential resources that enable young women and men 
to initiate actions that promote their own development and that of their communities and 
broader society.
Through the National Youth Council Act no. 3 of 2009 (for its text, see Republic of 
Namibia, 2009), RYFs are established in each of the 14 political regions and 102 constituencies 
of Namibia. The Act stipulates that the forum is mandated with certain responsibilities: it 
‘coordinates activities of the youth in its region’ as it ‘is the immediate representative’ of 
the National Youth Council at regional level; it ‘reports to the Representative Council once 
a year’; and it ‘must receive financial support from the [National Youth] Council based on 
the terms and conditions determined by the youth council Board’ (40.2). The Act further 
stipulates (40.3): 
Source: NSA 2014: 19.
Figure 3.2 Access to ICT facilities in Ohangwena in 2011
56 
 
youngsters, full-time and part-time students, rural and urban residents – and represented all 
racial categories in the region. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 ccess to ICT facilities in Ohangwena in 2011 
SOURCE: NSA 2014: 19. 
 
A few words about these participants and their main forms and structures of 
organization are in order here. My dissertation focused on 18–35-year-olds from the 
Ohangwena region – people who can take part in elections at the regional and local authority 
level. Some participants were voters older than 35 years: these took part in the study in order 
to present their views on how youths use mobile phones to engage in politics. Fixed-term 
elections give the electorate an opportunity to vote for its representatives at the regional level 
of government, and this should foster development in their respective constituencies.  
The youths in my study were all members of the Ohangwena RYF. The RYF is a 
structure of the National Youth Council and in this capacity upholds the latter’s aims and 
objectives. It is an umbrella body for ll th  youth groups in th  region. The RYF is made up 
of CYFs, which are structures from each constituency in the region. CYFs aim to empower 
Chapter 3 | Methodology
56
A regional youth forum consists of – 
 (a) representatives of youth organizations and associations at regional level; 
 (b) representatives of constituency executive committees; and 
 (c) a regional conference that sits every fourth year and consists of 
  (i) all members of regional executive committee; 
  (ii) seven delegates from each constituency forum; and 
  (iii) all regional youth officers in the region as observers. 
The next point in the Act (40.4) concerns the forum’s conference: ‘[e]ach regional youth forum, 
at its regional conference, must constitute its regional executive committee to administer 
the affairs and activities of the forum’. This committee ‘consists of (i) all chairpersons of 
constituency youth forums; (ii) four additional members elected by the regional conference; 
and (iii) all regional youth officers in the region who are members by virtue their office but 
have no right to vote’. At the regional conference RYF members ‘must elect the office bearers 
of the regional executive committee’, which consists of a chairperson, a vice-chairperson, a 
treasurer, and an administrative secretary. And, as the Act goes on to say, ‘[a] member of a 
regional executive committee serves for a term of four years of office, subject to a maximum 
of two terms’. These officials are elected regardless of their political affiliation to the regional 
executive.
Since a political region is divided into constituencies (for Ohangwena’s 12 constituencies, 
see Figure 3.1), the Act also states (41.2–4) that each constituency should establish a CYF 
that ‘coordinates’ the activities of young people within its remit, serves as an ‘immediate 
representative’ of the RYF at the constituency level, and reports to the RYF. Like a RYF, a CYF 
should hold an annual conference that elects its own executive committee – a body that 
‘conducts the affairs and activities of the forum for a term of two years’. The other major 
task of the annual conference is to ‘elect the office bearers of the constituency executive 
committee’, namely a chairperson, a vice-chairperson, a treasurer, and an administrative 
secretary (see also Republic of Namibia, 2009: 21–3).
RYFs report directly to the chief regional officer – the regional executive – and, at the 
political level, to the regional governor. The forum’ chairperson or vice-chairperson should 
be present at every meeting or discussion that takes place, to represent his or her fellow 
youths. Taking this organizational structure as a basic premise, this dissertation looks at how 
political engagement of youth is shaped through an ongoing negotiation between the two 
entities of the youth forum and the relevant regional authority.
The forum is made up of members from different constituencies in Ohangwena who 
serve as representatives of the youths in their respective constituencies. In 2011 the regional 
executive team numbered 76 members: 72 representatives of the 12 constituencies (six 
from each one) and 4 members appointed at the regional level to represent the interests 
of their fellow youths. Additionally, each constituency was supposed to have a functional 
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and active youth club that works directly under the RYF. This means that youth clubs are 
reporting to the RYF on their progress and on the activities they are engaged in. However, 
some constituencies failed to establish youth forums, while in others the youth forums 
ceased being active because their founders neglected them after they got jobs elsewhere.
The RYF strives for political change and development in Ohangwena by targeting 
the region’s rural youth, with the main objective of creating platforms for socializing and 
information sharing. This organization prompts young citizens to engage in political 
discussion at the regional level, keeps them busy, particularly the unemployed and the out-of-
school youth, and raises awareness on alcohol and drug abuse and on unwanted pregnancies. 
According to the population and census results for 2011, the regional unemployment rate 
was 43 per cent among youths aged 15 and older. Since then, the majority of young people 
went all the way up to grade 12, finishing their secondary education; some have obtained 
even higher-grade certificates and diplomas or are currently studying.
Most of these young people meet weekly or biweekly at their constituency offices, 
where the control officer usually allow them to use a small office without charging them. The 
youth groups they form discuss a wide variety of issues, ranging from teenager pregnancies, 
land distribution, and employment opportunities to project identification and political 
affiliation.
Many young people had cell phones in 2011, but only a few had smartphones that 
would allow them to use the Internet and open social media applications such as Facebook, 
WhatsApp, Instagram, and LinkedIn. They communicated regularly via phone calls, SMSs, 
and, in some constituencies, WhatsApp groups. Oshikango, Ohangwena, Epembe, and 
Omundaungilo were among the constituencies with active WhatsApp groups. These are 
the groups to which I was added as an active participant by the group administrators; and I 
carried out analysis of WhatsApp groups for these constituencies in order to assess the level 
of political engagement that youths and their political leaders could reach by using new 
media (see chapter 7). The phenomenon is somewhat comparable to what we witnessed in 
the West around Facebook. It is obvious that Facebook (with help from Cambridge Analytica) 
played a disproportionate role in politics in the global North. In the global South, WhatsApp 
groups achieved a similar position of importance in stimulating political engagement 
(though this analogy shouldn’t be pushed too far).
Additionally, young people communicate with their councillor through texts and 
messages sent on the mobile phone and designed to be read out on NBC Oshiwambo 
Radio, on a morning program named Luganda that is reserved for councillors. On this 
programme councillors usually announce dates of meetings with the youth or the general 
public, or urgent visits from government officials. This means that most of the councillors’ 
communications, exchanges, and interactions with their communities are done through 
Oshiwambo Radio, which is part of the National Broadcasting Cooperation (NBC) – itself a 
state-funded agency. Councillors call in using their airtime allowance from the responsible 
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authority – the Ministry of Urban and Rural Development. Each councillor is entitled to a 
N$1,000.00 airtime credit per month. Most of the residents in the Ohangwena region speak 
Oshiwambo and listen to Oshiwambo Radio – hence its popularity among the elderly and 
its relevance for the transmission of political messages. Although the programme is useful, 
I have noticed that its timing at a very early hour – 6.00 a.m., Monday to Friday – is not 
appropriate. This is the part of the morning when most of the active people are on their way 
to work. As a result, more often than not the messages do not reach their intended audience 
in time.
Since more than 90 per cent of the regional population speaks Oshiwambo, councillors’ 
meetings are always conducted in this language, to ensure that all forum members have 
an equal opportunity to participate in discussions. The chairperson always takes the 
minutes, discusses with the regional councillors the issues outlined there, and returns to 
the group with feedback in the next meeting. The minutes of forums’ meetings have been 
incorporated into my data analysis for this dissertation. The idea was to look at the political 
discussions and narratives of the youths in the region. The selection was based on the 
criterion of active participation in RYF activities, which explains why only youths from eight 
constituencies – Ondobe, Eenhana, Oshikango, Oshikunde, Okongo, Omulonga, Epembe, 
and Omundaungilo – are part of my study.
These constituencies were selected for specific reasons. Two of them, Ondobe and 
Eenhana, are semi-urban constituencies. Oshikunde is a newly created constituency and its 
councillor is also a member of parliament (MP), which means that this councillor is most of 
the time in Windhoek, more than 700 km away from the region (NSA, 2014). Epembe and 
Omundaungilo have poor network connectivity and radio frequencies, but mobile phones 
are more widespread in these constituencies, which makes them interesting sites for this 
dissertation. Ondobe, Eenhana, Okongo, and Oshikango are urban constituencies and most 
of their communities or villages have access to a reliable network (see chapters 4 and 5).
3.5 CONCLUSION
3.5.1 Summary: Highlights
In this study I applied participant observation to forum meetings in order to get a sense of 
the kind of interests and concerns that animate the youths and the causes they are engaged 
in, the hierarchies in place among them, who are the key people and who are the followers, 
who are the diehards, who are the regulars, and who are the casual members – in short, the 
politics of participation.
I also conducted semi-structured interviews with selected groups of youngsters. This 
was done through informal discussions with youths from the Ohangwena forum and from 
other CYFs in the region, but not just on social media. The interviews explored attitudes to 
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politics in general, matters of interest, curiosity, and concern for young citizens, examples of 
protest, and the participants’ relationship with and perception of the government.
Government officials and other stakeholders were selected by reason of their function 
as key stakeholders and government representatives at grassroots level: these people are 
tasked with being public servants, and in this capacity they have a duty to listen to the 
problems and suggestions of youths and take them up to the executive, for possible 
solutions. 
RYF members were purposively selected. This is a qualitative study; hence it belongs 
in a category generally associated with small, in-depth research designs that are based on 
the collection of qualitative data. My aim was to explore and interpret the everyday life 
experiences and perceptions of participants with mobile phones in the region under research 
(Welman & Kruger, 2001). Hence participants were not chosen at random, as in quantitative 
research; they were chosen with the purpose of answering my research questions and 
testing my hypotheses against their relevant experiences – that is, experiences related to 
the use of mobile phones for political engagement. The qualitative method enabled me to 
research my topic in depth.
This research looked at relationships, negotiations, the circulation of discourses, 
engagements with geographies, and the influence of mobile telephony on political life. The 
thematic themes that emerged gradually from this material and drove the design of data 
collection tools are political engagement, online and offline political participation, political 
interest, accessibility, digital literacy, and motives (and rationale) of joining social media. 
More details about data collection tools are discussed in sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 
of this chapter.
3.5.2 Summary: Timeline
The present chapter has discussed the research methodology used in this study. It also 
explained my choice of a qualitative approach and perspective. Qualitative methods were 
best suited to the exploratory and interpretive aspects of the research, which in essence 
involved discovering the meaning of a specific phenomenon by analysing its various 
perceptions. I will end the chapter with a brief timeline of how the methodologies presented 
here unfolded.
The research began with ethnographic participant observation, which was carried 
out at three RYFs meetings in the Ohangwena region as a preliminary stage. Participant 
observation was followed by 65 semi-structured interviews with selected representatives 
of young people from the RYF in Ohangwena; then, on the basis of information gathered in 
these interviews, two focus group discussions with selected youths were organized. Next 
I conducted semi-structured interviews with the regional governor and six constituency 
councillors of Ohangwena; these were meant to explore how young people use their mobile 
phones to interact with regional councillors on local and regional political issues. Finally, I 
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organized focus group discussions with representative youths from the RYF. Information 
from the focus groups proved to be a great aid. 
Since this study is about country-wide political engagement through the media, old and 
new, but particularly about engagement facilitated by the mobile phone, most participants 
were Namibian citizens aged between 18 and 35 years, hence eligible to take part in political 
discussions constitutionally as well as most likely to integrate mobile telephony into their 
lifestyle. Some older and a few younger citizens took part in the study too.
The next chapter surveys the use of old media by young citizens in the context of 
regional and local politics and civic engagement, and especially by comparison with the 
use of new media.
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CHAPTER 44
Old and New Media
*  A similar version of this chapter, co-authored with Payal Arora, has been submitted for publication in a journal and is 
currently under review.
*
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
With the advancements in mobile technology that we witnessed in the past three or four 
decades, especially the emergence of smartphones and non-smartphones, which combine 
features of radio, television, and Internet (e.g. by giving access to online newspapers and 
by offering content- and news-sharing applications such as Facebook and WhatsApp), 
political participation at regional and local governance levels is anticipated to change 
(Schugurensky, 2016). Hence this chapter explores the views and experiences of young 
people from Ohangwena as to how mobile media influence political participation and 
determine preferences in the region, given the popularity of these devices as well as their 
affordances. 
Several studies carried out over the years have claimed that traditional media continue 
to be, to this day, powerful transmitting belts and conveyers of political information for the 
marginalized and rural natives in various communities of the global South, although, with 
the rise of mobile phones, they have seen a decline in popularity among the youth (Bell, 
1981; Buckingham, 1999; Chadwick, 2013; Fallows, 1996; Robertson, 2013; Loader, Vromen, 
& Xenos, 2014). The decline is specifically attributed to the proliferation of mobile devices 
in this layer of the population because they offer a two-way communication channel. The 
studies mentioned here were looking at traditional and new media as public spaces for 
information sharing, communication, debate, and participation in public affairs and political 
activities in various countries; and they reached the conclusion that, in all the countries 
covered, both the old and the new media strengthen democratic rights and the freedoms 
of citizens. 
Most studies on new media in conjunction with the global South take it for granted 
that the new technologies are creating new forms of political engagement and that this is 
a process of replacing old media forms and practices. But this chapter tries to demonstrate 
something quite different – namely that this is not an evolutionary process of the old giving 
way to the new, but a case of new hybrid practices that enable political engagement. Most 
of the earlier scholars based their arguments on Habermas’ public sphere theory, where 
the public sphere is equated to the national space and the latter provides an autonomous 
and open arena for public debate, guaranteeing free access and freedoms of assembly, 
association, and expression (Habermas, 1991). Today this theory has been repurposed as 
a theory of the virtual public sphere, since that is the place where inclusive democracy is 
believed to happen (Papacharissi, 2002). McBride (2015) explained that inclusive democracy 
is a form of collective action that can allow citizens to see themselves as sharing the 
ownership of the political institutions that shape the context of their lives, be it at the 
regional or at the local level. The premise here is that an informed citizen is an empowered 
citizen (Schrock, 2015). 
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The present chapter targets the hype around the element of novelty in new media and 
aims to debunk this notion of a shift from old to new, embracing instead the complicated 
forms in which all media, new and old, work together to create the empowered citizen. In 
this study, ‘participation’ refers to reading news on media, creating news by commenting on 
media stories, sharing and discussing the news via social media with friends and relatives, 
voting, and taking part in political campaigns and protests that may all lead to activism 
(Catlaw, Rawlings, & Callen, 2014). I examined how traditional media combine and integrate 
with new media to strengthen these kinds of participation. Previous studies have looked 
at the low reading habits related to traditional newspapers, especially from the angle of 
citizens’ trust and distrust in traditional media by comparison to new media (Kling, 1996; 
Negroponte, 1998; Patterson, 1996). We know little, however, about the sources that rural 
Namibian youths trust when it comes to political information; and we know little about their 
expectations from the old media and practices around them. By investigating these issues 
through young people’s own narratives and practices, I reveal a complex set of cultural 
norms that the new media bypass (and, from a certain angle transcend), as they allow for 
the temporal suspension of the hierarchies that have long dictated political communication 
between the rural constituents and their local council representatives in this region. 
4.2 HYBRID AND TRANSMEDIA STORYTELLING
There has been a new wave in the manufacturing industry of mobile phones in recent years: 
the development of mobile devices endowed with the capability to access the Internet as 
well as to enable watching TV news, listening to the radio, and reading newspapers and 
other current affairs online (see Louho, Kallioja, & Oittinen, 2006). This development gave 
rural citizens access to some of the facilities that were considered luxuries in the early 1990s, 
for example television – although there are villages, and even townships, that do not have 
the access frequencies needed for these devices and their networks. The dual function of 
mobile devices as tools for communication and information created a niche market for young 
citizens who are prepared (or even eager) to use their mobiles not only to communicate but 
also as enabling devices that can bring transmission closer to them. On the negative side, 
having this kind of option is known to bring down the sales of printed newspapers and TV 
sets, especially in developed countries (Pauwels, 2005). However, in developing countries 
such as Namibia, where income disparity is greater and network infrastructures poorer, 
citizens are still heavily reliant on both print and online media, so that the two support each 
other. Generally in the global South they are complementary tools, not competing ones. 
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4.3 NAMIBIA’S MEDIA LANDSCAPE
Like other countries in the Southern African Development Commission (SADC), Namibia 
is governed and directed by its constitution, which enshrines freedom of expression and 
freedom of the media. There are several media houses in Namibia that report political news, 
and they, in turn, abide by the country’s laws and legislations. Like many other countries of 
the world (see Downey and Fenton, 2003), Namibia has experienced a growth in localized 
forms of mass media such as community radio, television, and newspapers. 
The traditional media that are widespread and familiar in Namibia are the following:
A. Radio  NBC’s radio services consist of 22 stations in different languages such as 
Oshiwambo, Afrikaans, Silozi, Rukavango, Damara/Nama and various community 
radio stations such as Ohangwena Community Radio, which operates three 
TV channels and eight radio services. NBC broadcasts FM radio in the country’s 
official language, which is English, as well as in Afrikaans, which functions as a sort 
of lingua franca, in German, and in the regional languages of Ovambo, Damara/
Nama, Rukwangali, Setswana, Herero, and Silozi. All radio stations are streamed 
online, too (Cameron, 2013; Fox, 2012; Kavari, 2013).
B. Television  Namibian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) services (public 
broadcaster); One Africa (private). The NBC is a public broadcaster established in 
1990 to replace the South West Africa Broadcasting Corporation (SWABC), which 
was operating before Namibia’s independence that year. 
C. Newspapers  Nearly all newspapers are privately owned. The largest selling 
newspaper is the Namibian; the Afrikaans-language daily, Republikein, comes 
second. New Era is owned by the government.
4.4  YOUTH ACCESS TO OLD AND NEW MEDIA IN THE OHANGWENA 
REGION
As already mentioned in chapter 3, the Ohangwena region has a relatively young population. 
About 44 per cent of its residents are under 15 years of age, while the population of working 
age (15–59), which has a strong component of young people, too, constitutes about 46 per 
cent. By comparison to other Namibian regions, Ohangwena also has the highest number 
of youths living in rural areas (NSA, 2014; Ohangwena Region, 2016). Table 4.1 shows that the 
region totalled 43,723 households, of which 37,404 were located in in rural areas.
Table 4.1 also maps the distribution of specific communication assets, both by 
constituency and for the region as a whole, on the basis of the census results for 2011. 
Between a half and two thirds (69.9 per cent) of residents had access to radio, the figures 
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indicating slightly greater access in urban (75.3 per cent) than in rural (69.3 per cent) areas. 
But, in spite of the high percentage, it is not yet clear how youths access and this medium. 
This chapter aims to explore the matter of whether young citizens use the radio and other 
traditional media to participate in regional and local politics – and, if so, how. 
Also in 2011, mobile phones were much more widespread across the region than 
landline telephones: the ratio between them was 43.5 per cent to 1.3 per cent (NSA, 2014). 
Almost a half of the households owned a mobile phone. However, access to other modern 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) such as computers, laptops, and 
Internet-enabled components is very limited, particularly in rural areas. Some constituencies 
appear to be technologically disadvantaged; thus the Omundaungilo constituency had 
1,169 households, yet only 1 household (0.08 per cent) had home Internet connectivity, only 
15 households owned a computer or a laptop, and no more than 370 households (32 per 
cent) owned a mobile phone. The situation has not changed much to date.
Access to newspapers, not included in Table 4.1, was also very low in 2011: only 12 per 
cent of the population had daily or weekly access to a newspaper (NSA, 2014).
Table 4.1 Distribution of communication assets in Ohangwena by household, in 2011. Asset-owning 
households are counted by constituency. Oshikunde is not included, as it was only a village at the time; the 
survey was taken before the demarcation of constituency boundaries.
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Ohangwena 43.723 32.455 5.125 825 23.247 1.297 498
Urban 6.319 4.460 2.475 219 3.984 687 178
Rural 37.404 27.995 2.650 606 19.263 610 320
Eenhana 3.982 2.961 722 77 2.137 302 45
Endola 4.654 3.701 648 101 2.965 153 26
Engela 4.903 3.657 1.050 133 3.383 148 42
Epembe 2.568 1.672 42 50 862 4 1
Ohangwena 3.153 2.389 561 41 1.741 135 56
Okongo 4.773 3.544 235 57 2.549 64 19
Omundaungilo 1.169 802 19 49 370 15 1
Ondobe 3.851 2.687 204 59 2.125 69 49
Ongenga 3.887 3.102 427 42 2.049 84 22
Oshikango 5.378 3.883 926 139 2.573 255 163
Omulonga 5.405 4.057 291 77 2.493 68 74
Source: NSA, 2014: 120.
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4.5 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
This section presents fieldwork findings related to both old and new media. The main 
aspects to be discussed here are access to these media, their popularity, the affordances 
they offer, and the preferences they command among young citizens interested in politics. 
It goes without saying that these findings are confined to the Ohangwena region. 
To understand young people’s usage of old and new media for political engagement, 
we need to look at their media practices more generally. Given that digital media constitute 
a relatively novel sphere of action for this demographic, it is important to capture which 
media are popular, what their appeal is, in other words, why youths prefer these platforms, 
and at what point exactly the switch from personal to political occurs. My findings reveal 
that it is not useful to create a dichotomy between ‘the personal’ and ‘the political’ when it 
comes to platform preferences, for we are dealing here with hybridized practices.
Overall, the findings indicate that young people listen to the public radio mainly for 
music and other entertainment and prefer private or community radio stations, because 
those incorporate music into their programmes. But, although radio was found to be 
widespread in the region, not many youths appeared to listen to it. Respondents further 
indicated that television is less accessible to young people than radio and that printed 
newspapers get looked at mainly for job opportunities and for relaxation, when people 
have nothing else to do. Due to the portability of the mobile phone, young people prefer 
accessing mainstream media (including newspapers) online, via their mobile gadgets, 
despite the region’s poor network coverage of political news (which is itself a symptom of 
the digital divide). In a nutshell, old media are less familiar to the youth, and this causes the 
marginalization or even exclusion of rural youngsters from public debates that presuppose 
the acquisition and sharing of political information, although old media content does get 
recaptured and shared on new media – for example in the form of newspaper clippings or 
short TV video clips, which can go viral on social media platforms. 
Fieldwork led me into the three key areas on which I focus on in this chapter. My work 
in these areas corresponds to the following research questions: Which media are the most 
popular among young citizens who wish to engage in politics, and how are they accessed? 
What are the reasons for this popularity and preference? What are the challenges and 
obstacles faced by young citizens when they attempt to use these media for regional 
politics?
4.5.1 Public Radio Less Popular for Political Engagement
Radio has been available to residents in this region for quite a long time; it is a popular 
medium, especially with the elderly (see Table 4.1). Citizens listen to NBC Oshiwambo Radio3 
3  NBC Oshiwambo Radio was renamed Kati FM in 2018.
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for news, announcements made by the councillors, political messages, entertainment 
shows, and cultural programmes. They believe that radio enables them to know what is 
happening in the country and in the world at large. 
One of the programmes on NBC Oshiwambo Radio that are popular with the residents 
of this region is Lungada (already mentioned in the previous chapter). This is a special 
programme running from 6 to 7 a.m. on weekdays. It is reserved for government and 
other officials (including youth leaders) who have urgent announcements such as job 
opportunities in their respective constituencies, villages, or offices, pension distributions, 
various meetings, and other topical matters that need the public’s attention. The 
programme was allocated its early time slot by the management team, according to what 
the station’s daily broadcasting schedule permitted. Councillors and other officials call in 
by using their own credit. Each official has a limited time of up to three minutes to make his 
or her announcement(s); so these messages to the public must be clear and to the point. 
NBC presenters encourage councillors and other officials to announce only urgent matters 
every day. There is also a programme called Eyakulo lOshiwana (Public Announcement 
Programme) that runs from 9 to 10 a.m. on weekdays and from 8 to 9 a.m. on Saturdays, with 
the somewhat complementary purpose of giving the general public an opportunity to air 
its messages and announcements. The NBC Oshiwambo Radio station can be accessed via 
various Namibian mobile radio applications whose sizes range from 1.58MB to 4.8MBs; so all 
such applications can easily fit into any mobile phone. However, these applications do not 
support offline radio. To be used, they require Internet connectivity.
The next best used radio station is a private one, called Ohangwena Community Radio 
(OCR). This station is managed in part by the Ohangwena Regional Council, together with 
the Eenhana Town Council and with the support of some other donors such as UNESCO. OCR 
offers some programmes that enable their audiences to participate in debates on certain 
topical issues such as land distribution, the HIV/AIDs pandemic, teenage pregnancies, 
and youth empowerment in the region. This radio station does not have its own mobile 
application, is not available on any of the other mobile radio applications in Namibia, and 
its programmes cannot be downloaded on other platforms such as YouTube. Some youths 
indicated that they prefer listening to this station because it plays ‘nice music’, but not 
necessarily for political information. 
This converges with, and supports, Bosch’s (2014) findings on community radio 
journalism in South Africa – namely that the country’s residents have always considered 
community radio practices participatory, primarily because stations are usually owned and 
operated by community members and on-air presenters. As Bosch shows, community radio 
projects emerged from the political and cultural struggles of the 1980s against apartheid in 
South Africa: in these struggles radio was perceived as having the potential to inform and 
mobilize communities. Here, however, I wish to extend the notion of community beyond its 
utilitarian application to purposeful projects – such as building relationships and networks 
Chapter 4 | Old and New Media
70
for political engagement and empowerment – into the sphere of emotive and affective 
relations. Community media were found to serve as a forum for individual entertainment, 
which may not have an immediate or direct impact on community building. For instance, 
my respondents indicated that the community radio station does not really focus on youth 
engagement in civic and political activities, as most of the time young listeners consume it 
only for the entertainment offered. 
Although this community radio is streamed online on Facebook and can also be accessed 
via mobile phones with built-in radio, it is only available to people who live in nearby towns; 
and OCR station frequencies cannot be reached from all areas of Ohangwena. These findings 
are inconsistent with Bosch’s claim that community radio stations are intended to give 
previously marginalized groups access to the airwaves, since the marginalized communities 
in Ohangwena cannot access this community radio.
Some of the councillors remarked that they also send announcements to Omulunga 
Radio, in order to ensure that those who do not tune in to OCR or to NBC Oshiwambo 
Radio receive the message too. Most of Omulunga Radio’s programmes are in Oshiwambo. 
Omulunga Radio station frequencies, just like those of OCR, are not reachable throughout 
the whole region. 
While visiting the Okongo Village Council, I met Moses, a 19-year-old forum member, 
with whom we discussed the status of young people’s participation in public affairs in 
the region (among other issues that affect the youth). I asked Moses which medium he 
considered to be best suited to conveying political messages to young people in this 
community. And I received this reply: 
 Radio is better, as some youth can access it via their mobile phones despite the 
poor frequencies and connectivity in some areas of the region … most of the youth 
have access to them [sc. mobile phones] sometimes.
This observation reveals that, despite poor radio frequencies and connectivity in the region, 
young people tend to prefer using the mobile Internet and rely on it more than on listening 
directly to the radio. This belies the widespread image, so popular in the international 
development community, of rural youngsters listening collectively to the radio. Clearly 
personalized consumption is a not just a western cultural habit (Karuaihe-Upi & Tyson, 
2009; Mchakulu, 2007; Moyo, 2012). According to Moses, ‘some villages in the region still 
do not have reliable radio frequencies’. In villages such as Epinga, Onamafila and Ondama-
yOmunghete, residents have to climb trees to catch the right frequencies that allow them to 
listen to the news or get the messages delivered by their political leaders.
Moses also argued that connecting or listening to politicians or councillors on the radio 
is not really about political interest, but about employment – about survival, since politicians 
are the source of job opportunities, the state being the dominant employer. The second 
big interest is to get the latest news on death announcements and on old age pension 
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distributions in the region. The most important finding in this narrative is how, in this 
context, politics merges the state and the market. Conventionally, in the West, politicians 
and the market are separate estates; but in developing countries such as Namibia we are 
reminded that the two reinforce each other, complicating what constitutes political issues 
(O’Neill & Harsell, 2015). 
According to Moses, the region’s poor radio frequency makes it difficult for people to 
listen to the radio regularly; in most cases they receive old news, and even that comes by 
chance, if they happen to go into town. Additionally, the timing of the programmes used 
by councillors and other leaders is a problem. Most of the young citizens I interviewed 
complained that for people with regular jobs, this programme comes at the exact time 
when they are on their way to work. For those who remain at home, this is the time to take 
the animals to nearby boreholes or water points. Therefore the messages often fail to reach 
the intended audience. However, councillors said that they cannot do anything to change 
the timing, as this programme is addressed not only to the residents of Ohangwena but to 
all the people who listen to NBC Oshiwambo Radio in Namibia. It is worth noting that radio 
programmes from this station cannot be downloaded even if the young people’s mobiles 
have the capacity to store them.
Moreover, most of the youths I interviewed have developed an attitude that radio is 
just for elderly adults and rather young children. Most of them would not tune in to NBC 
Oshiwambo Radio or other stations to listen to programmes relevant to them even if the 
frequencies are available or their mobile phones give them access. Here is a statement made 
by 30-year-old Eliaser: 
 Most of us we have radios, even on our mobiles, but the problem is we don’t listen 
to NBC Oshiwambo Radio, we like Omulunga Radio, and the councillor uses mostly 
NBC Oshiwambo Radio; but, as for us, we listen to Omulunga, because we like 
music.
Omulunga Radio is a private radio station. Its programmes are a mixture of the latest songs 
and political messages interspersed with them; the latter come either from newspapers or 
through direct call-in by political leaders. However, politicians cannot make full use of it, 
since they have to use a public radio station. Both NBC Oshiwambo and Omulunga Radio 
can also be captured on mobiles, through built-in radios or mobile radio applications.4 Unlike 
mobile radio applications, built-in radio does not require credit or Internet connectivity, as 
most phones come with the radio capabilities from the manufacturers. People can tune in to 
these stations both with smartphones and with non-smartphones, provided that there is a 
frequency in their area. But Eliaser’s statement reveals that, even if or when NBC Oshiwambo 
4  These can be downloaded from https://m.downloadatoz.com/omulunga-radio-namibia/com.mobincube.android.
sc_3ERIBY (accessed February 10, 2019).
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Radio is fully available in the house or on the mobile, young people would not listen to it; 
they would rather tune in to stations, especially private ones, that offer live music or other 
entertainment. Most youngsters enjoy their music and show little interest in a state-funded 
radio station such as NBC Oshiwambo Radio.
One of the councillors I interviewed (see Appendix H for the whole list) shared Eliaser’s 
sentiment that young people do not listen to the radio, in spite of the fact that this is the 
channel through which most of the political messages are transmitted. According to him,
 When we [sc. councillors] want to reach the youth, sometimes we use the radio, so 
we send messages, and these messages have to be read over the NBC Oshiwambo 
Radio, but only very few youths … listen to the radio messages or to programmes 
like Ewilamanguluka, Lungada … few youth listen to that. Most of them when they 
tune on the radio they are just interested in music or entertainment. (Councillor 4, 
2016)
Given that only a few young people listen to the public radio, yet that is the mode of 
transmission used regularly by politicians in the region, I asked this councillor what steps he 
takes to ensure that his messages reach youths who do not tune in to NBC Oshiwambo Radio 
(or Kati FM). He indicated that councillors use various other platforms concurrently with the 
radio. They also have noticeboards in their offices where they paste these announcements; 
they hold public meetings in the villages; and they send text messages to youth forum 
leaders in the constituency, on their mobile phones. These messages are then forwarded 
by the recipients to their peers on social media platforms such as Facebook and WhatsApp, 
since there is a high presence of young people on these platforms.
 I have realized that most of the youth are always on Facebook […] we created a 
Facebook page named after our constituency, so whenever I have something to 
share with the youth […] I post it there and we are always interacting with each 
other. (Councillor 4, 2016)
This statement is consistent with Papacharissi’s (2010) claim that the new communication 
technologies offer information and tools that may extend the role of the public in the social 
and political arena. Scholars in favour of these new technologies believe that the new 
media create a virtual public sphere that can increase citizens’ participation in public and 
political activities (Fallows, 1996; Patterson, 1996; Bell, 1981; Kling, 1996; Negroponte, 1998; 
Rheingold, 1993). They believe that social media and the mobile phone can enhance the 
democratic participation of young citizens.
One last point: Ardèvol-Abreu and Gil de Zúñiga (2016) concluded that, apart from trust 
and distrust, which are usually related to traditional media, other factors or motives may 
influence people’s preference for new or traditional media as a news source. My findings 
support this view. Some of the factors and motives uncovered during my research and 
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presented in this section relate to distance, transport, infrastructure, taste, and accessibility 
of media in the community. These factors explain why, even though radio (including radio 
on mobiles) is generally popular in the region, young citizens tend to listen to private radio 
stations, for live music and entertainment, and to ignore the political aspect of radio. Those 
who tune in more frequently to NBC Oshiwambo Radio for news and current affairs are on 
average older people. 
4.5.2 Television a Luxury Medium for Rural Youth Politics
In Ohangwena, television is a luxury for the few: only 12 per cent of the regional population 
own a TV set (NSA, 2014). Some constituencies do not receive television signals, and the 
shortage of electricity, critical in some remote areas, makes the situation worse. I found that 
only the residents of small towns or villages situated within a small radius from large towns 
such as Oshikango, Ohangwena, Onhuno, Ondobe, Eenhana, Okongo, and Epembe receive 
TV signals. Very few business establishments, typically bars in towns, have TV sets and, 
when they do, they use them predominantly for the sport channels. My findings dispute 
the conclusion reached by international research recently carried out in Spain, in the United 
States, and in the United Kingdom (Casero-Ripollés, Feenstra, & Tormey, 2016; Robertson, 
2013). This research claims that broadcast television and the use of intense digital media 
boost citizens’ engagement and self-mediation in politics. My findings also contradict 
the mediatization theory, which argues that mainstream media, particularly broadcast 
television, have a strong influence on politics (see Chadwick, 2013). Besides, in the case of 
Namibia television is simply not a mainstream medium. 
Interviewees from rural areas who had smartphones indicated that they usually stream 
NBC News through their smartphone, although this operation uses up their data bundles. It 
is worth noting that not all the mobiles owned by youths have applications that allow them 
to watch television, and there are still some young people in the region who do this only 
rarely. Those who attend secondary school watch television in the classroom. Also, people 
get to watch television when they go for holidays in town. Affordability is a major issue of 
TV access, as there is an annual license fee that to be paid. Since most of the young people 
are unemployed, this handicap really makes it difficult for television to function as a source 
of political engagement. 
To learn more about whether young people in the region watch television on their 
mobiles or share news videos and clips for political news, I spoke to Mart, a 31-year-old 
who has lived in Ohangwena since the 1980s and now works for the Namibian police (see 
Appendix G for a list of all young people I interviewed):
 They [youngsters] do not watch television, especially those who live in remote areas 
[…] there are no TV network coverages there […] maybe only 24 per cent watch 
television […] some tend to ignore it and go to night clubs.
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On the same topic, another young man said:
 I do not think most of the youths in Ohangwena region watch television, simply 
because TV sets are very expensive and the TV signal is very weak in most of the 
rural areas where many youth stays. (Jus, 29)
Corroborating this view, the councillor for one of the constituencies that have poor TV 
signals and radio frequency stated:
 We [residents] do not have TV signals in most areas of our constituency, hence we 
cannot talk about TV news, as our youths do not watch television. (Councillor 3, 
2016)
In urban areas and in the few other places where TV reception is available, parents are 
predominantly unemployed too, therefore they cannot afford a TV set. Some also have 
cultural beliefs according to which television contributes to immoral activities, for example 
by exposing young people to the bad influence of sexual movies. As a result, many young 
citizens are forbidden by their parents to watch television.
 In some areas where there is electricity, parents may not afford to buy a TV set, as 
they are unemployed, or have myths about TV [as] the main source of all evils. (Ag, 
36)
Overall, this set of findings reveals that television (as well as mobile television) is not 
too widespread in rural areas of Ohangwena. The reasons for its limited use are poor TV 
reception owing to network connectivity; a high unemployment rate; anti-TV cultural 
beliefs; and also poor electricity supply in rural areas. As for urban areas, television is not 
very popular among young people in cities either. They watch especially sport news and 
other entertainment programmes, and they watch these mainly from their homes, or in 
establishments such as bars or clubs. 
My findings contradict the current position in the literature, which treats television as a 
major access tool in rural areas in developing countries: television cannot possibly perform 
such a role in in Namibia, simply because most residents in these areas have no access to 
television. As a result of access and affordability issues, only a few young people can get TV 
news. In such circumstances, even a highly influential medium like television fails to advance 
the cause of political inclusion for the marginalized communities of Namibia.
4.5.3 Newspapers as Tools for Updating Young People’s Current Affairs and 
Employ ment Opportunities
Owing to its economic growth and development, Ohangwena has several shops and outlets 
that sell newspapers to the public on a daily basis. The presence of Puma service stations at 
Ongha, Onhuno, Omafo, and Oshikango, of a Shell service station at Eenhana (the Onawa 
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service station), and of four other private service stations in the region contributes to the 
greater availability of newspapers in the region. There were also some big retail chains such 
as the Shoprite U-Save at Okongo, Eenhana and the Shoprite at Oshikango, as well as Pick 
n Pay supermarkets at Okongo and Oshikango. Some small-to-medium retail shops sell 
newspapers too, for example the Onawa Mini Market, the O’Save Mini Market, and OK Grocer 
(a chain of special supermarkets at Ondobe, Eenhana, and Okongo). However, all these 
shops are aligned along two main roads: Eenhana–Erundu and Ondangwa–Oshikango. This 
means that only young people who live in or near these four towns or visit them regularly 
can buy newspapers.
I visited several outlets and retailers and found that they mainly sell the following 
newspapers: the Namibian, a daily that sells very fast in all the areas of the region (but all 
of them receive a limited number of copies); the New Era which is a state newspaper; Die 
Republikein, an Afrikaans newspaper that usually carries many job ads in both the private 
and the public sector, yet only a few copies of it come in, as not many people are fluent 
in Afrikaans. Other available papers include Kundana, a newly established newspaper 
written in Oshiwambo; the Sun; Confidante, a tabloid; and Informante, a tabloid sometimes 
distributed for free. I observed that newspapers are delivered very late, usually after 9 a.m., 
and sometimes do not reach areas such as Okongo before 2 p.m. The Friday newspapers sell 
faster than any other weekday editions, because more often than not they advertise a lot 
of vacancies. In some areas people have to buy their newspapers in advance, or else they 
would not get any. All these newspapers are available online, including on Facebook and 
Twitter. Young people with smartphones or mobiles that can access the Internet read them 
electronically; but in order to be able to do this they need to have enough data bundles on 
their mobiles.
Mr Log works at one of the retailers that sell newspapers in the town of Eenhana. When 
I enquired about his sales, he told me that, at their shop, the Namibian sells faster than any 
other newspaper, and this on a daily basis. On average, the newspaper is delivered around 
10 a.m. every day. I also learned from Mr Log what newspapers his establishment usually 
receives every morning and in what numbers: 95 copies of the Namibian (250 on Friday); 5 
copies of the Republikein (8 on Friday); 30 copies of the Sun (40 on Friday); and 20 copies of 
the New Era (30 on Friday).
I was interested in finding out from the sellers which age groups buy which newspapers. 
I discovered that newspaper buyers are, for the most part, young people and that they buy 
especially the Friday edition. I also spent a few days surveilling open spaces such us hiking 
points and recreational facilities where young people tend gather; I was on the lookout for 
youths reading newspapers and I wanted to observe their habits around this activity. The 
majority of these youths live in towns; very few come from rural areas. I noticed that only 
one in four was likely to carry a newspaper. During interviews, youngsters made it quite 
clear to me that they only scanned the newspaper for vacancies; they were not in the habit 
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of reading the news or anything else. Yet Vesa, a 31-year-old from Oshikango, gave me a 
different perspective. Vesa was reading a newspaper at a hiking point. When I asked him 
why he would buy a newspaper, he said:
 Well, I buy newspapers for two reasons: basically to know what is happening in the 
country and the world at large and to search for job opportunities.
Rega is another youth who shares Vesa’s sentiment, and this is how he expressed his views 
about newspaper access and affordances: 
 In Ohangwena, we do not have enough access to newspapers. You can only buy 
them at Oshikango, Eenhana, Ondobe, Okongo and Ongha. Most of the youth living 
in the villages have no access to this. Most of them do not even have an interest to 
buy the newspaper. (Rega, 29)
I spoke to one of the young entrepreneurs in the region about the sorts of newspapers he 
buys as a businessperson and about the reasons why he buys them. He, too, revealed more 
than a strictly local interest in ads:
 I buy the New Era newspaper daily, simply because of the construction business I 
am current doing and most of the government tenders are being advertised here 
[…] I also buy the Namibian regularly, just to keep up to date with what is currently 
happening inside and outside the country. (Linga, 30)
He continued:
 To be honest, I do not like reading long stories. I always scan the stories but the 
short stories I finish them. I do not think most youth care about reading, especially 
newspapers. They only read about sport, criminal activities, fashion, entertainment, 
etc. Final year students and unemployed graduates scan newspapers for one reason 
only – jobs.
I asked Mary, a shop owner, about her views on how widespread the habit of reading 
newspapers was among the region’s youths, and she gave me this not very encouraging 
outline:
 Many youth do not read newspapers as far as I know in my region. Since some 
have no access to them […] they mostly listen to the radio whereby constituency 
councillors does air some but limited information. […] People have no access to 
newspapers because the Ohangwena region is poor in terms of development, 
those who are staying at villages cannot read newspapers every day, because there 
are no outlets/markets that sell newspapers there. (Mary, 31)
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Young people from rural constituencies such as Omundaungilo and Epembe feel 
technologically disadvantaged as a result of poor network coverage, and yet their first port 
of call for getting the latest news is the mobile phone – not the newspaper. This is quite 
remarkable.
My findings show that young people buy the Namibian and New Era because these 
two advertise more jobs and than any other newspapers. The same goes for Friday 
newspapers: youngsters purchase them in greater numbers because Friday issues provide 
more information of the kind this public is interested in. It is clear that the majority of those 
who buy and read newspapers do it for the sake of the latest news (local, national, and 
international), vacancies, tender advertisements, and entertainment pages. This conclusion 
is consistent with a research conducted in the United Kingdom that revealed that young 
people’s reading of newspapers is largely focused on entertainment and sports pages 
(Harcourt & Hartland, 1992; Buckingham, 1999).
The findings further indicate that newspapers are not the most suitable communication 
platforms for transmitting political messages to the young in this region, since most 
of them live in rural areas, where newspapers are a luxury. In Ohangwena, newspapers 
serve only a few young citizens who reside in urban areas. What is more, newspapers are 
in short supply: daily deliveries for sale throughout the region are too small for there to 
be enough newspapers even for these few urban youths. Finally, most youngsters in this 
restricted group do not really buy newspapers for political information, but for employment 
opportunities and current affairs in the region. 
4.5.4 Are New Media Taking Over the Role of Traditional Media for Democratic 
Citizenship?
Contrary to expectations, it turns out that traditional media such as television, radio, and the 
newspaper are a luxury in the Ohangwena region. On the whole, those who do have access 
to these media use them se media for information about job opportunities, entertainment, 
and news. These findings prompted me to ask what other media platforms young people 
might use to communicate, disseminate and consume information, and receive messages of 
a political nature. Mobile gadgets quickly appeared to be the answer.
I also asked some of my young respondents how they normally use their mobile 
phones. It appears that, when they have Internet access, they often use them to send or 
receive messages concerning youth programmes or information about the region or the 
country at large. This corroborates earlier scholars’ conclusions on the relationship between 
mobile telephony and the Internet: mobile phones provide citizens with new opportunities 
to actively engage in the process of information production, news consumption, and 
civic participation (e.g. Bachmann & Gil de Zúñiga, 2013; Chari, 2013). The majority of my 
respondents use their mobiles to access online newspapers and social media platforms. 
Here is a representative answer from one of the young people I interviewed:
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 Generally I use it [mobile phone] for communicating with others, mostly friends 
and not so much with relatives or leaders […] to download pictures and videos 
especially with smartphones […] also to download and listen to music […] but the 
original idea is to make communication easy for myself. (Lyd, 35)
Heys, another youth from the region, stated:
 With my phone I normally call my colleagues, friends and family and the application 
that I use mostly is Facebook because I use to get very interesting information as 
well as fun posts. (Heys, 25) 
These excerpts validate the idea that citizen journalism of the kind advocated by Goode 
(2009) is possible with mobile phones, as citizens can use these devices to receive and share 
news, inform others, and create online new content that can be read by others. 
However, my findings do not support the claim, put forth in US studies, that young 
people use their mobile phones (and new media in general) as news platforms as a result 
of growing public mistrust of traditional media and concern about the pervasiveness of 
biased reporting (Örnebring & Jönsson, 2004; Wagg, 2004; Javaru, 2013; Ndimbira, 2014). As 
my interviewees use only what is available to them, the fact that this is the mobile phone 
rather than the newspaper, the TV set, or the radio does not indicate that they do not trust 
traditional media. In response to a question about how much trust they put in television, 
the radio, newspapers, and social media as sources of information, some participants stated 
that they trust less what is being discussed on social media, since in their view some of 
the participants in those discussions are not serious – they are probably just joking about 
the issue. On the matter of trusting Facebook discussions, Hendrine, a young unemployed 
youth forum member, made the following comment: 
 I only have trust in some posts and statuses, because not every post I see on 
Facebook has true information even if it is giving good images. I do not need to 
share it with my group because I do not trust some sources on social media because 
someone might just post something which does not exist at all. (Hendrine, 25)
This challenges Javaru’s (2013) view that modern media are quick enough to deliver the 
information of generic content, but the news and issues rendered by the modern media 
have much less influence among the people’s local issues for it is devoid of physical contact 
and personal feelings of a particular locality.
My findings suggest that mobile phones are a promising medium that can be well 
used to build political participation in the region, considering that at least 70 per cent 
of the residents own a mobile phone and 43.5 per cent of the population is made up of 
youths. While the dominant medium in Ohangwena is the public radio, only a few youths 
listen to it, and those who do concentrate on entertainment. The mobile phone can act as 
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a transmitting belt in political life because it is popular among the young and most of them 
already make use of it one way or another. 
4.6 CONCLUSION
One major conclusion that emerged from this chapter is that, although public radio is 
popular in the community at large (almost 70 per cent of residents own a radio), it is not 
too popular among young people, especially when it comes to political engagement. The 
few young citizens who tune in to the radio listen mainly to entertainment and music, and 
for this reason prefer private stations (commercial radio) such as Omulunga Radio and OCR 
but do not show interest in political programmes and political news and would not listen to 
them even when a radio set is in the house or when they could catch radio stations on their 
mobile. This puts statistics into perspective. 
But there is one interesting feature about young people’s habits around the radio. 
Although network connectivity is poor in the region, when young people choose to listen 
to the radio, they tend to tune in via their mobile phones. This is relatively expensive for 
them, since most are unemployed; yet they say that mobile phone radio is better for them 
because they can use free data bundles from the network operators. 
Another interesting conclusion is related to the fact that the most popular newspaper 
among the young people of Ohangwena (for those who can get it) is the Namibian, and 
mainly its Friday’s edition. This is so primarily because this paper advertises a lot of jobs. 
However, upcoming entrepreneurs prefer buying the New Era for its government tenders. 
All the evidence suggests that the main reason why people, and especially youths, are 
interested in these newspapers, either in their online or in their offline incarnations, is what 
they offer in the areas of employment and entertainment; political consumption does not 
figure in the equation.
The last major conclusion to be taken from this chapter is that new media such as mobile 
phones with radio application and Internet are slowly replacing the traditional media 
platforms, especially among the youths. My interview respondents made it clear that their 
mobile phones give them access to social media platforms such as Facebook (Buckingham, 
1999); and some of their phones have radio applications too, allowing them to switch 
between stations any time, wherever they are. This is another strong reason for advocating 
the use of mobile telephony (and of new media in general) for youth participation and 
engagement in regional politics.
In a nutshell, old media are losing ground not because they are unappealing in the 
era of social media (e.g. because of engagement issues), as is usually assumed, but rather 
because access to them is very limited. Relatedly, the idea that old media pave the way 
for new media is a myth, too: the inequality that served as a barrier to accessing the old 
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media continues to influence access to new media, albeit in different ways. That being said, 
mobile social media look promising, and the manner in which they are used indicates a 
potential for engagement that may turn them into powerful political tools. This chapter 
has also attempted to draw attention to various points where tensions around these issues 
resolve and where they remain.
The next chapter looks at the offline and online political engagement of young citizens 
in the youth forums and other political networks in the region.
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CHAPTER 55
Offline and Online Political Networks
*  A similar version of this chapter, co-authored with Payal Arora, has been submitted for publication in a journal and is 
currently under review. A previous version, under the title ‘Mobile Phones and Digital Divide: An Ethnographic Analysis 
of youth Participation in Politics in Ohangwena Region, Namibia’, was presented at a 24-hour conference held on 26–7 
January 2017 at Tilburg University, Tilburg, the Netherlands.
*
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
Quite a few studies carried out in the past few years indicated that there is a downward 
trend in youth participation in politics and civic engagement, both in the global South and 
in the global North (Cooper, 2014; Fu, Wong, Law, & Yip, 2016; Hao, Wen, & George, 2014; 
Chatora, 2012; Resnick & Casale, 2014; Malila, 2016; Yamamoto, Kushin, & Dalisay, 2016). These 
studies also reported that young citizens are not taking part in elections, are apathetic 
and disengaged, are not members of political parties, and find it difficult to communicate 
with their fellows in various political organizations. Namibia is not an exception in these 
matters. In this general context, an increase in mobile phone subscriptions in Namibia is 
perceived as a game changer: it could significantly increase young people’s engagement in 
civic and political life. The aim of this chapter is to explore how young citizens’ day-to-day 
participation in political activities intersects with their online political enactments.
The conclusion that youth interest and involvement in politics is on the wane has been 
met with both agreement and disagreement (Towner & Muñoz, 2016). All round, there has 
been much discussion of what can be done to attract youngsters into political life, offline 
and online – make them commit; and, again, Namibia takes part in such discussions as much 
as any country. But, for of all these efforts, nothing seems to move the youth in the direction 
of becoming politically active again, either in the global South or in the global North. 
Moreover, a recent study carried out by Lekalake and Gyimah-Boadi (2016) in different African 
countries shows that African youths are less likely than their elders to engage in a variety of 
political and civic activities such as voting, attending community meetings, joining others 
to raise an issue, and contacting leaders. Young women expressed significantly less interest 
in public affairs than young men, as men have greater access to education and employment 
opportunities; and this is part of the country’s colonial legacy of unequal educational 
opportunities, which gave men a relative advantage in the acquisition of cognitive skills 
and financial resources normally associated with active political participation (Portney, 
Eichenberg, & Niemi, 2009). Some scholars (Resnick & Casale, 2014; Lekalake & Gyimah-
Boadi, 2016) further contended that African youths tend to register in large numbers for 
regional and local authority elections in various countries, yet fail to turn up for the actual 
voting. This explains why the voter turnout is always very low in spite of registration results. 
On the other hand, a recent study conducted in South Africa in 2015 (Malila 2016) reveals 
that only 31 per cent of the youth population of this country registered and took part in 
2014 elections. Such findings go to support the notion that youth participation in politics 
is in general decline throughout the world (Ndlovu & Mbenga, 2013; Murti, 2016; Kahne, 
Middaugh, & Allen, 2014; Resnick & Casale, 2011; UN-DESA, 2008; Malila, 2016; Yamamoto et 
al., 2016). 
In Namibia, Evalistus (2015) conducted research on youth participation in the 2014 
elections that took place in Windhoek, the country’s capital (situated in the Khomas region); 
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and he concluded that most of the youths did not vote because they were not interested 
in political change (or in politics in general). His study posited that young people’s apathy 
about elections was mainly caused by the fact that politicians made empty promises and, as 
a result, the youth as a whole felt isolated and cut off from the political process. This is one 
of the very few studies on youth political participation conducted in Namibia. Unfortunately 
Evalistus did not consider youth participation in regional and local politics or in elections 
for regional councils and local authorities, which were characterized by a very low voter 
turnout; he limited himself to exploring young people’s attitudes to and perceptions of 
national and presidential elections. The study also eliminated rural or semi-rural areas and 
used only ‘students’ (a term he employed interchangeably with ‘youth’) from urban areas, 
although some of the young voters came from rural areas. Clearly the population sample on 
which Evalistus worked was not representative enough, bearing in mind that most of the 
rural youths are unemployed individuals and school dropouts. Nevertheless, this study adds 
to the literature that tells us that youths around the globe are becoming less and less active 
in politics in the current climate.
Declining engagement in politics on the part of young citizens in Africa (Lekalake and 
Gyimah-Boadi, 2016), particularly in Namibia, is associated with a number of challenges, 
two important ones being that ageing politicians – the old guard – are clinging to power 
across the political spectrum and that women lack representation in political leadership 
positions (Bandora, 2014; Evalistus, 2015). It is believed that the youth feels that politics is 
for older politicians, who are not inclusive and accommodating when it comes to youth 
empowerment. Makgala and Botlhomilwe (2017) added that the African youth is generally 
disillusioned with politics and civic engagement. Validating this idea are the findings of a 
survey that was conducted by the Electoral Commission of Namibia (ECN) in 2012. This study 
brought to light the existence of many factors that drive youths’ political apathy in Namibia. 
Such factors include perceptions that political activism and engagement does not yield 
results, distrust of political parties and institutions, and lack of access to political leadership. 
Some of the main challenges for youth participation related to these general factors are 
limited opportunities for the young to participate in decision-making processes, and lack 
of capacity development, especially for young women. More than half of the respondents 
(54.6 per cent) thought that the communication tools used by political and civic leaders 
were not attractive to the youth and almost three quarters of them (74.8 per cent) felt that 
regional youth activities had to be linked to national initiatives if they were to attract more 
youths. These are among the key findings of the ECN survey. 
A Namibian Afrobarometer survey conducted in 2014, three years before the ECN 
survey, consolidates the impression that regional councillors do not consistently and 
actively engage the public on the importance of their works in the region. A significant 
number of participants indicated that regional councillors do not consult their communities 
sufficiently. Conversely, 79 per cent of the participants avowed that in the past year they 
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never contacted their councillors, either to report an important problem or to share views 
with them. These findings point to a strong disconnection between politicians and the 
people they serve; and this, in return, explains why community members are disengaged. 
The situation highlights the need for an empirical research that should help to devise a 
possible engagement strategy. And, of curse, engaged citizens would be more likely to 
recognize the importance of subnational government structures such as regional and local 
authorities (IPPR, 2015b).
Observing this trend of youth apathy with some concern, governments across the world 
have been trying to find solutions to this issue. Consistent and convergent results, such as 
the one reported above, can be of service in this respect. In 2009 African governments, 
through their African Youth Charter at the African Union (AU), formulated an African Youth 
Decade Plan of Action whereby each signatory promised to increase youth participation in 
political issues. The decade runs from 2009 to 2018, on the expectation that more youths 
in Africa will be active in politics and civic activities by the end than were at the beginning. 
One of the resolutions adopted by this framework is to use new media, including mobile 
phones, as platforms for attracting young people to politics, especially at regional and local 
governance levels. Namibia is one the countries that signed and ratified the African Youth 
Charter with the main aim of increasing youth political participation and civic engagement 
by 2018. Bearing in mind that the National Youth Act 2009 defines a ‘youth’ in Namibia as a 
citizen between the ages of 18 and 35 years, let me recall that this country has a relatively 
young population, almost 37 per cent of which is under the age of 15, and that the median 
age is 21 (which means that half of the population is below and the other half is above this 
age: NSA, 2014). These figures indicate how crucial the new media resolution adopted by the 
action plan can be for Namibia.
Given the increase in mobile phone and other new media usage, various scholars 
in political communication revealed that mobile phones can be used as a tool for youth 
engagement in regional and local politics. The high number of mobile phone subscriptions 
in the global South (Garcia-Castañon, Rank, & Barreto, 2011) encouraged the hypothesis that 
youths are more active online than offline, and this in turn fuelled a debate. In the digital era, 
youths have different ways of making their voices heard by fellow youths elsewhere in the 
world. Nevertheless, some prefer to remain politically neutral, as they do not understand 
the importance or necessity of being a member of a political party.
The online presence of youths through their mobile phones can help the countries 
that signed the African Youth Decade Charter to achieve their goals of increasing youth 
participation in political issues (Lekalake & Gyimah-Boadi, 2016). Mobile phones and other 
new media such as social networks are virtual extensions of what used to be physically 
localized coffeehouses, restaurants, hotels, salons, and town-level meetings, as proposed by 
subcultures theory (Baker, Robards, & Buttigieg, 2015; Ndlovu & Mbenga, 2013). They serve 
as electronic town halls for the youth – sites where where nationally and geographically 
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dispersed young people can meet and discuss matters that concern them. They create a 
youth subculture sphere, conceived of as a discursive arena where private people come 
together to discuss matters of mutual interest freely, as a public (Baker et al., 2015).
Addressing the 2012 annual ICT Summit in Windhoek, the former minister of ICT in 
Namibia informed the participants that, in that year, mobile phone penetration in Namibia 
passed 110 per cent, with about 2.35 million active customers for both Global System for 
Mobile Communications (GSM) and code-division multiple access (CDMA) combined. 
This figure is higher than the Namibian population. According to the minister, more than 
80,000 customers accessed the Internet through a personal computer or tablet and more 
than 470,000 through their mobile phones, with the result that in 2012 almost 550,000 
users accessed the mobile Internet from various platforms (Kaapanda, 2012). The figure is 
expected to be even higher today, if one looks at the rate of acquisition of mobile phones, 
especially among young people in Namibia.
Despite this interesting growth in new media acquisitions throughout the world, the role 
of mobile phones in engaging youths in regional and local political processes has not been 
satisfactorily examined. In Namibia, no single study can be traced that explores how mobile 
phones are used by young people to participate in regional and local politics. A literature 
on youth political participation in offline and online public activities is, however, emerging 
in sub-Saharan Africa. In order to contribute to it, this chapter discusses the empirical case of 
how youths of the Ohangwena region use their mobile phones to participate in regional and 
local politics for effective service delivery throughout the country. Particularly, it is believed 
that young people often use their mobile phones in order to consume political content and 
to engage with it, and that the platforms these devices offer have the potential to foster 
political participation and civic engagement at the grassroots level of governance, to reduce 
the political passivity of citizens, and to nurture an inclusive democracy (Yamamoto et al., 
2016; Gil de Zúñiga, Molyneux, & Zheng, 2014).
5.2 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION LANDSCAPE
Political communication scholars have defined political participation differently for more 
than two decades, ever since they started deliberating over the concept of youth political 
participation. The latest definition comes from Resnick and Casale (2014), who understand 
political participation as applying to citizens’ activities that aim to influence the selection of 
government personnel and its decisions, for example voting in elections, as well as to more 
informal modalities of engagement, for example meeting community members, contacting 
political representatives, or getting involved in collective action. This is the definition 
adopted here, because I think it has the best chances of helping us to understand young 
Namibians’ use of mobile devices in regional and local politics. 
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Studies revealed that, if political activities are not inclusive and proper channels of 
communication are not used, the result can be political disengagement. Yamamoto et al. 
(2016) defined political disengagement as a negative attitude towards politics that inhibits 
political participation or civic engagement, causing political apathy in young people. Thus 
youth apathy is measured in youths’ unwillingness or reluctance to get involved in any kind 
of political activities, regionally and locally (see also Kruikemeier & Shehata, 2016; Lekalake 
& Gyimah-Boadi, 2016). Youths with high levels of apathy make very little effort, if any, to 
engage politically or civically. As already explained, this kind of attitude among the youth 
can be caused by political cynicism – that is, distrust and lack of confidence in the country’s 
political leaders.
According to Verba and Nie (1972), there are four modes of political participation: voting 
(e.g. being a registered voter and casting a vote); performing campaign activities (e.g. working 
for a political party, or being a party member); contacting public officials (e.g. a government 
official, or elected councillors, traditional leaders, church leaders); and undertaking 
cooperative or communal activities (e.g. participating in a local community meeting, being a 
member of a youth forum or a youth club, volunteering in community or village projects or 
programmes aimed at raising the standard of living for residents). 
Brady (1999: 737) extends the definition of participation to include, ‘actions by ordinary 
citizens directed toward influencing some political outcomes’. Such actions incorporate 
drama, songs, and the use of mobile phones, social media, and music into political 
processes, with the main aim of influencing, attracting, and conveying political messages to 
the masses. Brady’s definition opened the door to inclusive democracy. Inclusive politics is a 
relatively new concept in political science, media studies, and journalism. It involves radical, 
feminist, and liberation movements in the global South that assume that, at the beginning 
of the new millennium, the world faced a multidimensional crisis – economic, ecological, 
social, cultural, and political), which was – and is – caused by the concentration of power in 
the hands of a few elites (Pernice, 2016). To a certain extent, an inclusive democracy requires 
equal distribution of power among citizens at all levels, including at the grassroots level 
of governance represented by regional and local authorities in democratic governments; 
and this in turn leads to direct democracy (Fotopoulos, 1997). Direct democracy means 
listening to the masses and involving them in decision-making by letting them free to voice 
their opinion, criticize social and political processes, and suggest strategies they think can 
improve their standard of living (Schugurensky, 2016). Political participation can also be 
measured in terms of whether or not citizens of a public sphere (normally within a nation-
state) are active members of political parties and trade unions, engage in various civic 
duties, and register to vote – as well as vote (Lall, 2014).
On the African continent, political participation has been regarded as consisting mainly 
of citizens’ presence or active attendance at political rallies, meetings, conferences, and other 
5Offline and Online Political Networks | Chapter 5
89
gatherings of this sort. This kind of presence has been declining, as citizens – particularly 
young citizens – increasingly choose not to attend such meetings in person, since they can 
participate in them digitally (Kruikemeier & Shehata, 2016; Towner & Muñoz, 2016). Empirical 
studies that investigate this phenomenon offer an explanation for it (Mattes & Richardson, 
2015; Dawson, 2014; Fu et al., 2016; Hao et al., 2014). According to these studies, many young 
people nowadays feel that attending political gatherings is a waste of time; they would 
rather stay at home and do some constructive work. 
The present chapter aims at contributing to this debate by suggesting some strategies 
by which political parties, political leaders, government officials, and youth representatives 
to change their way of engaging young people in the democratic political processes even 
in the public debates. I should start by saying that, in this dissertation as a whole, ‘political 
participation’ refers to any act or activity carried out by a citizen with a view to influencing, or 
having an effect on, public decisions about the social, economic, technological, and political 
welfare of that community. According to this definition, taking part in election campaigns 
and voting, attending community and town-hall meetings, or being a member of a regional 
youth forum or youth group that advocates the empowerment of young people are all 
expressions of political participation.
Mchakulu (2007: 96) made the following statement: 
 Youth do not see politics as a solution to their problems, but rather as a source 
of community and economic disruption. Thus, it makes sense that many youth 
avoid political debate and deliberation, or indeed any discussion of political 
empowerment for youth, and instead focus on socio-economic development 
issues.
Yet some research (e.g. Lekalake & Gyimah-Boadi, 2016) reveals, importantly, that many 
youths are not quite as politically passive or disengaged as it is claimed, insofar as they 
remain critically engaged in projects that improve their own lives and the lives of those 
around them. Everyday politics and the personal struggle of young people to try to make 
the best of their lives is entangled in a larger social and political fight. These people, who 
felt disillusioned and alienated from conventional spaces of participation and local politics 
more broadly, acquired a sense of agency and political consciousness through protests 
(Dawson, 2014); and there is great potential there. This is where the political use of mobile 
telephony comes into its own, especially on the matter of political mobilization in places 
such as rural Namibia. As stated before, no study has so far been found that explores this 
problematic.
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5.3  YOUTH POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN 
NAMIBIA
The latest regional and local authority elections in Namibia took place on 27 November 2015. 
The Electoral Commission of Namibia (ECN), which is mandated to strengthen constitutional 
democracy and to promote democratic electoral processes, used various platforms to 
sensitize citizens about elections and other democratic matters prior to the election date. 
It used radio, television, newspapers, the short message service (SMS) on mobile devices, 
and social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter to attract as many youths as 
possible to electoral politics (ECN, 2015). All these steps were taken in order to ensure that 
more Namibians – especially the country’s youth, which is believed to be apathetic and 
uninterested in regional and local politics – register for the elections. Additionally, to secure 
youth participation in the electoral process, the ECN recruited 112 youth ambassadors, all 
between the ages of 18 and 24 years. They were contracted for a period of three months, 
from 15 September to 15 December 2015. Eight youth ambassadors, including youths with 
disabilities, were recruited in each of the 14 regions. These ambassadors assisted voter 
education officers in different regions with the provision of voter and civic education, 
motivated other young persons and people with disabilities in the regions to participate in 
the planned elections, and served to supplement the staff in these regions, in preparation 
for the 2015 elections (ECN, 2015). As a result of this strategy, 1,267,335 voters were registered 
for the 2015 regional council elections and 418,544 voters were registered for the 2015 local 
authority elections (ECN, 2015). In the second case, 44 per cent of the voters consisted of 
youths. This was the largest number on record for young people registered for elections 
after independence in 1990 (ECN, 2015). 
Surprisingly, though, the voter turnout was relatively low for both the regional council 
and the local authority elections – namely 39.8 per cent for the former and 36.6 per cent for 
the latter (ECN, 2015). The reason why the turnout was so low when a high number of people 
registered for elections is not known.
Low voter turnout for regional council and local authority elections has been a concern 
in Namibia. In fact, only the first round of these elections, of 1992 recorded high voter 
turnouts, of 82 per cent and 81 per cent respectively; all subsequent elections at these 
levels have seen very low voter turnouts (ECN, 2015). For example, the voter turnout for local 
authority and regional council elections in 2010 was 33 per cent and 38 per cent respectively. 
So the 2015 elections were no exception in this regard. And, along with voter turnout for 
these elections, the overall participation of young Namibians in straightforwardly political 
activities has been generally low (Motsamai, 2015), in spite of their more diffuse participation 
in politics through engagement in life-improving projects, as discussed at the end of the 
previous section.
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What is more, the 2015 post-election report of the Namibian Institute for Democracy 
(NID) compounded the growing concern about young people’s lack of engagement in 
regional and local politics by signalling a similar attitude of apathy to national elections. 
Voter apathy in the 2015 presidential and National Assembly elections was higher than in 
2014, although even then the majority of voters were elderly people and youths registered 
a low turnout (Motsamai, 2015).
Now, regional and local authorities are important elements in Namibia’s governance 
system, as they are tasked with bringing government services closer to the people in 
terms of delivery and development at the grassroots level (IPPR, 2015b). These bodies are 
regulated respectively by the Regional Councils Act no. 22 of 1992 and by the Local Authority 
Councils Act no. 23 of 1992. Regional councillors are elected by the masses and are expected 
to engage citizens in local decision-making processes. They must facilitate and maximize 
these citizens’ participation in the affairs of their communities; in other words, they must act 
to promote democratic inclusiveness and bring the government closer to the people. It is at 
this level of governance structure that the leadership, both political and civic, is expected to 
stimulate broad public participation in the development of democracy and the deepening 
of its processes (IPPR, 2015b). This is why decline of interest in this particular area of political 
life is of great concern, especially when it comes from the country’s youth.
In this chapter I will propose a solution to the problem of low participation of young 
people in regional-level politics, in Namibia and elsewhere in the world. The solution I 
wish to suggest capitalizes on two main factors: the increasing number of subscriptions for 
mobile phones across the country; and the potential of digital political platforms to facilitate 
and stimulate even offline political engagements.
5.4 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
This section presents findings from my ethnographic fieldwork in the Ohangwena region. 
The research question that led this exploratory part of my study was this: How do young 
people in the Ohangwena Regional Youth Forum (ORYF) participate in civic and political 
activities by using their mobile phones? 
My fieldwork took me into four key areas, on which I will consequently focus in this chapter. 
These areas correspond to the following questions: 
1. Who are the young and what motivates them to take part in regional and local 
politics? 
2. What civic and political activities do they get involved in by using their mobile 
phones? Are these strictly online activities, or are offline, real-life activities triggered 
through the mobile phone as well?
3. How do young people communicate with their fellows, both in and outside the 
region, to share political messages and information? 
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4. What are the constraints or challenges that affect what I would call the ‘mobile’ 
participation of youngsters in politics and their ‘mobile’ civic engagement in 
public affairs? 
The findings are presented according to the themes that emerged during the data analysis, 
which are encapsulated in the subheadings of this section.
5.4.1  Political Platforms for Youth Employment, Political Dialogue, and Survival 
Politics
This part of the study explored the reasons why the young people in my survey joined 
regional or constituency youth forums. Many of them had been unemployed for a long time; 
quite a few others were self-employed. Most of these young citizens were aged between 18 
and 35 years, male, and driven by the common goal of bringing development into their 
constituencies. The majority had mobile phones, but a few of them did not. The latter said 
that they always received information from their friends, when they meet. Overall, my 
results indicated that most of the forum members were literate (they could read and write) 
and came from families of working people. Only one member in this forum was unable to 
speak or understand English. 
Lameck, an unemployed 26-year-old, stated his reasons for joining the forum thus:
 What motivated me is that I spent too much time at home and I have been seeing 
my fellow youths going to several places and participating in different activities, so I 
realized that this was a good thing compared to just being home doing nothing, so 
let me join so that I can be like my fellow youths participating in different activities.
Gadana, a self-employed 26-year-old, said:
 I decided to join the youth forum so that I can negotiate and talk about how to 
bring development in our constituency. Second thing I noticed in our constituency 
is that we have a high rate of unemployment in our community and more youth 
employment opportunities need to be created.
This tells us, interestingly, that forums are or can be used by members as a networking 
platform for youth employment in the region. 
Kamilo, an 18-year-old, gave the following account of his reasons for joining a youth forum:
 I have joined because I want to socialize with my fellow youth, to share ideas. I 
am unemployed and have no other source of income … here I mean to put ideas 
together with my fellow youths and discuss young people[’s] related matters … [I] 
like to talk about the right things that can help young people.
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The quotations above reveal that a need for networking and local political change rather 
than national political dialogue was the decisive motivational factor for most of the young 
people: they joined forums in their constituencies in order to discuss matters that affect their 
lives. These young people also debated over developmental issues such as youth projects in 
the region, to see whether there will be change and socioeconomic development growth. 
These findings are consistent with those of Kahne, Lee, and Feezell (2013), Kahne et al. (2014), 
and Roberts (2015), who discovered that young people’s engagement in some form of non-
political activity can serve as a gateway to participation in civic and political life such as 
volunteering, community problem solving, protesting, and having a political voice. My 
findings can also be seen as continuing the debate that emerges from Gökçe-Kızılkaya and 
Onursal-Beşgül (2017), who claimed that youth forums in Turkey (called there youth assem-
blies) are an important venue for the youth to make their voices heard. My study extends this 
conclusion in the areas of young people’s employment, survival, and political networking.
5.4.2 Online and Offline Politics
In the forums, young people come up with their timetable for weekly meetings, choose 
their chairperson and other officials, as prescribed in the National Youth Act 3 of 2009, and 
make sure that the forum is registered with the relevant authorities in the region. In these 
meetings young people discuss issues that affect them, and they do so by exchanging ideas 
on how to go about resolving them or by alerting the relevant office about their issue. I 
spoke to Simon, an employed 24-year-old, who gave me this picture:
 When we [youths] meet, we come up with different ideas of role play, topics for 
dramas, and ways of motivating each other so that our group will continue to move 
forward, we encourage other youths to join [us,] and we go to schools showing 
them what we have prepared in our club. 
According to Simon, people in his group learnt a lot of things during their discussions.
 These young people usually discuss matters of direct relevance and concern to them, 
such as HIV/AIDS, teenage pregnancies, alcohol and drugs abuse, unemployment, 
and project proposal-writing skills. Sometimes they also share ideas on how to 
complete application forms for employment and such like.
Edie, a 23-year-old, stated:
 Sometimes we discuss and educate ourselves on how to prevent ourselves from 
contracting HIV/AIDS and to also respect our culture. We also discuss issues 
concerning politics.
One important point needs to be mentioned here: most of the young people felt that it 
would be better if all members in the region were to have mobile phones, so as to be able to 
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discuss some private and very confidential issues (e.g. HIV status, pregnancies, sex) online, 
because obviously not all youths are always free to talk about such matters openly during 
meetings. They thought that online discussions are friendlier and more private and that, 
in consequence, youths can discuss all the delicate aspects of their problems there. This is 
an important finding for my dissertation insofar as it enables me to argue that the culture 
of the youth forum space fosters new forms of interaction and openness. In this respect 
youth forums are unlike the more traditional political spaces, for example meetings, which 
discourage more intimate exchanges – because entrenched cultural enactments of what 
these spaces are for have marked them and the kinds of practices that can emerge from 
them (Arora, 2012).
My research shows that the members of the ORYF form a diverse group of individuals. 
This element of diversity doesn’t quite fit with Gökçe-Kızılkaya and Onursal-Beşgül’s (2017) 
conclusion that only a small number of youths use unconventional method of political 
participation such as youth forums or assemblies, which seems to suggest a restricted and 
somewhat uniform (or at least less diverse) composition. At any rate, it emerged clearly from 
my study that the number of youths who take part in non-political activities such as youth 
forums, both online and offline, is rather large.
5.4.3 Perspectives on Political Participation in the Public Sphere
While doing fieldwork in the region, I also explored young citizens’ understanding of 
the concept of political participation. Most participants were asked to define or describe 
political participation in their own words and supplied unique answers. For instance, 
Ndapu, an unemployed 20-year-old, ventured this description: ‘it is the ability to influence or 
convince others to accept or reject a certain policy or political ideology, for example’. Anna, 
an employed 26-year-old, offered an analogy: she said that, to her, political participation is 
‘like when I am influenced by my friend who likes dancing and now I follow him too so that 
we can all be dancing’.
Anna’s analogy suggests that participation in politics takes different forms. One may 
never know that what he or she is involved in is politics (Abdalla, 2016). Interestingly, Lahya, 
a 29-year-old, also employed, has a different idea of political participation. To her, this 
phrase captures situations such as ‘when taking part in elections to vote for the people who 
are going to represent us in a certain team or party’.
All these attempts reveal that, to the youth, political participation has to do with 
influencing others, with taking part in elections, and with performing activities in and for 
the community. 
A few young people did not bother to attempt to explain their understanding of the 
term at all, claiming that they were not interested in politics and would not know what 
political participation is. They said they believed that those interested in politics could 
define it better, so they would leave the task to them.
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5.4.4 Political Ideologies, Family Politics, and Constitutional Obligations
During observations of youth meetings and semi-structured interviews with members of 
ORYF, I found out that most youngsters in this group belonged to the South West People’s 
Organization (SWAPO), which is the current ruling party in Namibia; the current president 
is a member of this party. There were, however, young people who had enrolled in other 
political parties in the region, such as the Democratic Turnhale Alliance (DTA), the Rally for 
Democracy and Progress (RDP), and the Congress of Democrats (COD). 
Some of these youths came to the meetings wearing their party mascots and insignia. 
I asked them why they did this, and they responded that the dress code ‘is a symbol’ of 
their ‘political affiliation’ and they ‘cannot hide it’. A few told me that they joined this or 
that political party because they were in agreement with its ideology and political line and 
would like to make a difference in the lives of their fellow young citizens in the region. For 
example this participant, when asked why she joined a political party, said:
 I belong to [name withheld] simply because it’s where most of the youth are … 
most of the youth are on the side of [name withheld] because we are trying to fight 
against poverty, ok, I do not want to talk about other political parties, I just want to 
say, I think they are not, they are not fighting against that. (Ndeshi, 25, unemployed)
But I received a different angle from the forum’s vice chair, who stated her reasons for 
belonging to a political party as follows:
 I joined a political party because we have been told that when you turn 18 years 
you need to vote and to vote you need to be a member of a political party. I made a 
choice of joining a political party that brings development in my region or country. 
(Caro, 24, employed)
A number of participants said that they were not members of any political party, either 
because they were not interested in politics or because they were not impressed with the 
existing political parties and their manifestos. Still others clearly indicated that they were 
not aware of the benefits of belonging to a political party. 
Among existing members of political parties, it turned out that some youths had joined 
simply because their parents were members of the same organization. However, these were 
only a few and indicated that they tended not to attend party meetings or rallies, which they 
did not consider to be ‘beneficial’ to them (on this attitude, see also Resnick & Casale, 2014). 
Finally, I had occasion to register a certain degree of confusion and ignorance across the 
whole spectrum. A few young people were registered as members of political parties but 
did not really know why they had joined them. On the other hand, other youths were not 
registered at all because they did not know what procedure to follow in order to join and 
become a party member.
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5.4.5 Communication and Mobile Connectivity
Mobile phone subscriptions in the Ohangwena region have been increasing recently. In 
2011, out of 43,723 households in the region, 23,247 – 53.1 per cent – owned a mobile device; 
this is a good indicator of acquisition. Some constituencies, for example Omundaungilo, 
rated low on the criterion of mobile phone ownership per household: only 370 out of 1,169 
– 32 per cent – households reported owning a mobile phone in 2011 (NSA, 2014). But the 
majority of young people in semi-urban areas such as Eenhana, Ohangwena, Oshikango, 
Ohaukelo, and Eembaxu are reported to own mobile phones; and they use them mainly to 
communicate with their fellows. In Eenhana, the capital of the region, every other young 
person I saw had a mobile phone and one in three youths was engaged in conversation 
on the mobile phone or busy with it in some other way. It was interesting to observe that 
those who were talking into their mobiles were either speaking loud or using a lot of body 
language, especially by raising their arms.
Participants in my study were asked how they communicate with fellow forum members 
in the region, particularly those who are not on the executive team. Most of them answered 
that for the most part they make use of mobile phones (see also Aricat, 2015): they call, they 
text through the SMS, or they use social media (since most political parties have Facebook 
pages). However, I also noted that in most cases such communications are not about party 
politics but mainly friendship talk, sharing of information about study opportunities and 
vacancies, and requests of advice from peers on how to overcome challenges such as 
loneliness and stress (see also Yamamoto et al., 2016).
Additionally, 50 per cent of the interviewed young citizens acknowledged that they 
have local WhatsApp groups for their parties: for example, in the Ohangwena region there 
is an Ohangwena SWAPO Party WhatsApp group. That’s the main place where they discuss 
political issues that affect their daily lives as citizens and residents of the region. 
All this casts doubts on the validity of some of the conclusions reached by scholars 
such as de Vreese and Elenbaas (2008), who stated that new media have a negative impact 
on the political participation of a country’s youth, as they can be used to instill distrust or 
cynicism in an audience (Mitchelstein & Boczkowski, 2010; Strömbäck & Shehata, 2010), thus 
alienating its members from political or civic activities. Only a few among my participants 
communicate with their fellow party members on social media as a matter of course. Their 
communication tends to be hampered by the digital divide, as not all the young people in 
rural areas have Internet connectivity or access to the Internet; but they still believe that the 
mobile phone helps them to communicate with their peers. A thorough analysis of social 
media pages and groups will be done in chapter 7, which looks specifically at the discourses, 
relationships, and debates that are formed or take place on those platforms.
When I spoke to Caro about how ORYF members use mobile phones to communicate 
with their peers, she said: ‘we communicate with them usually through their cell phones by 
calling, sending SMS, and most of the time at conferences’. Caro’s statement supports what 
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Herman Wasserman (2011) found in one of the studies he conducted in Africa: Africans use 
mobile phones in their everyday life to take photographs, make films, search the Internet, 
and, increasingly, for social networking. Other studies (e.g. Berger, 2011; Essoungou, 2010; 
Etzo & Collender, 2010) were able to expand the list. Africans also use their mobile phones 
to transfer money, check market prices for products on sales and in auctions, monitor and 
observe elections, and send and receive public health or emergency messages.
I observed that some of the young citizens who have mobile phones inform others, who 
do not, of any news they receive through their mobiles. This created a culture of sharing in 
the village. Paulus, a 27-year-old, remarked:
 Because as a team, if you know that someone plays soccer but you cannot tell them 
through the phone because maybe the person cannot read, we tell them face to 
face by walking long distances to their houses and others that can read we text 
them to meet at the field, and sometimes youth likes bars, we pick them up or 
sometimes we whistle because the field is near and they come.
This is another way of sharing news or information in the absence of relevant media such as 
newspapers, television, and so on; and it takes into account that most of the young people 
can always be found at cuca shops.5 Their fellows have to reach them in this way, so that 
everyone receives the latest information. As for those who cannot read and write, their 
friends visit them in person, at home, to deliver the message or to read it out for them; and 
sometimes they spend up to five hours only to reach a friend’s house.
Tuhafeni, a 25-year-old, gives a good picture of the challenges of spreading the news 
in time:
 Most of the times we use cell phones as our chairperson has all members’ cell 
phone numbers by short messages or [we] send the message to the counsellor and 
announce it through the radio but sometimes we fail as this information does not 
reach us on time and we are far from each other.
This picture is supported by Gabs, an unemployed 24-year-old:
 In most cases, we communicate through mobile phones by sending short messages 
because at some places we do not have network. Our colleagues normally send 
short messages but we receive them late, although this is the only way we can 
communicate and deliver information to one another, there is no other way because 
we are not living in the same place.
5  Cuca shops are privately owned small business entities in rural areas that sell mostly basic necessities along with 
traditional alcoholic beverages such as Otombo, ginger, and Okatokele. Most of these shops do not have operating hours, 
as they are less regulated.
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It is very clear that, owing to the considerable distance between their houses or from a house 
to a meeting point, young people choose to communicate through their mobile phones: 
this is their best and most efficient option. When it comes to affordability, sending messages 
to others seems the best option too: MTC, which is the largest mobile telecommunication 
operator in Namibia, has special promotion packages of recharge vouchers with pre-loaded 
free data bundles for Internet, WhatsApp, the short message service (SMS), and Facebook. 
These bundles come with the recharge voucher that a customer buys. Such packages work 
especially well for those who have good mobile network or Internet connectivity.
5.4.6 Politics and Digital Divide
Most of the villages in my study have limited power or electricity. Although most of the young 
people in these villages do have mobile phones, they can be left with them uncharged for 
up to three days in a row, if they do not find someone to take them to a place where there 
is power or to bring their phones back once they have been charged. The situation is a 
little different for young people who live in remote villages, far away from towns. In those 
villages there are houses with solar panels; however, villagers have to pay at least N$5.00 
to charge their phones, as requested by panel owners. The owners’ justification for asking 
villagers to pay is that, if panels get damaged or need to be repaired, they need to be able 
to pay – and the charging fee would cover just such costs. However, it was revealed that 
solar panels generate income for their owners’ families and that phone charging has turned 
into a kind of rural entrepreneurship. The situation makes it difficult for the elderly and the 
young unemployed to charge their phones daily, since they have no adequate funds for it. 
As Wasserman (2011: 149) stated in one of the studies, ‘[f]or many Africans, the handsets 
(mobile phones) are too expensive and running costs are too high to permit full use of the 
capabilities offered by mobile technologies’.
In some villages of the region, network connectivity tends to be good around midnight. 
The young people with whom I spoke told me that midnight is the only time when they can 
access the Internet or make phone calls. I asked Ileka, a 25-year-old rural resident, to explain 
to me the reason for this and I received the following comment:
 During the day, the network is very weak … so you will find some people waiting 
until midnight to go and look for a specific point where they normally access the 
network. But this is better than during that time when there were no mobile phones 
in the village, says Ileka.
At my prompting, another rural resident, 24-year-old Matias, talked to me about the 
challenges that youths in rural areas experience when using their mobile phones for political 
participation. Matias observed that ‘[s]hops are very far … some of the youths in the village 
never even used a phone before … we are really in need of shops and network connectivity 
in this village’.
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Supporting this is 20-year-old Krista, who expanded:
 Even if you have a mobile phone you can stay even for a week or two without using 
it as there is no network coverage … we sometimes get the network at one spot in 
the neighbor’s field but that one you have to go there around 12 o’clock midnight 
… it is very risky as we have wild animals too here.
The excerpts above are generally consistent with the results of a study that was conducted 
in remote rural locations in Ghana and Malawi. The study describes how the few people 
who possessed mobile phones in those areas were often seen to be walking to particular 
points where signal can be obtained – most commonly a hilltop (Porter, Hampshire, 
Abane, Munthali, Robson, Mashiri, & Tanle, 2012). According to the authors, no shops in 
the researched areas sold credit or mobile phones. The situation I found in Ohangwena 
presents some striking similarities in that young people in rural areas of this region seem 
to have problems of network connectivity, which are compounded by the fact that shops 
are quite remote from the villages. But there is a difference: in Ohangwena mobile phone 
ownership is high – 43.5 per cent, as reported earlier, in chapter 4 (see p. 65) – which, taken 
together with Matias’ and Krista’s statements, indicates that owning a mobile phone is not 
really a problem in the region, as it is in Ghana and Malawi. The real problems here are 
network coverage and power supply, on account of which even those who possess mobiles 
are unable to use them daily – unlike their peers in urban areas. But the words of Matias 
and Krista also suggest a real appreciation for mobile telephony: it is clear that, for all the 
difficulties of communicating, young rural people compare favourably the current period, 
when this possibility exists, with the earlier days when there were no mobile devices in their 
villages.
A final point relates the digital divide to something I noted in the previous section. As 
we have seen there, young people with mobile phones in the villages act as what may be 
called village messengers; in this respect, as political intermediaries, one may consider them 
an extension of Internet intermediaries, that is, facilitators who bring third parties to the 
Internet, mediate online communication and enable various forms of online expression (see 
MacKinnon, Hickok, Bar, & Hai-in 2015). This kind of function is shared by Google’s search 
engine, Twitter’s social network, and Vodafone’s telecommunication and Internet services. 
There is now a literature on political intermediaries that shows how today’s intermediaries 
are increasingly focusing on the machine and not on the human. This line of research 
emphasizes the role of technology in facilitating various kinds of political contact and 
engagement: in a nutshell, technology supports human agency. 
But in the specific context of rural Ohangwena, which is determined by the digital 
divide, human agency plays a rather heavy part, which is crucial to this ‘intermediation’. 
People with messages ask for the number of a nearby youth who has a mobile phone; then 
they send him or her a message that has to be passed on to the right recipients. According to 
Chapter 5 | Offline and Online Political Networks
100
the respondents interviewed by me, this procedure really helps people to send and receive 
messages within and outside their village, although it is time-consuming, as messengers 
have to walk long distances to the recipients’ houses.
5.4.7  Young People’s Political Apathy and Cynicism: Towards an Emerging Mobile 
Society
While in the region, I attended some community meetings and informal gatherings along 
with the youth forum meetings, with the main aim of observing the use of mobile phones 
on those occasions. Additionally, I also wanted to see how many young people attended 
them. I noticed that, as a rule, only a few young people would turn up for public meetings, 
no matter whether the latter were called up by political leaders or by traditional leaders 
such as village headmen or committee chairs. At one meeting that was addressed by a 
constituency councillor only a handful of young citizens turned up. Some of them stood and 
listened for few minutes, then left. The meeting was attended instead by elderly people and 
children, who discussed issues facing their community such as corruption, water shortage, 
lack of electricity, poor network connectivity, lack or gravel roads, and alcohol and drug 
abuse among young people, especially school-age children.
To complete the picture, the semi-structured interviews I carried out revealed that 
young people were no longer interested in physical, face-to-face community meetings 
conducted by the councillors; and the distance that separated their homes from to the 
meeting points added to this general lack of interest. Nevertheless, they made efforts to 
attend their youth forum meetings. Many young people have their reasons as to why they 
do not attend those meetings. Caro told me this:
 I think the reason for the youths’ low attendance at those meetings called for by the 
headmen or by the councillors is that most of the youths in the villages do not get 
assistance from our elders [= politicians] and neither do they discuss youth-related 
matters such as unemployment and study opportunities. You always find these 
elders talking about housing but we do not have houses.
This is interesting to compare with the following conclusion of a study conducted by 
Lekalake and Gyimah-Boadi for the network Afrobarometer:
 Less than half (47 per cent) of the 18- to 35-year-olds who participated … say they 
attended a community meeting at least once during the previous year, while 40 per 
cent joined others to raise an issue (vs 57 per cent and 47 per cent for older citizens). 
Young women’s participation lags behind that of their male peers (by 9 percentage 
points, on average). (Lekalake & Gyimah-Boadi, 2016)
Some young people also consider that public meetings summoned by councillors are for 
politicians only and, even more specifically, for ruling party members. Since most of the 
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councillors are members of the SWAPO, which is the ruling party, youths who are neither 
members nor supporters of the SWAPO simply do not attend such meetings, which they 
think are not designed for them.
During a youth meeting that was held at the Oshikango constituency office in 
Ohangwena in August 2016, a youth officer from the Ministry of Youth raised her concern 
about the manner in which youths were taking part in civic and political gatherings. She 
asserted that some of them lacked the interest to attend local meetings or to participate 
in community discussions. As this youth officer presented the situation, only a few youths 
usually attend such meetings, and yet this is where their problems are supposed to be 
discussed and where actions could be taken to address them. She also made the point that 
in some constituencies there were WhatsApp groups, but that some youths developed 
an attitude of reading the notifications on WhatsApp without really, actively participating 
in the discussion – part of the phenomenon now known as clicktivism or slacktivism. At 
this meeting, youths claimed in response that they did not get the messages as they were 
announced on the radio; moreover, they said they hardly listen to the radio. They blamed 
the councillor for not using the right sorts of platforms, such as their mobile phones or their 
WhatsApp group, where the young people are, in order to reach them and deliver messages 
about meetings. They wanted the councillor to use all the available platforms on which the 
youth can be reached, so that no one would feel left out.
Most of the young people to whom I spoke at various meetings or during interviews 
revealed that they and their peers would not show up at events or meetings where they do 
not get anything to eat, or where they have to pay for anything instead of receiving money 
themselves. They wanted to be rewarded for attending a meeting. My participants further 
claimed that there is a lack of morale among the young citizens in terms of their involvement 
in public debates or political issues. One young citizen commented on this and advised 
others to attend community meetings so that they may learn, gain and get more information. 
He also criticized young people’s habit of wasting time in bars and not gaining anything, 
when what they needed was to join youth groups and educate themselves. Another young 
citizen, a youthful forum member, mentioned the topic of youth volunteerism in relation 
to public debates and discussions and stated that some young people lacked that courage 
to be volunteers. She put great emphasis on youth disengagement from public issues and 
debates, which is a matter of concern and contributes to explaining why young people will 
not get the right information at the right time.
These findings challenge those of a survey conducted for Afrobarometer (see Lekalake 
& Gyimah-Boadi 2016), which concluded that attendance at political campaign rallies is the 
most popular form of pre-electoral engagement among young Africans. Interestingly, the 
Afrobarometer survey also stated that 33 per cent of the country’s youth – in other words, 
about one third – attended at least one such rally in 2015, by comparison to 37 per cent of 
the older citizens. My findings raise a question mark about this result as well. (The gender 
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gap in participation in rallies averages 10 percentage points.)
I asked forum members which group usually predominates in the meetings held in their 
communities. Was it political representatives or traditional leaders? They confirmed that it is 
mostly older adults who attend the meetings, while young adults are very few; in consequence, 
rallies and other gatherings tend to be organized by political party representatives. Some 
of the young citizens were of the view that the mobile phone can offer a solution out of the 
impasse of youth participation. Hence they were in the process of appealing to their political 
and civic leaders, asking them to consider diverging to these platforms so that more young 
people can be engaged in regional and local political discussions; this would create digital 
inclusivity. They proposed that these leaders have mobile numbers for all young people in 
their constituencies and always send them messages or invite them to meetings by phone. 
According to 34-year-old Jack,
 Mobile phones can engage the youth to get off the streets and be able to join these 
meetings. There are some people [youth] who spend most of their time at home 
and they are mostly on their phones … Most information is obtained through the 
phone. Therefore if they use mobile phones it will be a good way to inform the 
youth and get most of them to attend meetings digitally.
Forum members also suggested that choosing leaders from the youth would have a very 
healthy effect overall. They pointed out that there were very few young people in leadership 
positions in the region, and this had a discouraging effect, especially since the young did 
not have role models to follow at those meetings, where they needed them most.
5.4.8 Religion as an Offline Political Outreach
Since I spent most of the time in the region throughout my research, I listened to the 
radio every day when councillors were making announcements, sharing information, or 
discussing local matters. This gave me practical examples of how councillors and other 
leaders in Ohangwena used the radio to convey messages from different offices, give 
feedback on complaints raised by residents, and inform them about job opportunities or 
application forms for employment, about scholarships, or about the availability of other 
services at their offices. However, my observation notes reveal that only a few of the young 
people used the radio to transmit information or messages to their leaders. It was mainly (if 
not only) the councillors who kept informing their communities through this channel; there 
was no two-way traffic, and this made the radio less engaging than it should have been. 
I also attended some Sunday church services where, after the main service, councillors 
used the opportunity to address the citizens already gathered there and talked to them 
about issues that affected their region. This puts the church in Ohangwena right at the hart 
of the debate around John Rawls’ theory of liberal democracy and liberal citizenship. This 
theory regards the act of informing individuals as vital protection and as guarantee of a fair 
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political process. In consequence, according to Rawls, in such a regime leaders can make 
use of religious events to convey political messages that are for the common good, but are 
not about party politics (Greenawalt, 1990). One issue broached at an after-service church 
gathering of this kind was the distribution of drought relief food (DRF)6 by the government, 
which one councillor attempted to explain to the public. As the result to the severe drought 
in the region, this relief distribution programme was changed so that not everyone was 
supposed to receive the free food, because the existing amount of it would not have been 
enough. Councillors and committee members had a tough time explaining the rationale 
behind restrictions in the distribution of relief food and convincing the residents of their 
justice. Their main argument was that Ohangwena is one of the regions that usually receive 
a good rainfall and in most cases residents survive on their mahangu (pearl millet) and other 
traditional food they harvest in their fields.
5.5 CONCLUSION
Let me summarize the findings discussed in this chapter. Many of the young people who are 
members of ORYF are unemployed and in their early twenties. They are trying to improve 
their grade 10 or 12 at a nearby tuition centre and have less education than their peers, as 
most of them did not go to university. On the whole, these people tend to stay at home 
or hang around bars and cuca shops; and, when connectivity is reliable (if it ever is) and 
there is network coverage, they actively discuss issues of public concern with their fellows, 
digitally. However, the dominant group of youths who take part in such discussions consists 
of employed people and of urban residents.
The chapter further concluded that youth forums are used as a good network for 
employment and source of political identity. Their members derive from them a sense 
of purpose (instead of killing time, for example), since they use them to discuss issues of 
political survival. They function as political dialoguing platforms where young people 
can practice re-energizing exercises in order to become more active in their regional 
developmental approach. The sociopolitical issues that young people discuss in these 
forums are mainly teenage pregnancies, alcohol and drug abuse, and HIV/AIDs. Members 
also give encouragement to their disengaged peers, to boost their morale; and they offer 
tips on project proposal writing. These issues emerged as a result of high prevalence in the 
region; young people felt that most of them were falling victim and hence needed to create 
awareness and sensitization about these problems, in order to protect themselves and their 
families against them.
6  This is a government programme of distributing food to residents who have been hit hard by the drought. Food is free, in 
order to ensure that no one will die of hunger.
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A third important conclusion is that young people have indeed developed a negative 
attitude of political cynicism and apathy towards attending physical, offline meetings 
in the region, but this happened only because they felt (and continue to feel) that they 
are neglected rather than valued (Evalistus, 2015). My fieldwork confirms Mattes and 
Richardson’s (2015) claim that many youths nowadays do not attend meetings offline, in the 
physical world. According to Kirigha, Mukhongo, and Masinde (2016), too, young people’s 
presence at these meetings has been declining; these citizens in particular choose not to 
attend in person since they can participate digitally instead. 
Young people in these communities face many challenges and are under severe 
constraints, which also play a part in restricting their civic and political contributions and 
degree of engagement and participation. I list some of these challenges and constraints 
here (and see also Chatora, 2012): 
 ∙ the unemployment rate among the Namibian young citizens aged 15–35 is very 
high; 
 ∙ there is a good deal of favouritism when opportunities for employing young people 
in the region open up; 
 ∙ poor network coverage, cultural hierarchies and protocols at community meetings 
create barriers and handicaps; 
 ∙ access to proper road infrastructures and other road networks is poor too; 
 ∙ young people have a weak representation at decision-making level; 
 ∙ when it comes to new media and their effects on the country’s social development, 
public and political literacy is low in Ohangwena, among both young citizens and 
senior leaders; 
 ∙ the digital divide between semi-urban and rural young people is widening, and the 
situation is not helped by the lack of mechanisms from political leaders to support 
all youths, regardless of their political affiliation. 
Young Namibians are often portrayed as apathetic or inactive and uninterested in politics in 
the real world, offline; but, if we consider all the elements of the situation, such descriptions 
can be misleading, or at any rate do not represent the entire truth. These youths need only a 
platform that is free from interference from other political agents. My findings demonstrate 
that, together, regional and constituency youth forums have created an emerging public 
sphere for the local community and that there is here a space for youths and other 
disadvantaged groups to discuss solutions to local socioeconomic problems. On this 
basis, the chapter suggests that a new relationship between political participation, civic 
engagement, and new media use should be theorized.
Loader, Vromen, and Xenos (2014) defined engagement as conventional forms of 
political participation and political knowledge among citizens in any country. Wasserman 
and Garman’s (2014) findings from their research in South Africa reveal that young South 
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Africans who were interviewed as part of the study are disengaged from politics and find 
that the media do not speak to, or connect with, their everyday lives. On the basis of my 
results, this conclusion applies to Namibia as well, at least at the present stage. Hence a 
recommendation was made by the young participants in my study that more active youths 
be appointed to executive positions in the region, so as to attract fellow youths to these 
gatherings.
Another major conclusion from this chapter is that, to the young people of Ohangwena, 
‘politics’ does not necessarily have to do with party politics but is mainly tied to survival, 
employment, identity, and youth empowerment, as these youths are the future leaders of the 
country. However, they also take participating in electoral processes such as elections and 
being a member of a political party as constitutional obligations that permit them to elect 
their leaders of choice and to belong to the political party whose ideologies match their 
own aspirations and understanding of social development. 
This allows me to get back and restate a previous conclusion from an enriched 
perspective. The chapter’s balanced view is that, deep down, these young people are not 
really apathetic about politics; they are politically engaged – but in a different manner from 
the one familiar to us from the past. As daily users of the Internet, they may prefer to show 
their interest by committing to online political groups, where they can harness the Internet’s 
resources to their advantage (Hao et al., 2014). Young people are now using these political 
groups as a means of doing politics among themselves and of discussing matters of public 
interests. They meet to share, educate themselves, and entertain one another on specific 
matters.
Additionally, one can conclude from this entire part of my study that young people were 
using mobile phones mainly to make direct calls, to send messages to their relatives, friends, 
and fellow youths, and generally to share and convey important information. They were 
taking advantage of preloaded data bundles that come with various recharge vouchers – 
bundles that usually include free SMS, free WhatsApp, and free Facebook. Such packages 
enabled them to create a digital public and platforms where they can discuss youth-
related issues all by themselves, without the presence of the elderly or politicians. New 
media, including mobile phones, are regarded as tools that can be employed by citizens to 
engage in discussions that touch on matters of national concern – such as land distribution, 
corruption, political ideologies, and other social issues – within a newly defined sphere 
known as ‘the virtual sphere’ (Habermas, 1989; Papacharissi & Rubin, 2000; Papacharissi, 
2010; Mudhai, 2013). These online discussions should be encouraged and emphasized by 
national leaders at all times, and especially when the aim is to encourage young people to 
participate actively in democratic processes such as elections and community development 
initiatives.
Young people’s direct participation to civic and political life with the help of mobile 
phones creates the premise for an inclusive and direct digital democracy, wherein each and 
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every person feels part of a larger group and contributes to solutions to the common plight. 
The mobile phone also gives access to social media platforms that can further strengthened 
this component of democratic participation to the public sphere.
The spread of the Internet in conjunction with mobile telephony has led to the emergence 
of a new form of citizen participation in many sub-Saharan African countries. While this 
movement and its impact are less obvious in Africa than in Europe and the United States, 
vibrant online communities exist in many countries, and citizen journalists are increasingly 
using digital technologies such as blogs, SMS, social networks, microblogs, video-sharing 
platforms, and mapping to report and comment on a wide range of topics (Mutsvairo & 
Columbus, 2012). Associated as they are with this reshaping of the public sphere, mobile 
phones are hailed as symbols of a revival of bottom-up, participatory democracy in the 
West; and we would like to see this happening in the global South as well. 
There are, however, some caveats. For one thing, it seems that young Namibians have 
less trust in online posts on social media than do their western counterparts. This is the 
reason why they tend to prefer using their mobiles for discussions more than as points of 
entry on social media sites, although the situation is very nuanced, changeable, and hard 
to appreciate on this front. In fact SMS and direct calling turn out to be the communicating 
modalities that young people in my study prefer or make most use of. But we must not 
forget that only a few indicated that they use them for political engagement. There is still a 
lot of work to be done to put the mobile phone on the map, making it into an instrument of 
participatory democracy.
Although the Namibian government passed an information and communication 
technology (ICT) bill to regulate social media communications and made it clear that 
Internet communication is subject to the same laws that govern offline politics, it has kept 
its promise of not blocking online political communication. Therefore young people are 
still able to deliberate freely, online, on national issues. The study on which this chapter 
is based has inevitable limitations, since it meant to examine only the young people of 
Ohangwena; to get a more comprehensive picture of how Namibian or African youths use 
their mobile phones to engage in regional and local politics, one should now design a study 
that covers all the country’s regions (it would be interesting to see how the results compare 
across regions). Also, my research was semi-ethnographic; but if we wish to explore the 
relationships and the various discourses and motives of young people in the area of political 
participation and civic engagement, a full ethnography will be needed. But, on the positive 
side, this research provides valuable insight into an important yet under-researched area: 
the use of mobile phones as a tool for the political sensitization and mobilization of young 
people.
The next chapter will turn to the question of how young people use mobile devices to 
engage their regional leaders in political discussions and civic debates.
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CHAPTER 66
Engaging Citizens from Above and 
from Below
* A similar version of this chapter, co-authored with Payal Arora, has been submitted for publication in a journal and is 
currently under review. A still earlier version was presented at the RMeS Winter School & Graduate Symposium 2016–
17, held on 19–20 January 2017 at Erasmus University Rotterdam, Netherlands, under the title ‘Engaging Citizens: New 
Media and Political Engagement in Namiperiodical of of the Namibia’s University of Science and Technology: Shihomeka, 
Sadrag Panduleni, 2017. Engaging citizens: Youth, mobile phones, political leadership and inclusive democracy in the 
Ohangwena Region, Namibia. NAWA: Journal of Language and Communication, 11(1), 4–16. 
*
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6.1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, reports have surfaced on the political engagement practices among civic 
and political leaders in regional and local authorities in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly 
in Namibia (Loader, Vromen, & Xenos, 2014; Mattes & Richardson, 2015; Helsper, 2012; 
Wasserman & Garman, 2014; Yamamoto, Kushin, & Dalisay, 2016; Abadie, Diamond, & 
Hainmueller, 2015). Political leaders are accused of not involving their citizens actively in 
public debates, political activities, and community projects. Citizens have complained 
that their government representatives are neither easily accessible nor available to listen 
to the needs, aspirations, and wants of their communities. This absence prevails, despite 
government efforts to construct regional councillors’ offices in all the constituencies around 
the country and to provide mobile phones, phone allowances, Internet connectivity, and a 
car designed to reach communities regardless of the geographic location of the villages. It 
is not known whether young citizens and political leaders really use these facilities as the 
government intended, namely to interact in order to strengthen an inclusive democracy. 
Against this background, the present chapter explores the ways in which young people use 
mobile phones to engage with political leaders on matters of regional and local politics in 
the Ohangwena region. 
Over the years, political communication scholars have developed an increasing 
interest in the participation of young people in civic and political activities, especially in 
the global South. Most of these studies focused on participation in elections, protests, and 
entertainment and on the use of new media in politics (Hirzalla, van Zoonen, & de Ridder, 
2010; Loader et al., 2014; Mattes & Richardson, 2015; Mpofu, 2013; Quintelier & Vissers, 
2008). Their authors posited that new media can facilitate and even enhance participatory 
democracy and political communication in the global South. Most of the studies conducted 
so far have been looking at conventional political participation or at the civic engagement 
of the youth in urban activities. To complete the picture, this chapter aims at exploring how 
young citizens interact with their political representatives and engage them in political 
activities in the region.
6.2 POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT PRACTICES AT REGIONAL AND LOCAL 
GOVERNANCE LEVELS
The spectacular changes in new media that happen continuously under our eyes and how 
they can influence citizens’ political participation and civic engagement in democratic 
processes are themes that have dominated debate in the global South no less than in the 
global North (see Loader et al., 2014; Mchakulu, 2007; Republic of Namibia, 2014; Van Belle & 
Cupido, 2013; Wasserman, 2011). Reports such as the ones cited here testify to the fact that 
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contemporary political and public consumerism do pay heed to changes in digital media 
technology. What is more, they attempt to show the ways in which these changes have 
influenced both political participation as a whole (Kahne, Middaugh, Lee, & Feezell, 2011) 
and young people’s decision-making at regional and local governance levels. 
Several studies (Mattes & Richardson, 2015; Helsper, 2012; Wasserman & Garman, 2014) 
reported that practices of engaging the youth in civic and political debates run by politicians 
were conducted in a way that led to the current decline in youth political participation. The 
upshot is that – as also explained here in previous chapters – young citizens came to feel 
excluded and not valued (Yamamoto et al., 2016). This decline is becoming worrisome in 
African democracies and especially in rural areas of young democracies such as Namibia, 
Zimbabwe, Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, and Tanzania. Citizens in these countries accuse 
political leaders at regional and local governance levels of nurturing or promoting exclusive 
democracy (Kahne, Hodgin, & Eidman-Aadahl, 2016; Kahne, Lee, & Feezell, 2013; Kahne et 
al., 2011). These citizens claim that not all of them are given equal opportunities to partake 
in political and public discussions; some have fewer platforms than others, and only a few 
well-off and well-connected individuals really have a say in regional and local political 
deliberations (Helsper, 2012). As a result of such complaints, leaders working with regional 
and local authorities, political parties, and other civil society organizations are reportedly 
identifying appropriate strategies that can motivate the youth to engage actively in 
public discussions (Helsper, 2012; Kahne et al., 2011). It is envisaged that these discussions 
should promote an inclusive democracy; thus they should also help to dismantle exclusive 
democracy, which can destabilize peace and harmony in the communities (Kahne et al., 
2011; Ward, 2010; Ward & de Vreese, 2011). 
Inclusive democracy is defined as a system of governance in which all citizens, regardless 
of their age, political affiliations, gender, level of education, geographical distance, 
and social status participate equally in the discussion of sociopolitical issues, in order to 
incentivize the delivery of services in governance structures and make it effective at all levels 
(Helsper, 2012; Wasserman & Garman, 2014). Such services can be initiatives that target the 
less privileged in society (e.g. children, youths, marginalized rural groups) and give them 
an opportunity for direct contact and exchanges with their leaders on political, cultural, 
economic, technological, and developmental issues in their communities (Norris, 2001); 
and such exchanges usually lead to positive change and growth in those communities. By 
contrast, exclusive democracy is a system in which, in any governance structure, some of 
the citizens are not given platforms for partaking in political and public discussions on the 
same footing as others (Kahne et al., 2016; Kahne et al., 2013; Kahne et al., 2011). As already 
mentioned, in this type of system only a few well-off individuals participate actively in civic 
and political deliberations designed to improve life (Helsper, 2012). The corollary is that an 
exclusive democracy leaves out the poor, the unemployed, the young, children, and the 
geographically disadvantaged, who have little or no power to influence political and civic 
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decisions concerning the social upliftment of their communities (Kahne et al., 2011; Helsper, 
2008; Kibere, 2016). This explains claims made by Mattes and Richardson (2015) and others 
– claims already familiar from previous chapters – that young people are now disengaged 
from political, civic, and decision-making activities, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. 
New media such as mobile phones are reported to be the appropriate tools that can 
enhance inclusive and participatory democracy in this digital era (see Mpofu, 2013; Quintelier 
& Vissers, 2008; Van Belle & Cupido, 2013; Wasserman, 2011). Contemporary studies reveals 
that new media create a new public platform, which is accessible to all citizens regardless 
of their age, affiliations, gender, level of education, geographical distance, and social status 
(Helsper, 2012; Wasserman & Garman, 2014); and this kind of accessibility has the potential 
to facilitate equal engagement in regional sociopolitical issues. This brings me to the main 
theme and aim of this chapter: to explore the interaction of young people with their political 
leaders in the region via mobile phones.
Some reports (Kibere, 2016; IPPR, 2015b) claim that leaders at the regional and local level, 
especially in the global South, do not fully engage the youths under their jurisdiction in civic 
and political activities, or even that they make themselves inaccessible. As a result of this 
attitude, some youths find politics less interesting and less attractive (Mattes & Richardson, 
2015) and prefer to stay away from it. I have already broached this theme repeatedly in 
earlier chapters. Mattes and Richardson (2015) point out that, when measured in amounts 
of individual contact with local councillors, citizen engagement with the local government 
is very low in South Africa – both in absolute terms and in relation to other African countries 
(though various pieces of evidence suggest that participation is increasing). 
Here it should be noted that there are numerous types of citizen engagement in regional 
and local authority governance. For example one can participate via websites of political 
parties or via government ministries; one can get involved in improvement activities or in 
town and village projects; and one can manifest oneself as a political agent through political 
behaviours such as voting, petition drives, and hearings (see Kang & Gearhart, 2010). Out 
of these various forms of political action, voting is generally considered the most common 
and most basic. But electoral participation itself encompasses several other processes – 
getting involved in election campaigns, organizing them, attending meetings, attempting 
to access information on different political parties (Kang & Gearhart, 2010). Other forms of 
participation require citizens to engage in grassroots politics within their local communities 
by attending gatherings and interacting with their local political representatives, for 
example regional councillors and traditional authority leaders. Finally, participatory activity 
extends to attending civil protests and signing petitions on various issues, online or offline, 
as well as joining interest groups such as youth forums that engage in lobbying or political 
advocacy. Quintelier and Vissers (2008) identify online voting and the forwarding of emails 
with political content as political activities that can be carried out digitally by youths. 
It is against this background that regional and local authority councillors, as political 
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representatives elected by their communities, play an important role regarding the 
involvement of youths in decision-making processes. This role is to foster activism. The 
community expects its leaders to deliver what they promised their constituencies before 
elections. It is therefore important that residents should feel free to communicate with their 
local councillor to ensure that he or she is fulfilling his or her mandate (Van Belle & Cupido, 
2013).
Various studies on political engagement, youth activism, social media and the youth, 
digital citizenship and e-governance, as well as political consumerism have been conducted 
so far in the global North and global South. Most of these studies either look at the general 
population or infrastructure development or are based on western countries. Very few 
studies (Mattes & Richardson, 2015; Mpofu, 2013; Van Belle & Cupido, 2013; Wasserman, 
2011) have been carried out in the field of citizen engagement in politics, with the aim of 
determining whether and how civic and political leaders use new media to engage young 
citizens in politics in southern Africa; and none so far has been devoted to Namibia. There 
are instead areas of ambiguity and numerous disagreements among researchers about the 
use of mobile phones as engagement tools and about their capacity to enhance effective 
participatory democracy. The present chapter intends to be the first study of this kind in 
Namibia. It also hopes to contribute to clarifying ambiguities and settling disagreements.
In Namibia, youths interviewed during the 2014 Afrobarometer survey also complained 
that leaders were using wrong platforms, such as face-to-face meetings, to communicate 
with their communities (IPPR, 2015b). Hence this IPPR report recommended that civic and 
political leaders create a public sphere that should function as a virtual space in which 
citizens are able to engage in conversations. This is because citizens need to be guaranteed 
freedom of assembly and association, as well as the opportunity to express and publish 
their opinions – especially young people who need to be groomed and prepared for future 
leadership positions. Other studies, too (Gachau, 2016; LSE Enterprise Limited, 2013; Van 
Belle & Cupido, 2013; ECN, 2015), suggested that political leaders should create a public 
space that could draw all citizens into a wide conversation, at the same time guaranteeing 
them freedom of assembly and association and the opportunity to express and publish 
their opinions.
But there is a significant limitation to this digital involvement of citizens: the lack of 
understanding of, and exposure to, political issues among the youth. Even if youths have 
access to the Internet, this does not automatically guarantee that they spend time engaging 
in civic activities or political debates; in fact most of them do not bother with anything that 
does not bring remuneration. This shortcoming is very important to remedy, and it relates 
to the political education of the youth. It has indeed been argued that, at least at regional 
and local government level (ECN, 2015; Mattes & Richardson, 2015), there is less emphasis on 
political education and less awareness of its role in harnessing young people’s use of new 
media so as to channel it towards civic and political activities. 
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Pătrut and Pătrut (2014) show that citizen engagement is a potential way of escaping 
the topdown politics of mass democracy, in which political parties and civic societies or 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) formulate policies with low-level participation or 
youth involvement. If this is true, then new media would contribute a lot. They provide the 
means for a high differentiation of political information and ideas, theoretical possibilities 
of participation, a high level of involvement in negotiations, and feedback between leaders 
and followers. They also publicize the collective participation of civic and political leaders 
in the activities of the broader community, for example discussion of civic affairs with 
community residents, involvement in political affairs, membership in formal or informal 
groups, and attendance to political hearings and rallies (Kang & Gearhart, 2010). 
To respond to this call for the creation of a public space of civic conversation, the 
Namibian government constructed regional offices and equipped councillors with mobiles, 
Internet connectivity, and other features designed to make them accessible and put then 
within easy reach of their electorates (ECN, 2015). At this stage, little is known as to whether 
politicians and young people in Namibia are really using these platforms to carry out civic 
and political dialogue. As I mentioned before, not a single study of this country can be 
traced that has so far explored the use of the mobile phone as a tool for public and political 
engagement; hence the in-depth nature of the present research.
And this is the place where, before presenting my findings in this chapter, I should 
restate the leading question of this study: How do young people in Ohangwena use the 
mobile phone to interact with civic and political leaders and to take part in regional and 
local politics? How does the mobile phone function as an engagement tool in the project of 
enhancing an inclusive digital democracy?
6.3 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
This section presents findings from the ethnographic fieldwork that I carried out in the 
Ohangwena region. 
The overall result is that, despite the construction of offices for political leaders 
and despite the provision of mobile smartphones and phone allowances, the regional 
leadership is more successful in engaging the public offline: there are more practices of 
political participation offline than online. Additionally, young people’s mobile phone-driven 
engagement in political matters is scarce. This result is causally related to young people’s 
claim that leaders cannot be reached on their mobiles 24/7 and to the perception that officials 
at constituency offices are not youth-friendly. In addition, too many political protocols need 
to be followed by young people when they wish to see the councillors; this is the opposite of 
the open-door policy claimed by the councillors themselves and constitutes an important 
obstacle to youth involvement. Finally, on the positive side, it appears that there is a will 
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for political engagement among the young people of Ohangwena: this will is not missing, 
but needs to be properly developed and channelled. Another possibly promising sign is 
that, during election, leaders showed greater willingness to make themselves accessible on 
their mobiles. On the basis of my findings, one can state that the entry of the mobile phone 
into the political sphere has produced less inclusivity than anticipated. Yet there are reasons 
to hope for better results in the future, if we really make the effort to understand these 
processes.
My exploration took me to four key areas of investigation: (1) the typical everyday 
experiences of a regional leader (something that could come under the heading ‘a day in 
the life of…’); (2) the process of engaging citizens in civic and political activities; (3) the tools 
of engagement; and (4) challenges or obstacles facing the use mobile phones by political 
leaders in the region. The findings are presented according to the themes that emerged 
during data analysis, which provide the subheadings in this section. 
6.3.1 Mobile Engagement, Access, and Politics
At the time of the research, all regional councillors had a government vehicle and an office 
administration block from which to operate. They were equipped with a mobile smartphone 
and received a monthly cell phone allowance of N$1,000. This was done to ensure that they 
were reachable whenever they were needed, be it by citizens or by other senior government 
officials. A few councillors were active on Facebook, but most of them were reported to 
be on the regional WhatsApp group, which had been created specifically for them as a 
communication and discussion platform, in case some urgent piece of news needed to be 
shared with the citizens (Gachau, 2016). The regional WhatsApp group was mainly used by 
councillors among themselves; but they also had a WhatsApp group with the citizens. I was 
not given access or permission to join this WhatsApp regional group because this is a closed 
platform, not open to citizens; councillors discuss there various issues before they share 
them on the platform open to the public. 
The councillors, who resided in areas with poor network connectivity, usually drove 
daily to places close by where they had a network and could communicate with others. 
‘Councillors are people’s servants and should be living with their citizens all the time in 
their respective constituencies’, declared Councillor 4. Most councillors told me that they 
encouraged their citizens, especially the youth, to approach or contact them at any time, 
24/7, if they wished to raise an issue with their local councillor. 
 We (regional councillors) encourage the youth that, if they want to engage us, we 
are 24 hours available through mobiles … if you have a problem or you want to 
share something with us, [it] is better to call the time you feel like you want, the 
time you are free … then talk to me as your government representative and we can 
try to engage you in discussions and conversations in the direction you want your 
problem to be attended to. (Councillor 1, September 2016)
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This response, reproduced here verbatim, suggests that regional councillors give their 
mobile numbers to all citizens in their constituencies, on a regular basis, for communication 
purposes. This prompted me to enquire whether young people indeed had their councillors’ 
mobile numbers and whether councillors were accessible all the time, as they claimed. Most 
youths confirmed that the majority of the councillors gave out their numbers freely to the 
public. 
 Yes for example Councillor [X] for [constituency A] and Councillor [Y] for 
[constituency B] are doing their best to announce their phone numbers in public 
and invite youths to interact with them. (Sela, male, 35-year-old car-wash attendant)
However, these youths also added that, although they had mobile numbers for their 
councillors, they struggled to reach them. For example Ndam, a 26-year-old female teacher, 
made the following remark during a focus group discussion: 
 The councillor is not accessible in most cases on his phone, as he seems to be a 
busy man. He will always refer you to the office phone, to talk [to] the officials there, 
and he tends to only answer those people he knows … This means that, even if the 
phone is accessible, available and one can call the councillor, but will not be helped, 
I don’t think this is what we call ‘reachable’ on his phone … Generally the political 
leaders are not reachable on their mobile phones every time; but during election 
time their phones are ever on, even during the night time, but after election things 
tend to change. 
This assertion contradicts the councillors’ claim that they were available on their mobiles 
24/7 to all citizens in their community, for discussions and suggestions. It became clear that, 
even if the mobile number of their councillor was available to youths, they still could not 
get hold of that councillor to talk to him or her directly. When they were calling they would 
either not receive an answer or be referred back to administrators at the constituencies’ 
offices, and they felt that even there they did not receive adequate responses. These ‘ground 
realities’ or facts on the ground in rural Namibia are in sharp contrast with the ideal of what 
new media could in principle achieve for political engagement – as stated for example by 
Alonso and Lippez-De Castro (2016). These researchers find that the technology should be 
used so as to engage and empower citizens, facilitate and support active participation, and 
help grassroots ideas to influence the political agenda in regional and local governance 
structures in a bottom-up fashion. 
The response that I quoted here from my participant also informs us that councillors tend 
to be more readily available to answer and discuss issues with citizens in their constituencies 
during elections – and only then. Leaving aside the obvious opportunistic interpretation of 
this short-term availability, its existence could perhaps be used as a window of opportunity 
on which youths may build in the future.
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6.3.2 Experience and Community Interaction
My research indicated that civic and political leaders had different levels of education as well 
as different employment backgrounds: some were teachers or school principals, whereas 
others had been in those political positions any length of time between one and twenty-
two years. I also noticed that not all the councillors were Internet-literate or supported the 
use of new media; furthermore, some lived in urban areas, others in the rural or semi-rural 
parts of the region. Some leaders and politicians were past their retirement age; only a 
few were in their early forties. But most of them, with their combined experience, made it 
clear that they enjoyed and loved what they were doing – which involved interacting with 
people, learning many new things, and making a difference in the lives of others. This was 
the driving force that made them stay on in their positions. ‘You know, interacting with 
community members, is the most thing I like … when you are with people … you learn 
a lot from their views and also their experiences, what they want, their wishes and their 
aspirations’, remarked Councillor 3 in August 2016.
The councillors I interviewed described their jobs as most challenging and difficult: this 
was because citizens expected them to bring development to the community regardless of 
the constraints they were facing. They were most of the time out of their offices because they 
had to conduct public meetings in different villages of their constituencies; and this is the 
reason why they share their mobile numbers with residents of the community. This validates 
the debate started by Matsusaka (2005), who claims that public or town-hall meetings are 
a popular form of direct democracy with a long history behind it: this form has been used 
by political leaders since long ago. According to Matsusaka, citizens used to assemble at a 
particular time and place, in their village or town, to make public decisions on behalf of their 
communities. I attended quite a few public meetings in the region, some of them addressed 
by various political leaders. 
It also emerged from my focus group discussions with the young that their councillors 
were performing a difficult and challenging job. But it became clear at the same time that 
both the citizens and their councillors need to have some direct interactions, which would 
certainly strengthen direct democracy in the region. Matsusaka (2005) claims that direct 
democracy is fuelled at least in part by the revolution in communications technology, which 
has given ordinary citizens unprecedented access to information and has heightened their 
desire to participate directly in policy decisions.
6.3.3 Open-Door Policy, Favouritism, and Face-to-face Public Engagement
I observed that most of the councillors tried to engage their residents in civic and political 
activities by inviting and encouraging them to attend public and community meetings, 
town-hall meetings, or other information-sharing gatherings in the region. They had an 
open-door policy and usually let residents know that they were there to serve them (Van 
Belle & Cupido, 2013), so that residents should feel comfortable about approaching them 
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with anything they were not happy about or that needed improvement. On the strength 
of this claim made by the councillors, I asked young people whether their councillors were 
easily approachable. Martha, a 33-year-old security guard, said:
 Relatively speaking councillors, though not all in Ohangwena region, have an open-
door policy … however, it is the people working for these politicians that make 
it difficult for the youth to reach the councillors anytime at their offices, because 
when such leaders are in meetings, their phones are answered by secretaries and 
these secretaries sometimes are not youth-friendly.
This response reveals that, although the open-door policy existed, the young citizens still 
found it difficult to meet their councillors face to face due to the strict hierarchy and protocols 
in place at their offices (Matthews, Limb, & Taylor, 2000), which made them less ‘serving’ 
than they claimed to be. This situation rendered mobile phones less useful as a platform for 
young people who wished to have direct contact with their government representatives 
in the region. Councillors’ engagement activities ranged from community and villages 
meetings to committee meetings, political party rallies, campaigning events and other 
activities (IPPR, 2015b), and all these enabled them to listen to the residents under their care 
and learn about issues that affected these residents’ lives. They discussed various matters 
at these sessions, for example updates on the drought relief food distribution programmes, 
the issuing of birth certificates, road and other infrastructural development, water shortage 
and network connectivity (just to mention a few topics). On the question of whom they 
engaged in public discussions and political events, one councillor, who had been in this 
position for more than sixteen years, said: ‘I engaged myself in public meetings, engaging 
youths in meetings, engaging traditional authority leaders as well as representatives of 
different stakeholders, both in the region and at constituency levels’ (Councillor 2, 2016).
According to their own statements, councillors addressed and tried to engage all 
citizens, regardless of their political affiliations, ethnic background, or age. Their appeal 
applied equally to traditional leaders, the youth, and other stakeholders in the region, for 
example the business community and other professionals who could give them guidance. 
Being fascinated by this, I asked young citizens whether they felt engaged in civic and 
political discussions in the region by the councillors, regardless of their affiliations, status, 
and other differentials. One young person said:
 To a certain extent, yes … councillors engage youths in community discussions or 
activities regardless of their political affiliations … but … I am one of the youths 
who are trying to interact with councillors and in most cases the governor, but 
these people tend to respond or listen positively and timely only to those they 
know. (Tim, 35, unemployed)
6Engaging Citizens from Above and from Below | Chapter 6
119
During the meetings that I attended as part of my research, councillors tried to give 
answers and feedback on any question that arose; when they did not have an answer, 
they usually promised residents that they would get back to them on the matter. But Tim’s 
assertion reveals that the phenomenon of political favouritism and discrimination based 
on personality was also at work in these communities and made it difficult for all the young 
people to get in touch with their regional leaders.
6.3.4 Radio and Social Media Engagement
On the question of how they communicate with members of their communities, one 
councillor said: 
 We use to call public meetings through the radio … but currently as I am speaking 
[it] is hard to get youths to community meetings … our youths are far away in urban 
areas in some cities or towns … but actually they are from the constituency but you 
want to engage them. (Councillor 3, September 2016)
The main platform that councillors were using in order to ensure that all residents get 
feedback from them was the public meetings they conducted. However, some councillors 
and the young citizens interviewed in the focus group discussions said that only elderly 
people turned up for these meetings; the young did not really attend. But this kind of 
situation was a threat to inclusive democracy – the very type that these councillors were 
out to represent and promote. Alonso and Lippez-De Castro (2016) stated that an inclusive 
and equitable governance involves multiple actors – all the people and communities who 
are interacting, collaborating, and deliberating on public affairs. Conversely, excluding 
some actors from the governance system promotes an exclusive democracy, in which many 
citizens feel left out and sidelined. The absence of young people from public meetings and 
the looming threat to democracy that it represented became a concern for most of the 
leaders in the region; hence they began to look for some other ways of getting in touch with 
the youth so as to maintain inclusivity in their governance. One of the respondents stated 
that, in the process of looking for a solution,
 I have introduced a social media platform, Facebook page for my constituency 
and … am about to move to WhatsApp. … At least to accommodate all the youths 
from the constituency. And sometimes they are far: it doesn’t mean that they don’t 
want to attend this community meetings but just because they are very far, that is 
why I thought outside the box by saying [to myself], why can’t I introduce a page 
on Facebook, so that I can engage the youths who are out of the region, out of 
constituency. At least to hear their views. (Councillor 4, 2016)
Several other civic and political leaders in the region made statements along similar 
lines. Once they knew that most of the young people were on Facebook and other online 
Chapter 6 | Engaging Citizens from Above and from Below
120
platforms, they followed them there: they decided to go where the young citizens were, in 
order to convey messages and information to them. One of them said:
 I have realized that most of the youth are always on Facebook, so we created a page 
with the name of our constituency, so whenever I have something that’s where I 
post the information and we are always interacting with each other. (Councillor 6, 
August 2016)
These words suggest that social media have become an instrument for young people 
engagement. This idea received support from Alonso and Lippez-De Castro (2016), who 
found that technology can facilitate interactions among citizens and between citizens, 
government, and other actors, thus playing an important role in improving efficiency and 
effectiveness in communications and public service delivery. 
But how do things work from the other end, when youths attempt to initiate the 
contact? Do social media work any better than simple phone calls? I have asked some of the 
youths whether their councillors could be reached more easily on social media, and here is 
a typical answer:
 There are few councillors who are using different media to interact with youth 
[…] for example [X], who has a WhatsApp group for the youth, a Facebook page 
for his constituency and he put his phone on disposal at all times […] but some 
other councillors are not trying their level best to reach out to youths. (Emmy, 34, 
unemployed)
Public officials and leaders interviewed in this study confessed that, for the most part, they 
were using traditional media such as the NBC Oshiwambo Radio and newspapers. This was 
because, in general, a large number of people had radios in their houses, even though the 
young appeared not to listen to the radio and only a few of them had access to newspapers 
– especially youths who lived in towns such as Eenhana, Okongo, Oshikango, and Ondobe 
and in other semi-urban areas (see details on this in chapter 5). However, these officials and 
leaders also listed social media platforms: they wanted to move in step with technology. But 
here they raised a concern. The new media were good, they said, but there was a twofold 
problem associated with them. One negative aspect was poor network connectivity, at least 
in some villages; the other was poverty, which was linked with the fact that the region had 
the highest rate of unemployment, especially among the young. Poverty affected digital 
engagement in politics insofar as citizens could not afford to buy a mobile phone or, if they 
possessed one, might find it difficult to recharge it so as to access the Internet or social media 
platforms. This ties in with the finding, revealed in some studies, that citizens, especially 
young ones, sacrifice some of their income to ensure that they have enough credit or data 
bundles for social media platforms (Wasserman, 2011; Wasserman 2014). 
One councillor declared: ‘I am using different platforms: face-to-face community 
6Engaging Citizens from Above and from Below | Chapter 6
121
meeting; community radio, which is NBC in Lungada in the morning and Eyakulo in the 
afternoon; and also newspapers like Kundana’ (Councillor 6, 2016). We can clearly see that 
the region’s civic and political leaders tried to use a variety of platforms for the sake of 
engaging their citizens and establishing a strong relationship with them. They also tried to 
tackle community problems with a view to improving people’s lives.
6.3.5 Politainment
I witnessed several events in the region where young people were invited either by the 
councillor or by other regional leader to attend a presentation. One such event was a 
town-hall meeting that took place at Eenhana Multipurpose Youth Center. The theme for 
this meeting was how to enhance youth public participation in the law-making process. 
The meeting was addressed by the chair of the National Council of Namibia. The regional 
councillor was assigned the task of inviting the general public. He made an announcement 
via the Oshiwambo radio and also sent word to the youth forum chairperson, asking him 
to inform all the youths in the region. Attendance was very poor and the public consisted 
mainly of adults and included a few traditional leaders. The poor attendance was attributed 
to the fact that the meeting took place between 10 a.m. and 13 p.m., when the largest part of 
the population is at work. Another probable (in fact very likely) reason was that most people 
did not receive the message, since the councillor’s announcement was usually made about 
07 a.m., when they were on their way to work. The youth forum group from Khomas region 
was invited to entertain the audience with drama and songs: the main aim was for the group 
to explain the functions of the National Council of Namibia in the form of a drama. The result 
was very entertaining. People were dancing, some were taking pictures. It was actually a 
very pleasant and educative event, but only a few attended it because the majority did not 
know about it; they had not received the message. 
The Ondobe youth forum had a similar group, which performed at various events in the 
region. Some members were present at these events and were very happy about them. I 
talked to a few young citizens at the end of one such event and asked them what they did to 
prepare these meetings, how they rehearsed for performance, and how they attracted and 
entertained their audiences. Sela, an unemployed 23-year-old, explained:
 When we meet we come up with different ideas of looking for music, steps, and 
dramas and for motivating each other, so that our group will continue to move 
forward, we encouraged other youths to join and we go to schools showing them 
what we have prepared in our club.
With the assistance of the youth officer, the group received funding from the Ministry of 
Youth and Sport for uniforms and for equipment such as speakers, a laptop, a printer, and 
t-shirts. At most of the events, group members performed voluntarily; however, there were 
times they were invited to perform and received money from their forum. Sometimes 
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their performances endeavoured to create awareness of HIV/AIDS or of the possible 
consequences of teenage pregnancy. This is what Wilhem, a 28-year-old forum member, 
said about education theatre:
 We did a drama about alcohol and drug abuse as well as pregnancies. That drama, 
we did it at school, to educate those school learners who do not know how to 
behave when they have boyfriends and about the dangers of alcohol.
There were also some dramas about corruption and the effect it had on the Namibian 
economy, as well as about how it could destabilize peace and social harmony in the country. 
Group members usually rehearsed for several days before they actually performed. Most 
of the youths strongly believed that, once entertainment and drama featured in political 
or community meetings, many other youths would attend and in this way would gain 
something important. 
This entertainment is not used online but offline: it is live, and designed to sustain 
political engagement. I observed that most of the young people were taking pictures on 
their mobiles; some were even recording. Then they shared these pictures and recordings 
on various platforms such as Facebook pages or WhatsApp groups; and they shared them 
with others, who were not engaged in political activities. Malakia, a 32-year-old teacher and 
forum member, stated: ‘Mostly we use music and drama to catch the attention of those in 
attendance. Otherwise they will not listen to the presenter and will go back without getting 
any message.’ He further explained that the point is ‘[n]ot only [to get] attention but also to 
pass on the message to others’, in other words to deliver some ‘public information’. 
Not everyone accepts this idea. There are researchers, for example Hao, Wen, and 
George (2014), who claim, by contrast, that traditional mass media are not effective in 
stimulating interest in politics and in promoting civic engagement among young people 
today. But the views I quoted here show that participatory politics can be enhanced 
through the use of drama, music, concerts, and other types of performance that attract 
young people. The messages in those songs or performances should be clear and people 
should be able to understand them easily instead of only following the drum sounds. This 
use of entertainment for civic and political ends lends credence to the idea, supported by 
Kümpel, Karnowski, and Keyling (2015), that chat applications such as WhatsApp can be a 
major traffic driver for news sites, sharing of video and live streaming of events; and, not 
surprisingly, a lot of news sites have recently added a WhatsApp-sharing button to their 
collection of social media-sharing shortcuts.
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6.4 CONCLUSION
The research I presented in this chapter led me to the following conclusions. 
Although politicians called themselves public servants, allowed their mobile numbers 
to be known among their communities, and claimed on this basis that they were available 
24/7, as a matter of course most of them would not answer their mobiles, especially when 
young citizens were calling them. The young participants in my study concurred that they 
were regularly being referred to their councillors’ offices to make appointments. Hence 
politicians did not really make themselves available to young citizens just by divulging or 
making public their mobile phone numbers, as they were claiming. The findings further 
revealed that staff members in those offices were not youth-friendly. All this means that 
the political leadership did not ‘nurture’ inclusive digital democracy – not effectively, in any 
case. What is more, there were also signs of exclusive digital democracy, as defined by some 
researchers (Helsper, 2012; Skuse, Fildes, Tacchi, Martin, & Baulch, 2007), insofar as some 
citizens felt excluded from public discussions.
The findings show that most politicians made themselves available 24/7 on their 
mobiles, but only during election campaigns. Such a pattern proves that they could stay 
in touch with their communities if they wanted to, but chose not to do it for the rest of 
the year. This behaviour is what discouraged young people most and alienated them from 
the entire political process. Their regional leaders seemed to be only interested in them 
only during elections, when they needed their vote and their support; after that, the same 
leaders did not care about them any more. This is what my participants all believed. What 
they described is in effect a selective democracy – that is, the kind of democracy that shows 
awareness of and respect for citizens only during critical times, when politicians need to 
motivate citizens to vote for them (Al-Dalou & Abu-Shanab, 2013; Mossberger & Jimenez, 
2009). 
However, there is a positive side to this. On the one hand, as I just noted, the fact that 
politicians are available to the public 24/7 at certain times indicates that this possibility 
exists; hence such periods need to be multiplied and extended. On the other hand, the 
reasons for politicians’ lack of availability during ‘normal’ times are in reality quite complex; 
these people are often engaged for days on end in public activities that involve continuous 
meetings and travel. Many of the councillors I interviewed came across as dedicated, even 
passionate about what they do. If these features are put together, it should be possible to 
plot a constructive outcome and a good way forward.
Nevertheless, for the time being, my findings in the area of mobile phone contact 
between young people and their regional leaders are negative: there is less mobile 
engagement than expected – both of leaders by youths and vice versa. More generally, 
there is still too much top-down approach to citizen engagement in the region. This may 
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well be one of the deep reasons why the young have difficulty discussing political issues 
with their leaders via an equalizing instrument such as the mobile phone. 
On a different line, it became clear in the course of my investigations that political 
entertainment and outreach programmes such as songs, drama, and music can be 
successfully used as tools to attract young citizens and to persuade them to join political 
groups in the region. Therefore this study recommends further support for a political 
education theatre in the regional youth forum. The management team should strengthen 
this form of theatre and all related initiatives, in the interest of increasing young people’s 
participation in politics, especially at regional and local governance level.
Finally, a word must be said about the limitations of the research behind this study. Data 
were collected only from Ohangwena, which is one out of the fourteen political regions 
in Namibia; and only 50 per cent of the political leadership in the region took part in the 
data collection process. This surely influenced the type of narratives presented in this study. 
Additionally, the data collection instruments were qualitative in nature and required the 
presence of researchers during interviews. This may have contributed to the fact that the 
data provided by participants were less concrete than expected in a quantitative study. This 
chapter recommends that future studies should use quantitative methods of data collection 
and should cover more than one political region, in order to obtain a general view of political 
leaders in the whole country and in its different parts. 
In our contemporary world, mobile engagement practices have implications on political 
inclusiveness and decision-making, as mobile phones are now becoming digital platforms. 
Citizens in the global South tend to use them to contact their political representatives about 
all sorts of public issues, with the aim of improving the standards of living. In Namibia, 
the increase in mobile phone subscriptions is accompanied by the implementation of an 
e-governance policy by the Namibian government and – significantly – by a call from the 
head of state to create and nurture an inclusive house, where no citizens should feel left out.
The next chapter focuses on how the young people use mobile social media in regional and 
local politics to foster inclusive democracy and to promote equal opportunities and digital 
literacy.
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CHAPTER 77
Mobile Social Media and Political 
Digital Literacy
* A similar version of this chapter, co-authored with Payal Arora, is currently under review at the Information and Development 
Journal. The co-authored article is in turn based on a paper delivered by both authors, under the title ‘The impact of social 
media usage on Namibia’s regional politics’, at the workshop ‘Social media in Africa: Beyond the hashtag’, held on 26–7 
April 2017 in the Centre of African Studies at the University of Edinburgh.
*
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7.1 INTRODUCTION
In the past five years, Namibia has experienced an increase in the presence of people on 
social media platforms. This has generated various debates concerning the impact of such a 
phenomenon on citizen engagement in the political sphere. 
Studies from the global North have already established a vibrant tradition of scholarship 
about the transformative influence that digital platforms have on direct democracy, with 
limited empirical evidence as to whether such influence extends beyond the West. The high 
presence of youths on social media platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, 
LinkedIn, and Twitter in recent years elicited from political communication scholars a strong 
orientation of this discourse towards the youth and the theme of their involvement in politics 
and civic activities. Most of these studies were conducted in the United States and in Europe 
(in the United Kingdom and Italy, for instance). By contrast, only a few have been conducted 
in sub-Saharan African countries – for example in Nigeria, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, 
Kenya, and Ghana. This chapter focuses on the role of digital literacy in enabling political 
engagement in one region of Namibia. 
Many scholars believe that social media can reach and be used by many people who 
previously found it difficult to participate in politics or public affairs; and youngsters belong 
in this category, alongside the disabled and other marginalized communities. Such scholars 
have reached the important conclusion that social media, especially Facebook, have a 
stimulating effect on youth participation and engagement (Castells, 2009; Ellison, Lampe, 
& Steinfield, 2009; Erkul & Kes-Erkul, 2009; Shirky, 2008; Stiegler, 2008; Yamamoto, Kushin, 
& Dalisay, 2016). Hence they are positive about the idea of using social media as discussion 
platforms suitable for the youth – platforms where young people can debate among 
themselves and influence one another regarding all sorts of activities, in their own contexts 
(see Fenton & Barassi, 2011; Gachau, 2016; Loader, Vromen, & Xenos 2015; Yamamoto et al., 
2016). These activities can be extremely varied – Egyptian elections, Kenyan elections, South 
African youth protests against corruption, or land distribution; and they can be political or 
not.
In spite of the digital divide, which is a big obstacle in Africa, previous studies (e.g. 
Sarrazin, 2011) point out that African youths are already accessing social media platforms on 
a daily basis, using their mobile phones. And indeed, more recent evidence confirms that 
80 per cent of Facebook users in Africa access the site by mobile phone (Mackey, 2016). This 
is what necessitated the present research: it was vital to explore in detail young Namibians’ 
use of the mobile phone as a social media channel, especially in relation to regional and 
local politics. 
The presence of youths on social media platforms can be seen as an embodiment of 
Paulo Freire’s theory of a pedagogy of the oppressed, as well as of his popular critical literacy 
ideology, which aims at creating a platform for the critical discussion of topical issues in 
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society (when an individual knows and understand the environment around him). At the 
same time, such phenomena can be seen to fall under critical, social, and digital literacy, since 
all digitally excluded members of the population, be they old people or out-of-school youths, 
will be able to take part in public discussions aimed at improving the standard of living in 
their communities (Freire, 2000). This means that all citizens will use social media platforms as 
digital avenues for communication, deliberation, politics – everything. But, of course, for this 
to happen, citizens must be digitally literate and socially informed. Some optimistic scholars 
– for example Ostling (2010) – believe that digital and critical literacy enables citizens to use 
social media in a low-cost manner and thereby promotes political knowledge, interest in 
politics, and with it participatory activities such as discussion and voting.
7.2 THE SOCIAL MEDIA PRESENCE OF CONSTITUENCY YOUTH FORUMS 
The regional youth forum had a Facebook account under the name Ohangwena Regional 
Youth Forum (ORYF) and a WhatsApp group with the same name, to which all the members 
with smartphones had access. The ORYF Facebook pages had 481 members at the time of 
analysis (November 2016). The name of this group is Ohangwena Regional Youth Forum. 
Most of its members were male. They were from all walks of life: ministers in government, 
chief executive officers, teachers and principals, priests and pastors, as well as young 
political party representatives in Namibia. Some members – 35 per cent, to be precise – 
were unemployed, others were school or university students. Some were from Ohangwena, 
others from the neighbouring regions. Some of the youths from Ohangwena had jobs 
outside the region or got married in other parts of the country; to these, the Facebook 
pages offered a chance to participate in civic and political activities and interact with fellow 
members of their old community. Age on these platforms can range from 16 to 72 years. 
Given this wide variation, I have programmed Wordstat software to display each Facebook 
member’s date of birth next to his or her comment or post, for easier analysis. 
ORYF is the parent body of all other constituency youth forums in the region and Table 
7.1 gives the number of their members. There were constituencies (for example Oshikango) 
that were not on Facebook, but these had WhatsApp groups that were active.
7.3 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
This section presents the findings of my ethnographic fieldwork on the ORYF Facebook 
pages and on the WhatsApp groups in Ohangwena. 
Most members of these platforms were male, university educated, and employed; 
they lived in urban areas, although they were originally from villages in the region; and 
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they had smartphones or access to mobile Internet. Most of them participated on all the 
platforms. Only three of the seven Facebook pages analysed had high participation. But 
the two WhatsApp groups were, both, showcasing high engagement, as there was a two-
way communication between political leaders and citizens. Most of the discussions on 
these platforms were about employment opportunities offered by political leaders or by 
members of the ORYF Facebook, scholarships information culled from newspapers or other 
media houses, community problems such as lack of electricity and water in some areas, and 
the advertising of services such as printing and photocopying, offered by businesses within 
the region. Two dominant themes during the period of my research were the teachers’ strike 
and a peaceful demonstration by the youth against the construction of a new parliament; 
this demonstration took place on 16 June 2016 and will be discussed in detail further on. 
Overall, contrary to expectations, only a few young people from rural areas participated in 
these social media discussions; participants from areas with poor connectivity were scarce, 
too.
The exploration shaped three key areas, which I can summarize under three questions: 
1. What kinds of topics are discussed and debated on these online forums? 
2. What are the online and offline civic and political activities that young people are 
involved in? 
3. What are the constraints or challenges that affect their social media participation 
in politics and engagement in public affairs? 
7.3.1 Direct and Indirect Digital Democracy 
Social media (SM) are praised for their potential to create a space of political engagement for 
young people – a space where they can share problems and ideas, discuss political matters 
that affect their daily lives, or advise one another. John, 32, self-employed and the forum’s 
chair, gave me the following picture: 
Table 7.1 Youth forums in Ohangwena and their Facebook presence from 2016 on
Group name Number of members
Ohangwena Regional Youth Forum 481 members
Ondobe Youth Forum 1,000 members
Engela Constituency Youth Forum 6,200 members
Epembe Youth Forum 732 members
Omulonga Constituency Youth Forum 2,900 members
Omundaungilo Youth Group 642 members
Okongo Deltas Youth Trust 90 members
Oshikunde Constituency Youth Forum 58 members
Eenhana Youth Forum: not on Facebook –
Oshikango Youth Forum: not on Facebook –
Source: Facebook pages of various groups (2016)
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 I also created a WhatsApp group … sometimes we share news, and information 
there … but that is not for everyone as not everyone has a smartphone to access 
the group, that’s why we still have to use SMS messages or call directly non-
smartphone youths, to update them.
Clearly there is a sharp divide between users and non-users of smartphones, and this 
introduces an element of exclusivity to participation. However, there is an expressed 
effort to reach out to non-smartphone members to bridge this gap. Although most of the 
youngsters in rural Ohangwena did not have access to social media on a daily basis, they 
indicated that they logged on to social media sites occasionally, when they went to town. 
Young people can make use of the free calls that normally come with recharge vouchers 
on WhatsApp. All three mobile operators in Namibia – MTC, Telecom Namibia, and Leo – 
have free data bundles for Internet and WhatsApp; these come with different recharger 
vouchers, which cost from N$5.00 (around €0.30) to N$250.00 (around €17). The bundles 
vary across vouchers. Concerning those members who did not have smartphones and were 
not on WhatsApp, Caro, the 24-year-old vice-chair, said:
 We try by all means to inform even those without WhatsApp by using our own cell 
phone credit to call or send them messages to inform them about what’s being said 
on the group. If the chairperson is busy with work, because he is a policeman, I take 
for responsibility calling and sending texts to these people, because not all of them 
have WhatsApp-compatible cell phones. 
These SMS messages and direct calls were greatly valued by the semi-rural youngsters from 
Ondobe, Eenhana, Okongo, Oshikango and Ohangwena, as they made them feel part of the 
political process even though these members could not access the online forums directly. 
I asked my young participants whether the use of social media such as Facebook, Twitter, 
or Instagram would increase or decrease their chances of engaging in public discussions. 
Most of them strongly agreed that such use would definitely increase their participation, 
as they could take part no matter where they were at the time, without having to go in 
person to the physical site of the meeting; and they described access to social media as ‘a 
complementary tool’. Gab, an unemployed 24-year-old, spoke about how digital media can 
save them time and costs, especially when they reside in remote areas:
 I also would like to add more about road connections, as some of us we are living 
deep in the forest, there are just those gravel roads, I cannot even call them roads, 
even when you are driving, the car get stuck in the sand. We need some help, so 
that at least we can travel safe and arrive on time … sometimes we are far (even 100 
km away) from a tarred road where you can get a taxi to town for meetings, so that 
we can be updated. So mobile phones really help us to communicate, as we can 
forward text messages to our colleagues who are far; if I have their number, then it 
shortens the distance.
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Overall, this picture highlights the complexity of the challenge for digital inclusion and gives 
us a framework for assessing communities’ readiness to provide equal and unbiased access 
to decision-making, employment, and study opportunities in the digital age (Fotopoulos, 
1997). While my data show that it is primarily urban and educated male individuals who 
have control over these online forums, the forum leaders’ efforts to use their phone plans 
and free vouchers to place calls and send text messages to isolated rural members of their 
group make for a more complex narrative. And the situation described here, particularly by 
Gab, makes the case that we need to assess digital participation not just directly, as online 
participation and presence, but also indirectly, by looking beyond the surface, at factors 
that involve traditional and old technologies. This pushes us to expand the borders of what 
constitutes digital inclusion and to evaluate strategies for reducing the digital divide gap – 
for example, by bridging the gulf between old and new media. 
7.3.2 Digital Politics: Leisure, Learning, and Labouring for Change
During the seven-month period in which I collected my observations, most of the 
discussions occurred after working hours. Both youths and political leaders were placing 
posts and making status updates on these pages mostly during weekends. Some posts and 
videos were shared around 11 p.m. on weekdays. During the interviews I conducted, the 
young people stated that they used social media platforms mostly for leisure, especially 
when they were at home, bored and doing nothing. At such times these political forums 
turned into entertainment platforms for them, as they brought themselves up to speed 
with the latest political events in the country and got involved in discussions on matters of 
regional development. Sed, a 24-year-old woman from the region, unemployed, intimated 
what moved her to visit the forum’s Facebook page and WhatsApp group: 
 What motivates me on Facebook and WhatsApp is to talk to friends online and 
share ideas such job opportunities, studies opportunities and so on with my fellow 
youths. I stay at home most of the time because I am not employed, and sometimes 
when I get bored I can login and check what’s happening on the forum and get 
certain information. 
Most of the young people told me that they learned about many things on these platforms. 
Claudia, a 25-year-old local pastor, said: 
 We have our page called Oshikunde Youth Constituency where we share ideas. 
People from Windhoek also update us with information. On WhatsApp we also 
share news as we do not get newspapers, so we hear things through WhatsApp. We 
also inform each other about tenders in the constituency.
Young people and political leaders in the region used their leisure time to share, comment, 
discuss, debate, dialogue and convey information via these platforms. This is consistent 
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with some research studies, which found that, now more than ever, young people around 
the world are treating new media such as Facebook, Twitter and mobile phones as venues 
for social leisure and entertainment while at the same time they use them to engage in 
learning, political organizing, community building, and other such activities (Arora, 2014; 
Arora & Rangaswamy, 2014; Mpofu, 2013; Sarrazin, 2011; Wasserman, 2011). They are not just 
citizens; they are consumers of political entertainment (Van Zoonen, 2005).
I noticed that members of my study groups often took pictures with their mobiles, 
either from newspapers or from constituency notice boards, and then tended to share them 
with others, who might not have access to these types of media, even though they were 
online. They also shared political and commercial videos that carried various messages, for 
example advertisements for products such as medicines or political songs.
During the period when I was exploring comments, likes, and statuses on these seven 
pages, one of the issues that dominated discussion was the teachers’ strike. As a result of 
the harsh economic conditions that prevailed in the country in September 2016, teachers 
demanded a much due salary raise; and the strike was prompted by the failure of the teachers’ 
union and government representatives to reach a bargain agreement. The teachers’ union 
was asking for an 8 per cent increase in the teachers’ salaries for the financial year 2016/17. 
The government, on the other hand, stated that it was prepared to give them only 5 per 
cent. That provoked the teachers to threaten boycotting the national examinations, which 
started in September each year. In September 2016 the prime minister wrote a media release 
in which he published a table that showed the different levels of teachers’ salaries; and the 
table was displayed in all the media houses across the country. This angered members of 
the teaching fraternity and elicited harsh words and confrontational exchanges among 
ordinary citizens, youths, teachers, and other stakeholders. Publicizing teachers’ salaries 
was branded unprofessional and unethical, especially in view of the fact that the salaries 
of politicians, and especially of regional councillors, are never publicized. One of the 
councillors in the region shared a table on the constituency’s Facebook page and asked this 
question: ‘Are teachers being selfish or…?’ This earned him more than 63 comments and 27 
likes from youths, fellow politicians, and other members of the Facebook page. The majority 
demanded that the councillor should also share a table with the politicians’ salaries, for 
purposes of comparison with what teachers are earning. 
Loide (teacher, 35): Where is the table for politicians? Like councillors?
Councillor: Very pathetic. Not even worth publishing.
Kama (banker, 33): Just publish it, if you can be able to publish the teachers’…
Fessy (politician, 50): We were not born yesterday
Valo (teacher, 27): Comrade X, how much is your salary?
Councillor: Of course mine is less. But I do not compare myself to a teacher. I am on 
contract, they are full time.
Peter (school principal, 36): Teachers are not being selfish but they are just 
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demanding what is due to them! They shaped the profession. So there is a reason 
for them to earn better Hon. Councillor please do not scratch wound but rather heal 
the wound kamarada! Lol
Valo: For a fair comparison, let the honourable post the tables of politicians from 
regional councillors to the president, with their recent increments.
Councillor: Leave the comparison and focus on the issue. Why do you have to 
compare a politician to a professional? The current president is a PhD. Why do you 
want to compare him to a teacher who holds a mere BETD.7
Loide: Typical of politicians… Vote them in power and they will call you selfish 
when you demand for what is rightfully yours. We are not teachers by political 
appointment. We are teachers by profession. We studied to get there yet we are 
still paid less than those who only got appointed because of Tanganyika.8 Have you 
called your comrades selfish for increasing their salaries with 6 per mille? Have you 
called them selfish for stealing millions from SSC, GIPF,9 Avid, etc.? Have you called 
them selfish when they increased their allowances by more than 2,000 per cent? My 
councillor, the wise thing you can do is to withdraw that statement…
Councillor: Politically and tribalistically motivated. Think outside the box!!!
This scenario gives us a glimpse into how social media are used by the young citizens, 
political leaders and other citizens to discuss, enquire into, and give clarity on issues that 
affect their everyday life. Replies to comments were coming almost every five minutes 
and members expressed themselves freely indeed. One important conclusion to draw is 
that this online forum, while for the most part serving as an entertainment platform, was 
immediately mobilized into the political sphere when an appropriate critical issue irrupted 
onto the scene (Papacharissi, 2014). And this carries a deeper lesson for us. The leisure 
character of these digital spaces stimulates a more forthright and open dialogue than do 
the physical meetings I witnessed, with all their formalities, seniorities, and decorum of a 
traditional order, driven by the chair and not by constituency members.
7.3.3 Affective Publics: The Personal and the Political
Observation of these platforms revealed that most of the time members did not really discuss 
political or civic activities that were topical in their communities. Instead they spent much 
time posting and discussing matters related to their private lives, such as what they ate at 
home. They were also in the habit of uploading pictures that documented their presence at 
7  BETD is the Basic Education Teachers Diploma, formally a teaching qualification in Namibia issued by a teachers’ college 
at the end of a three-year teacher education programme.
8  ‘Tanganyika’ is a reference to a group of ageing politicians who founded the currently ruling SWAPO Party.
9  SSC stands for the Social Security Commission; GIPF stands for the Government Institution Pension Fund, an organization 
that deals with the pensions of all government employees.
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wedding parties; and, to a certain extent, they talked about others. This supports Mackey’s 
(2016) conclusion that, although young people can use social media to access information 
and engage in debate and activism, this is not what they are predominantly using social 
media for. According to this research, young people spend a lot of time chatting to friends 
and relatives about their love lives and dating, and very little on anything to do with regional 
development and youth empowerment.
Young people who participated in social media discussions were happy with them and 
with the posts, comments, and ideas expressed within the WhatsApp groups and on the 
Facebook pages of their regional youth forum. Alferedo, a 30-year-old teacher, said:
 Yes, I am very happy because most of the time none of the comments are against 
the spirit of the group or against the youth. What’s mostly posted are vacancies (job 
opportunities) and this can be posted by someone that is not a member anymore 
as long as they have been added to the group … although there are few individuals 
that misuse these platforms.
Job vacancies were the most shared of all posts. My exploration of both Facebook pages 
and WhatsApp groups in the region led me to conclude that many of the young citizens 
were accessing these platforms in order to share job opportunities or project adverts that 
required them to submit various proposals for funding, and that this kind of activity was 
a result of the high rate of unemployment in Ohangwena; it made sense in that context. 
Many vacancies in government institutions were publicized on these online forums. ‘Fellow 
young people, there are various vacancies at the constituency’s office notice board, you 
would make a detour there for your own benefit,’ announced Nalo, a 22-year-old member 
of the online forum. Not only the young but also some of the regional politicians were 
posting important information about vacancies and similar things on these platforms. I 
witnessed much solidarity and team spirit among young people when it came to sharing 
job opportunities with their fellows as a way of addressing the issue of unemployment and 
poverty in the region. 
Young people also shared their feelings of unhappiness and frustration on certain issues 
such as the performance of political leaders, favouritism in employment opportunities, 
youth empowerment initiatives coming from the political leadership, and corruption. At 
times these emotions reached a heightened level, where some of the youths manifested 
their anger online by insulting their leaders or their fellows. For example, the politicians 
were called puppets, enemies of progress, lazy, illiterate, and useless. Sometimes young 
people posted pornographic videos when they got stuck or were lost for words. The 
group administrator removed such videos and also blocked these members’ access, 
publicly shaming them for not adhering to the group’s or pages’ policies. On occasion, 
the administrator gave the offenders a warning or asked them to apologize to the group. 
Hendrine, a 29-year-old, blamed it all on the digital nature of this political platform: ‘The 
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disadvantages of Facebook are the Facebook users who insult others and insult elderly 
members of the community.’ As she saw it, digital properties somehow gave people more 
license to behave in ways that they would have repressed or restrained in the presence of 
the abused – in this case, if they had attended in person, being physically in the same room 
with the senior officials they insulted.
Most of the young people had reservations about the truth of what was being said on 
social media. They believed that some people were ‘not serious’ about it – for example were 
joking, or putting on – and this made them approach the whole matter of social media news 
and information with a healthy dose of scepticism. Here is for example the answer of Job, 
a 20-year-old labourer and one of the youth forum members, to the question of trusting 
Facebook as a source of information:
 I only have trust in some posts and statuses, because not every post I see on 
Facebook has true information even if it is giving good images. I don’t need to 
share it with my group because I do not trust some sources on social media because 
someone might just post something which does not exist at all. 
The findings reported here give an interesting twist to the tale of social media misinformation 
and abuse of users’ trust in the West, particularly in the light of recent developments around 
fake news (Manning, Penfold-Mounce, Loader, Vromen, & Xenos, 2016) and the manipulation 
of public sentiment. Platforms such as Facebook have been severely criticized for allowing 
the circulation of fake news reports. The presence – let alone dominance – of such stories in 
people’s news feed is seen as fostering a culture of misinformation. The verdict is that social 
networks have had the very harmful effect of disarming and incapacitating their users in the 
exercise of critical judgement about what is going on the real world: when one inhabits or is 
confined to these digital leisure networks, a proper evaluation of sources is out of question. 
But Namibia is very different from the West, in ways that place its youth at a completely 
new angle vis-à-vis a phenomenon like the social media – at least when it comes to trust 
and believability. This country has only recently emerged as a young democracy, but it 
has a long history of building systematic distrust of political propaganda. Perhaps through 
these decades of purposeful inoculation against the official version of events, or maybe as a 
combined result of both factors, the point of departure of most young Namibian citizens in 
their dealings with social media is clearly that of critical users.
7.3.4 Political Networks are Community Networks
One of the things I observed is that almost any of the young people could suggest a topic 
for discussion on the day. Sometimes this started spontaneously, with the sharing of a video, 
government document, or newspaper headlines that the group would start debating about. 
Some young people on these platforms were eager to discuss issues that affected their 
communities or the region as a whole. Administrators of the online youth forum supported 
such initiatives.
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 Evening my good people, missed you all! Can we come up with a schedule of 
what we can talk [about] on a specific day to improve our constituency and our 
region as well? We can even start with a debate on an issue or ask any questions 
of anything we wanted to know better. Because I can see some experts, such as 
pastors, politicians, nurses, teachers and youth on this page. I think it will help us if 
we can use this platform as an educational tool. You can coach me on how to attend 
or answer interview questions. Please let us educate each other. (Tatuu, 29, police 
officer)
As a result of this request, a large number of suggestions came in. Young people responded 
by requesting the mentorship of professionals such as teachers, nurses, pastors, and 
politicians, with whom they wanted to discuss community issues. They desired to build skills 
that could make them more job-worthy. A member suggested the topic of answering job 
interview questions. Most of the others contributed throughout the night. The following 
day Zulu, aged 36, marketed himself as a mentor and a professional:
 Hello every one, I am interested in educating people on financial aspects – how 
to control, manage, and budget your financial issues; and [I am] educating people 
on the importance of financial-planning topics … in fact I am a specialist in HIV 
management. 
By disclosing to the group that he was a specialist in human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] 
management, Zulu encouraged others to ask him questions and to seek advice about that 
range of problems. He was able to offer digital help to fellow youths in the region despite 
the geographic boundaries that separated them from him. Such digital training is very 
useful, as people do not have to travel long distances for some specialist services they need: 
they can access them online. This capacitates not only the youth but the regional political 
leadership as well, demonstrating in the process how digital skilling and digital literacy are 
possible with social media (McGregor, Lawrence, & Cardona, 2017). 
Furthermore, some young citizens suggested that they needed to discuss the challenges 
that faced them in the region and how they could overcome those challenges. One 
member proposed the question: ‘What are the major challenges faced by the youth in our 
community in realizing their goals and aspirations?’ This post attracted many respondents. 
The discussion thread was very long and ran throughout the night. A flurry of suggestions 
came in response. One member, 27-year-old youth officer Esta, lamented: ‘the big challenge 
faced by the youth in our constituency is that they do not look for information or [to] 
familiariz[e] themselves with what is happening around the country’.‬ This view garnered 
much support, as many people felt that youths do not make sufficient effort to find out and 
understand what is going on in the region. There was frustration that some of the young 
people in the constituency did not take it upon themselves to become acquainted with 
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the country’s economic, social, political, technological, and cultural realities. Another young 
member, 19-year-old self-employed Sig, remarked: ‘one of the challenges is the laziness and 
lack of understanding where the world is heading to. Young people need to be sensitized 
on the issues that will enhance and develop them.’
Yet other young people came to the defence of their peers, as they believed that the 
system was stacked against them: 
 May I be allowed to contribute on the discussion! we, the youth, have access to 
information, but we are disadvantaged when it comes to job criteria/requirements 
… and one challenge is that we are so engaged into some nonsense stuff like 
alcohol, stealing, womanizing or other funny activities …! We are singing a song 
of [wanting] the youth to be involved in economic development, but we are 
disadvantaged on resources or support! The youth will be empowered when our 
leaders are showing their interest through action. (Mark, 33, teacher) 
Some young people reported that they felt that political leaders in the region were not 
doing enough to engage, sensitize, and empower them. They pleaded that, in most 
cases, the reasons why youths engaged in what could be called anti-social activities such 
as stealing were unemployment stress, poverty, the lack of moral support from political 
leaders, and hopelessness. They urged leaders to encourage positive hopes for community 
development among the young. Judo, a 29-year-old teacher and WhatsApp member, 
expressed this attitude most powerfully on the forum: 
 Our leaders are the most attractive speakers, but it is not only words can transform a 
person but action do … For instance, you want a green scheme in our constituency 
… offer a land to the youth, if you want them to engage in economic affairs, support 
them with raw materials … that is what I mean by action! … Most of the time people 
that are victims of being criminals … is because of poverty and depression and 
hopeless life … Create awareness of hope among the youth or nation at large. 
This post garnered much support, as illustrated by an enthusiastic response from Ashu, a 
36-year-old community development officer:
 You are right … but the tree won’t stand without roots to hold [it] … just like a child 
won’t have manners if the parents don’t support a child … morally! … I am not 
encouraging people to look at government only but let the government support 
us mentally and economically. 
Clearly the young experience much anger and frustration with their local political leaders, as 
the latter’s actions affect their lives directly. They crave for moral and educational support. 
To summarize, local politics is community politics; it is intended to be long- lasting and 
persistent. Personal relationships constitute the foundation on which a local democracy can 
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be built in these regional contexts and online youth forums help to consolidate this building 
process, along with the political aspirations of those involved.
7.4 CONCLUSION
The findings from this study tell us that social media platforms are used by young people, 
politicians, non-politicians, and others in the region as sites for information sharing and 
debate. It is clear that the young interacted intensely on these platforms, both among 
themselves and with their political leaders; moreover, both parties did so well beyond 
working-time boundaries, which highlights their motivation to participate in social media 
forums. Young people and politicians alike were using their free time to access, share, 
and discuss topical issues in the region. This is a good sign; it reflects a growing political 
intimacy, forthrightness, and honesty between citizens and government representatives. 
The engagement with social media described in this chapter alerted the region’s political 
leaders to the concerns of young citizens under their care and made them aware of how 
these young citizens would like certain challenges to be addressed. 
Another major lesson to be drawn from this case study is that of the capitalization of 
digital resources and digital literacy. Young people are using Facebook and WhatsApp 
to offer advice to others and to ask questions for which they did not have answers, since 
there were many professionals online. This digital skilling or literacy acquisition on political 
platforms pushes us to expand the definition of local politics, making it incorporate aspects 
of social lifestyle, employment, community building, and trust, together with an ongoing 
process of building knowledge and proficiency in a range of issues well beyond normative 
politics at a national level. 
A third important point concerns inclusivity. While many of the young citizens from the 
rural and marginalized areas did not participate directly on these platforms, it is clear that 
they were indirectly engaged, through text messages they received from their local chairs, 
or else through vouchers, calls, and other strategies that pulled them into this digital world. 
This forces me to reconsider what constitutes digital inclusion in light of a more specific 
notion of bridging the digital divide, which entails bridging the gap between traditional 
media and new media. One has to switch all the time between traditional media and new 
media in order to ensure that those who do not have access to the former get access to the 
latter, so that everyone benefits and acquires the same information at the same time.
 The point about inclusivity has obvious implications. In a world where mobile Internet 
use is proliferating among young people as well as among government officials and other 
leaders, we need to attend to the issue of how inclusivity can be enhanced through such 
digital tools. Despite connectivity issues, social media are becoming a strong political sphere 
where young people can connect, meet and discuss, influence and motivate one another 
Chapter 7 | Mobile Social Media and Political Digital Literacy
140
on civic and political activities, or debate about challenges in the region, employment 
opportunities, and so on.
Finally, it must be said that this study has two main limitations. First, my participants were 
drawn only from one out of the fourteen political regions of the country; and each region 
has a different demographic makeup. In the future, similar studies should be designed for 
the exploration of the role of mobile social media – as used by the young – in regional 
and local politics in the other regions in Namibia. Secondly, this is a qualitative study; 
and qualitative ethnographies, while permitting the in-depth investigation of important 
aspects, block others. In this case, qualitative analysis does not allow for a full investigation 
of the youths’ use of social media, since the researcher cannot know wherefrom exactly they 
are posting or commenting. Hence, to complement this study, similar research should be 
conducted in Namibia, using a different data collection instrument. These two limitations 
speak against any simple, direct generalization of the findings presented here to the entire 
young population of Namibia.
The next chapter will draw the general conclusions of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 88
Conclusion and Implications 
for Future Research
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8.1 INTRODUCTION
In this dissertation I set out to study citizen engagement, politics, and digital media in 
Namibia. I explored how young Namibians use their mobile phones to engage in regional 
and local politics, trying to find out what motivates them to participate in civic and political 
life, what is the nature of this participation, and how they connect to political leaders and 
government officials in their region of residence. In this chapter I will present the general 
conclusions of my research, gathering them around the three questions I formulated at the 
outset, in chapter 1 (p. 9-10):
 ∙ RQ 1: Which young people participate and what motivates them to engage in 
regional and local politics?
 ∙ RQ 2: What is the nature of their political participation through mobile phones?
 ∙ RQ3: To what extent and in what ways do young people connect with the 
government and other stakeholders through the use of mobile phones?
8.2 CONCLUSIONS
But let me start at a very general level. Across the chapters, the conclusions I reached in my 
research outline four comprehensive topics of debate, which I summarize thus: 
 ∙ The relations between old and new media need to be reconsidered. 
 ∙ Digital politics is less about elections and more about community building. 
 ∙ Social media political platforms are slowly pushing against, and transforming, the 
cultural hierarchies that play out in face-to-face political meetings. 
 ∙ Used well, entertainment can play an important role in digital politics. 
Building my arguments around these four ideas necessitated a whole investigation into how 
mobile telephony can be used as a political tool – and not just in Namibia but anywhere 
in the world, given the growing digitalization of the public sphere. I have concluded that, 
although network connectivity is poor in Ohangwena (the region studied here), and 
especially in its rural constituencies, young citizens display a growing taste for using the 
mobile phone as an intermediary, to communicate with their relatives, friends, or even 
whole villages. Citizens are so avid for the services that these devices can offer that, in order 
to improve their chances of getting a network, they climb trees and organize their life so as 
to be free for online activity after midnight. 
It also became clear to me in the course of this research that there is less political 
engagement on the mobile phone than on community engagement platforms, although 
use of the mobile phone is the most widespread. This is an important element of picture; 
and it can take the researcher in several fertile directions. One of my aims has been to try 
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to find out how mobile gadgets can influence the political will of those young citizens who 
show no sign of being greatly motivated (if at all) to participate in politics offline, in the real 
world. Could they be made interested in online participation? And could that influence their 
overall attitude to political activity and engagement? 
Further along this path, my study opens the way to future explorations of the 
digital divide in the global South. Despite poor network connectivity and a high rate of 
unemployment, most of the young people in the region own mobile phones. Just to recall, 
for the sake of example, some of the details presented in chapter 3: 50 (35 male and 15 
female) out of the 65 youths in my semi-structured interviews have smartphones and are 
increasingly using them to read newspapers, listen to the radio, and bring themselves up 
to speed in current affairs. Young citizens are also using cheap data plans from local mobile 
telecommunications companies such as the Mobile Telecommunications Company (MTC). 
One such plan is Oka Aweh, prepaid packages that cost N$7 each and offer free calls to any 
national number. A package comes with 20 free minutes, 50 free text messages, 20 MB free 
data, and 20 MB social media data for WhatsApp; and all free units are valid for three days. 
Another affordable data plan from MTC is Aweh Go, which sells free calls to any national 
numbers for N$13 and offers 50 free minutes, 150 free text messages, 50 MB free data, and 
50 MB for social media data – all free units being valid for seven days. Such data plans make 
it possible for citizens to access the Internet; and they are not the only ones. MTC also offers 
the public preloaded packages with free data for WhatsApp, Facebook, free text messages, 
and free calling minutes. As for the smartphones, most of the affordable ones in Ohangwena 
come from the Chinese and Indian shops listed in chapter 3. 
Although radio is a popular medium and more than 70 percent of the population in 
Ohangwena owns one, it emerged from this study that young people tend not to listen 
to NBC Oshiwambo, which is a state radio station (see chapter 4); they prefer private radio 
stations such as Omulunga Radio and Ohangwena Community Radio, which have music 
and other entertainment programmes. On average, it is elderly citizens who listen to 
national or public radio. The few youths who tune in to it are predominantly interested in 
entertainment programmes and in politicians’ announcements of employment and other 
youth-related opportunities. The overall conclusion of this part of my research is that the 
mobile phone has become an object of entertainment and leisure for young citizens rather 
than being used as a political tool that can connect them to their political leaders. This is 
why my dissertation calls for governments to reconsider the usage of this mass medium – 
the mobile phone – and to find how it may be possible to shift it towards stimulating citizen 
engagement. One way to achieve such an aim would be for the government to set up digital 
literacy classes for the less technologically privileged members of the society.
It is true that politicians and other officials involved with the young are genuinely 
attempting to communicate with them by sending them urgent messages, the latest 
news, and topical information (say, about drought relief distribution programmes or public 
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meetings) through the NBC Oshiwambo Radio morning programme. However, given that 
young citizens do not pay attention to these stations, politicians and the entire regional 
leadership should make it a priority to instruct the population in their constituencies on the 
importance of listening to certain programmes on the public radio, even via mobile phones. 
An educational campaign should contribute to this goal; and I believe that such a campaign 
would fit in very well with the 081 for Everyone campaign, by which the Namibian MTC is 
striving to make sure that all citizens will be able to make use of their mobiles by 2020. I am 
also confident that the network connectivity problem that still causes trouble in Ohangwena 
will be resolved in the near future with the help of 081 for Everyone. Already in 2018, the 
MTC started erecting network towers in constituencies that had been marginalized ever 
since independence – that is, constituencies with limited connectivity (or even none at all).
Next, there is the matter of the hybridity of old and new media, which is of interest 
here because hybrid practices are reflected in regional politics and affect the participation 
of young people, creating a landscape of patterns specific to the region. In Ohangwena, 
traditional or old-style media such as newspapers and television are mainly available to 
urban residents. Young people who live in this region are on the whole reported to read 
the Namibian in preference to other newspapers (such as New Era, Republikein, and Sun), and 
especially the Friday edition, which they consult for vacancies, entertainment, and current 
affairs. Only a handful of youths indicated to me that they are in the habit of buying and 
reading newspapers out of some wider interest in sociopolitical developments; and these 
were a few among the few. The majority of young people I interviewed are using mobile 
phones to access radio stations and TV channels where they read or watch news; and this 
– rather than buying newspapers or tuning in to radio or TV sets directly – is the dominant 
tendency, even in spite of network coverage problems. As mentioned before, youths are so 
determined to use the mobile phone that they put up with extremely uncomfortable times 
and places when that’s the only way to do it.
But poor network coverage is just one out of many constraints and challenges 
that young people in the communities of Ohangwena are facing every day. Others are 
unemployment, which has a very high rate among 15–53-year-olds – and not just in this 
region, but in the whole country; favouritism in relation to jobs and other opportunities for 
young people; cultural hierarchies and protocols, especially at community meetings, that 
disfavour the young and discourage their attendance. My research proved that all these 
factors contributed to the low levels of civic and political engagement displayed by the 
young.
Other major challenges that came out clearly are restricted access to proper road 
infrastructure and networks; the poor representation of young people at decision-making 
levels; general ignorance and lack of understanding, coupled with a low level of digital 
literacy; and an endemic lack of moral support from the region’s leaders. The problem of 
public and political literacy, especially in relation to the new media and their effects on the 
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social development of the country, has been investigated in chapter 6, both among young 
people and among senior leaders. An important aspect of this problem – and one that 
keeps recurring, under many forms, in several areas of my investigation – is the digital divide, 
which seems to be widening within the youth class itself, namely between semi-urban and 
rural youths, in the absence of adequate mechanisms from political leaders to support all 
young people, regardless of their political affiliation. This has been discussed in chapter 4; 
and we have seen that political leaders are rightfully reputed to be ‘sweet talkers’ but to 
miss on implementation. In consequence, the young people in my study constantly request 
from them the support and assistance they need if they are to become actively invested in 
the socioeconomic transformation of their region. This takes us to the overarching problem 
of political digital literacy. Further studies are called for to determine the regional leaders’ 
levels of competency with the mobile phone as a communication tool – especially as an 
intermediary between them and young citizens.
Despite connectivity issues, mobile social media are now becoming an autonomous 
political sphere: they create a space where young citizens can connect around civic and 
political activities, meet and discuss, influence and motivate one another. We are here on 
the terrain of what has been labelled ‘affective public platforms’ (Papacharissi, 2016), where 
citizens can connect, share messages, date, and discuss all sorts of developmental issues 
concerning them and their country.
Social media platforms such as the ones explored here in chapter 7 – the Ohangwena 
Regional Youth Forum Facebook page and the two WhatsApp groups – show that participants 
mainly take pictures of posts and vacancies – as advertised for example in the newspaper 
or at the constituencies’ offices – and share them. Interestingly, some of the councillors 
actively share such notices of vacancies on these platforms – as well as other important 
messages. They also interact with other members of the group as they answer questions 
from the floor. It should be noted that neither all the political leaders nor all the youths in 
the region are on these platforms. However, those who are must be representative enough, 
since most of them are chairs of their respective youth clubs. This opens the question of 
digital inclusiveness and of the means to attain it in a democratic state like Namibia.
8.2.1  What Kinds of Young People Participate in Regional and Local Politics 
through the Mobile Phone, and What Motivates Them to Engage?
8.2.1.1 What Categories of Young People Participate in Regional and Local Politics?
The answer to this question comes from different chapters of the dissertation. 
According to my research, the young people who participate in regional and local 
politics in Ohangwena are predominantly male and unemployed – school dropouts for the 
most part. The majority are from marginalized communities in rural areas; however, some of 
the young citizens in urban areas are also active on the political front and generally present 
on the public scene.
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Although the youths from rural areas are the ones who face economic hardship 
head-on, as most of them were unemployed at the time of this research and had to walk 
long distances to reach nearby service centres such as constituency offices, they remain 
committed to the development of their country. 
On the whole, these young people stay at home or hang around bars and cuca shops; 
but they have ample time to browse the net and connect with their fellows digitally when 
the network coverage is reliable. At the same time, they have developed a negative attitude 
towards attending meetings in person in the region, since at such meetings they feel they 
are neglected and not valued. A similar conclusion has been reached earlier by Mattes and 
Richardson (2015) and by Mudhai (2013): young people’s physical presence at meetings has 
been declining, once the alternative to participate digitally opened. 
This kind of conclusion has generated two contrastive ways of interpreting the 
phenomenon of digital politics. One school of thought takes it to be a negative development 
– one that encourages a passive attitude and thereby has the potential to subvert real political 
action. Seen in this light, digital politics has acquired the pejorative label of slacktivism. At 
the opposite end, other scholars claim that digitalization is a positive development because 
it can motivate the young, get them engaged in politics, and broaden their sociopolitical 
horizon – bearing in mind that these youths have long been sidelined through traditional 
means of political engagement (hierarchies in real-world meetings, for instance). But 
achieving this potential is a tall order; if digital politics is to be up to the task, all or most 
young people should engage in politics effectively, through their mobile phones. And this 
cannot happen unless we make digital literacy campaigns part of our strategies – the ones 
designed to ensure that all citizens, old and young alike, understand the relevance of digital 
debates and how these can shape up our democratic institutions.
My study reveals, further, that both smartphone users and non-smartphone users 
participate in equal measure and are equally present in the democratic public sphere; 
they all show great interest, make enquiries or ask questions of their regional councillors, 
and come up with suggestions for various developmental programmes. And this applies 
all across the board. In spite of general tendencies to fall into the groups I outlined at the 
beginning of this section, there is great variety among the young people I interviewed. 
Some are in their early careers and just started working; some have degrees and diplomas. 
Some live in towns, some in villages, in or out of the region, close to centres of activity or 
far away in the woods. But, regardless of these and other differences, they are all making 
the same effort to participate in the political life of the region with the help of their mobile 
phones.
8.2.1.2 What Motivates the Young to Participate in Regional and Local Politics?
My research has pointed out a number of factors that clearly inspire the young people to 
participate in regional and local politics or create motivations for them to do so. Here I am 
going to list these motivating factors one by one.
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First, some of these factors are negative in character; and inaccessibility is probably 
the highest-ranking one among these. Poor network connectivity and inadequate radio 
frequencies in the region, along with difficulties in reaching regional officials (political 
leaders, councillors, and so on), brought youths together, prompting them to discuss how 
best to counteract such adversities and improve the situation in their region. It also appears 
that youths tend to use the mobile phone for contact with their political leaders because 
they cannot raise matters with them face to face. But political leaders remain elusive and 
difficult to get hold of even on their mobiles.
Second, the existence, availability and proliferation of mobile telephony is another 
strong motivating factor – a positive one, this time. Despite the high rate of unemployment, 
there is a marked increase in mobile phone ownership across the region, especially among 
young citizens between the ages of 15 and 35; and in my study youths in this category 
demonstrated great readiness to share and discuss issues of interest to them in the digital 
sphere. Most of the young people I interviewed are members of regional youth forums; 
and, although not all members attend face-to-face meetings or gatherings, those who do 
so update their absent fellows via text messages or via postings on social media platforms 
that they themselves have created, with the main aim of fostering an inclusive democratic 
atmosphere in the digital world. 
A third major motive for young people (at least for some of them) to join regional 
forums and political discussions is party ideology. Most participants whom I interviewed 
were members of political parties. They declared that they joined this or that party – or, as 
non-members, supported it and voted for its candidates – because they were attracted to 
its political and social ideology. 
This opens onto a new and very important topic: political role modelling. Youths in my 
research who joined various parties were usually continuing a family tradition: they had 
witnessed their parents acting as members of the same parties and embracing the same 
ideologies. This goes some way towards explaining the element of ideological attractiveness: 
by serving as role models, parents make the ideology feel familiar and right, and ultimately 
attractive enough for their offspring to adopt it. Political role modelling – an unexplored 
topic in media and political communication – is the kind of behaviour displayed by adult 
members of political parties so as to attract youths to politics and make them want to join 
the same political organization. 
To resume, a fourth motive was unemployment: another negative factor, like the first. 
Many interviewees made it clear that they joined political groups such as youth forums in 
order to find employment. Being members, they can use their mobile phone to get job 
adverts that are shared on various social media platforms. 
It became clear to me in the course of my study that young people regard voting as a 
constitutional obligation; this was the reason why most of them took part in the electoral 
process. However, I also found that some of these young people registered for elections but 
did not actually go to vote. 
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One major lesson from the case studies analysed in relation to motivation concerns 
the capitalization of digital resources and digital literacy. Young people learned to use 
Facebook and WhatsApp so as to give advice to others or to ask questions to which they 
themselves would not have answers, when a lot of professional expertise can be found 
online. Culling answers in this way, from the Internet, is a form of digital skilling and literacy, 
and its discovery is an important conclusion in this study.
8.2.2  What Is the Nature of Young People’s Participation in Politics through Mobile 
Phones?
Parts of an answer to this question can be found everywhere in this dissertation. According 
to my findings for Ohangwena, young people participate as members in regional and 
constituency youth forums mainly out of a desire to sensitize fellow youths to important 
matters that affect their lives and subsequently to discuss these matters, find solutions, 
and so on. As is obvious, in regional politics there are two basic types of participation, 
engagement, and activity, for the young as for anyone else: online and (let’s say, for brevity) 
offline. My findings are not alone in indicating that young people are less engaged in civic 
and political activities deployed in real, non-virtual space, which they associate with the 
elderly; they are willing instead to engage online, via mobile phones (and I’ll expand on 
this very soon). On the other hand, when they do engage in political activities in praesentia, 
in the physical world, something very interesting happens. In this region, young members 
sometimes perform dramas that feature messages of warning – say, songs about teenage 
pregnancy, the effects of alcohol and drug abuse at school or during social functions (e.g. 
the national heroes’ day, or the international youth day). The main goal of dramatic activities 
of this kind is to attract and educate other youths. Other activities, for example public 
debates, are typically dedicated to development in the constituency.
Young people’s online activities are extremely varied; the spectrum ranges from simple 
phone conversations on the mobile to sophisticated posts on social media pages created 
by the youths themselves. One key finding of my research is that young people spend 
their leisure time in such activities and share skills digitally in order to make significant 
contributions. This kind of participatory approach turns out to be working very well with 
young citizens, despite the digital divide that cripples it.
Youth forums also served as a source of political platforms that dialogue and network 
for employment and political identity. These platforms re-energize young people and lift 
their morale, as, to them, politics is all about sociopolitical issues such as empowerment, 
teenage pregnancy, HIV/AIDs, alcohol and drugs abuse, and mobilization. 
All this leads to the conclusion that the mobile phone emerged as the main 
communication tool, and one that can nurture direct democracy. All across the board – 
from its use in direct calls and messages to friends, relatives, and political leaders to its role 
in promoting social media platforms such as Facebook – the mobile phone proved itself 
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capable of increasing young people’s involvement in politics, in social causes, and in civic 
activities; and it creates a new public sphere for inclusive digital democracy.
Another major conclusion of my dissertation is that, to young people in Ohangwena, 
politics is not primarily a party affair and does not necessarily have to do with parties but is 
mainly about survival, employment, identities, and youth empowerment – which is important 
because these are the future leaders of the country. Nevertheless, as already mentioned, 
young people do take it to be their constitutional obligation to play their part in electoral 
processes and choose the leaders they judge fit, or to belong to the political party whose 
ideology matches their own aspirations and understanding of social development. 
This corroborates my view, expressed several times throughout this dissertation, that 
young people today are not politically inactive, uninterested, and apathetic about politics, 
as they are often portrayed, but are engaged in a different manner from the one we are 
familiar with from the past. As daily users of the Internet, they prefer to show their interest 
and commitment by joining online political groups. All they need is a platform that should 
be free from interference from other political elements. And the findings presented in this 
dissertation reveal that, together, regional and constituency youth forums have already 
created such a platform: a public sphere for the local community that includes a space 
for youths and other disadvantaged groups to discuss solutions to local socioeconomic 
problems. 
It is important that the mobile phone gave some youths access to social media platforms 
of the kind that nurture digital democracy. But one should also bear in mind that young 
people in Namibia are on the whole rather sceptical of what is posted on social media; 
hence they tend to prefer mobile communication by phone. As we have seen, they use their 
mobile phones mainly to communicate with their peers in the region; they do this through 
direct calls and text messages and, when the cost of talking and texting is prohibitive, they 
make sacrifices to ensure that their phones are recharged. This mode of relating to fellow 
citizens and political leaders in the community paves the way for direct democracy. 
Finally, all the elements in this complex picture tell us that the theoretical relationship 
between political participation, civic engagement, and new media use should be 
contextualized to the unique profile of the region, with its specific activities, groups, and 
individuals.
8.2.3  To What Extent Are Young People Connecting with the Government and 
Other Stakeholders on Mobile Phones?
This question is attended to throughout chapter 6 as well as in parts of chapter 7 (and 
others). As we have seen, although the mobile phone numbers of regional politicians were 
made available publicly, young people still found it difficult to talk to these individuals: their 
calls were either not answered or answered by generally unhelpful assistants. The politicians 
themselves were often in meetings. Relatedly, many young people felt that most of their 
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councillors tended to make themselves readily available to them only during their election 
campaign. 
Public town-hall meetings and mobile social media such as Facebook and WhatsApp 
turned out to be the most widely used platforms that enabled both citizens and politicians to 
interact and engage with each other without any geographical difficulties. Public town-hall 
meetings were attended by a disproportionately low number of young people; as a result, 
both they and the politicians created political outreach programmes with entertainment 
in the form of songs, drama, and music in their political. This move was successful and 
accomplished its purpose of attracting more young people to these events. 
Social media platforms are used by young people, politicians, and other residents of 
Ohangwena as information-sharing and debating sites. Here, on these platforms, both 
youths and political leaders can be seen to interact with each other without any concern 
for the time they spend doing it (compare also the results in Resnick & Casale, 2014). This is 
good sign: it indicates a level of political intimacy between citizens and their government 
representatives. Also, thanks to this kind of interaction, the political leadership gets to know 
what concerns the young people have and how they would like certain challenges to be 
addressed. Again, all this is part of constructing a direct democracy.
Besides, the evidence shows that the discussions take place mostly after working hours 
or during weekends. This means that both young people and politicians use their free time 
to share and discuss topical regional issues. It also means that private time (or leisure) is used 
constructively by both parties, for the benefit of the region, to ensure that there change and 
growth. This could take us to the area of politicization of leisure (but that is a subject for 
another study).
Namibia is a young democracy in a climate where the global conversation has shifted 
towards arguing that social media are a real threat to democracy. Countries went to war, 
or are not at peace, largely as a result of how their citizens were using social media. If not 
properly handled, social media can indeed wreck a democracy. Consequently, one of 
my aims in this dissertation has been to propose ways to save our democracy from any 
such threat – for example though digital literacy and sensitization campaigns, or through 
amendments to policies such as the communication act of 2009.
8.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The findings from this study have implications for various policies, especially the ones 
related to the practice of inclusive democracy, which is a major cause across the country. 
The government of the Republic of Namibia encourages and promotes inclusive democracy 
through a policy of decentralization; the plan is that citizens should be fully engaged, at 
grassroots level, in policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation. However, the fact 
8Conclusion and Implications for Future Research | Chapter 8
153
that regional councillors – who deal with their communities, including the young people 
– are reportedly using mainly mainstream channels of communication and venues such 
as public community meetings, village meetings, and constituency meetings is likely to 
result in the exclusion rather than inclusion of young citizens, because their attendance to 
such meetings is poor, as is their rate of use of mainstream traditional media. Hence young 
citizens will not have their say in debates that could stimulate growth in their region and 
improve their own lives. What is more, the findings discussed here detail how youths feel 
less engaged in regional politics as a result of the perceived systematic unavailability of their 
political representatives, who never answer their mobile phones (although they promised 
they would).
The present study recommends that entertainment activities should be incorporated 
into various political engagement activities; the aim would be to enhance participatory 
democracy, attract larger numbers of young people, and promote inclusiveness. It 
also recommends that the regional political leadership and young people forums (or 
constituency forums) should work together to organize information sessions designed to 
create awareness and explain the importance of these ‘offline’, real-world political networks 
for the youth. At present youth forums seem not to have much influence on political 
systems and processes; but the engagement of young people, be it formal or informal, can 
be understood as political participation and would be beneficial to a vivid and resilient 
democracy. Finally, this study recommends that political education programmes targeting 
young people should be strengthened and multiplied.
My research has limitations: it was conducted in just one out of the fourteen political 
regions of Namibia. Besides, I spent only seven months in the field; and I used participant 
ethnographic observation, semi-structured interviews, and focus group discussions to 
collect my data for this research. I suggest that future research into the relation between 
the mobile phone and young people’s participation in politics should cover all the regions 
of the country and be carried out over a longer period. It would be interesting to compare 
the results.
Owing to their easy portability and to the access they give to social media and the 
Internet, mobile phones are very popular among young people; for example, in spite of 
network and other difficulties, youths prefer accessing even mainstream media through 
their mobile phones rather than directly. This puts the mobile phone right at the centre of 
any research on the political activity of the young generation. My study aims to contribute to 
the current debate on mobile phones, young people, and participation in regional politics 
in the global South. The background ingredient most relevant to my research is the fact 
that, while there is a high proliferation of mobile phones and social media platforms, various 
researchers are currently concerned with the young people’s declining interest in regional 
politics and low levels of participation in any political activity.
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Appendix C
GUIDE FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS WITH REPRESENTATIVE 
YOUTHS FROM OHANGWENA
Structure of the interview
The interview contains two main kinds of questions, which are, respectively, primary and 
secondary within the topic. Primary questions are introduced as numbered items and 
should be addressed at some point during the interview. Sometimes a topic can consist of 
a cluster of primary questions. Secondary or follow-up questions are introduced as bullet 
subpoints. They help to guide the discussion and, later, the analysis according to the topic 
where they belong, but they are not mandatory; other questions may arise and replace 
them as the interview progresses. This general structure and the corresponding notation 
apply in fact to all types of interviews.
The semi-structured interviews will be conducted face to face and will last between 
30 minutes and one hour. They will be digitally recorded. They will also have the following 
rubrics:
Name of researcher:
Name of interviewee:
Date and time of the interview:
Brief presentation of the content, scope, and aims of the interview:
I am Sadrag Panduleni Shihomeka, a PhD candidate in politics and digital media at Erasmus 
University Rotterdam in the Netherlands and I am currently conducting research for a study 
with the title ‘Citizen Engagement: Politics and Digital Media in Namibia’, for the completion 
of my doctoral degree. The main research question that guides my dissertation is: ‘How 
does the youth engage in politics through social media in Namibia?’ As part of this research, 
I will be asking each participant questions on the following topics:
 ∙ the participant’s age – how the participant is situated in the larger age group 
selected for this study (which is comprised between 18 and 35 years); 
 ∙ relevant characteristics of the participant (gender, education, employment history, 
present situation);
 ∙ the nature and motives of the participant’s engagement (or lack thereof) in regional 
and local politics, his or her interests and expectations from it; 
 ∙ the situations and times when the participant is using his or her mobile phone for 
activities related to regional and local politics; 
 ∙ the extent to which the participant is connecting with the government and other 
stakeholders in Ohangwena via a mobile phone. 
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The results of the study will inform both policymakers and decision makers (and 
implementers) as to how youths engage in politics by using their mobile phones.
I am asking you to participate actively in this discussion, which will take place soon. 
Remember, there is no right or wrong answer to my questions; we are just trying to explore 
ideas on how best the youths can use mobile phones as a tool to engage in regional and 
local politics.
Kindly note that the information you supply here will be treated in the strictest 
confidence and will be used only for the purposes of this study. When you do not understand 
something, feel free to ask questions yourself, so that I can clarify. Also, please note that this 
is a semi-structured interview, hence you should feel free to interact with me. You have the 
right to withdraw from this interview at any point, should you deem that to be necessary.
Part A: Biographical/demographic data (socioeconomic characteristics)
1. Please tell me about yourself (your age, gender, religion, political affiliation, ethnic 
group, educational background, constituency)
Part B: Nature and reason of participant’s engagement in politics
2. Are you a member of any political party? If yes, which one and why of that party? 
If no, why?
 Do you occasionally visit the Facebook page for that party? Are you happy with the 
comments or posts on that party Facebook page?
3. Approximately how much time (minutes/hours) a day do you spend on the Internet 
in your spare time?
4. Do you have a Facebook account? If so, why did you choose to have that account? 
If not, why? 
 What other social media sites do you have accounts on, and why?
5. How do you use Facebook, and when? 
6. Do you discuss political issues on Facebook? Probe: 
 Which issues and why?
7. Who or what influences your decision to discuss political issues on Facebook?
8. What are the socioeconomic and political challenges facing Namibian youths 
when they try to go online or use Facebook (and other social media) in order to 
participate in local politics?
9. As a youth living in this region, do you think that social media increase young 
people’s chances to communicate, interact, and share information with 
government officials and other senior political figures in the region, or that they 
rather decrease such chances?
10. What do you think the government needs to do so that more youths start using 
digital media to discuss public matters? How can it ensure that youths get access 
to their political leaders any time they need?
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11. Accessibility Please describe the tools that you are using to access social media to 
engage in politics. Who owns them? Probe: 
 ∙ the tools belong to the user;
 ∙ the community library;
 ∙ an Internet café;
 ∙ the place of work or the school.
12. Digital literacy Please state whether in your view digital literacy is needed for 
youth engagement in politics. Give reasons for your response.
 The topics to be covered will probably include technical know-how; sending and 
receiving; membership of social media groups; online communities; and awareness 
of one’s rights.
13. Digital literacy As a youth of this region, what type of education and awareness 
programs do you think you need in order to become active in the virtual (digital) 
world?
14. Political curiosity When you are online, what political activities do you engage in? 
Are they the kind that enables you to be an active citizen, digitally and otherwise?
15. Political curiosity  Are you a member of any online youth group? If so, which one 
and why? If not, why not?
 Which online youth group would you join if you were online now?
16. Political curiosity Tell me whether you ever took part or thought of taking part in 
online protests and demonstrations. If you did, could you explain when and why? 
17. Political curiosity Did you attend online group meetings or forums? If so, which 
ones and why? If not, did you have a reason not to?
18. Political curiosity Do you have trust in social media discussions? If yes, why? If not, 
why?
19. Interest in public affairs In what ways do you think social media such as Facebook 
increase (or decrease) your chances, as a youth, to engage in public discussions 
concerning your region, your constituency, or your village?
20. Interest in public affairs Are you a member of any online community development 
committee (CDCs)? If you are not a member, why? And, if you are, did you decide 
to become a member and what type of community issues do you normally discuss 
online?
21. Interest in public affairs Did you ever attend an online CDCs meeting? If yes, why? 
If no, why not? Please give me your views on online meetings.
22. Interest in public affairs Have you ever participated in, or organised, an online 
public meeting that enables youths like yourself to participate freely in public 
matters that concern communities in their villages and constituencies, or in 
the entire region? To your knowledge, have fellow youths in your constituency 
participated in such meetings?
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23. Interest in public affairs Please share with me the public issues that you debated 
online. What were your reasons for picking them up?
24. Motives/interests What do you think motivates the youth to participate in online 
activities more actively than in activities on the ground, or in preference to 
participating in the latter? 
25. Motives/interests In what ways do you think youths can use their leisure time if 
they want to engage digitally in political debates?
26. Motives/interests  According to some studies, more and more youths around the 
world are treating new digital media such as Facebook, Twitter, mobile phones as 
social avenues for leisure or entertainment. As a youth, do you agree or disagree 
with this view? What are the leisure and entertainment activities that you engage 
in on these social media? 
Part C: General questions
27. How do social and cultural factors such as class, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, political 
affiliation, and location affect youth participation in politics – especially the kind of 
participation that is mediated by Facebook and similar social media?
28. What role do you think social media sites such as Facebook has on youths’ 
participation in the political and public life of their regions and villages?
29. What factors do you think have an influence on whether young people engage 
online in regional and local matters? 
 Topics to be represented here probably include money, time, knowledge, 
information, and political infrastructures such as community meeting halls.
Part D: Closure
30. Is there anything else you wanted to discuss that I haven’t covered today about 
social media and citizen engagement? 
 Do you have any suggestions or comments? Can I contact you again with any 
follow up questions?
I will send you the text of this interview after the transcription is completed. I will keep you 
informed if I choose to publish any of the material gathered today. I will also send you an 
executive summary of my dissertation once it’s published next year, as well as a URL for it 
when it’s made available online.
The interview is now concluded. I would like to thank you all for agreeing to meet me 
and to provide me with valuable information for my research project.
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Appendix D
PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION OF REGIONAL YOUTH FORUMS’ MEETINGS
Main parameters, criteria, and questions that guided and structured the observations:
1. attendance (gender; participation level in terms of gender, ethnic group, political 
affiliation);
2. engagement (level, nature of political activism);
3. type of technology used at the meeting;
4.  environment (how conducive to the use of social media); 
5. use of mobile phones by youths during meetings (are they listening? are there 
youths that are online during meetings of the youth forum? what can be done to 
make it possible for such meetings to accommodate online participation too, in 
the near future?)
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Appendix E
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE WITH POLITICAL LEADERS AND 
OTHER STAKEHOLDERS (REGIONAL COUNCILLORS)
Introduction
I am Sadrag Panduleni Shihomeka, a PhD candidate in politics and digital media at Erasmus 
University Rotterdam in the Netherlands and I am currently conducting research for a study 
with the title ‘Citizen Engagement: Politics and Digital Media in Namibia’, for the completion 
of my doctoral degree. The main research question that guides my dissertation is: ‘How 
does the youth engage in politics through social media in Namibia?’ I am asking you to 
participate actively in this discussion, which will take place soon. Remember, there is no 
right or wrong answer to my questions; we are just trying to explore ideas on how best the 
youths can use mobile phones as a tool to engage in regional and local politics.
Kindly note that the information you supply here will be treated in the strictest 
confidence and will be used only for the purposes of this study. When you do not understand 
something, feel free to ask questions yourself, so that I can clarify. You have the right to 
withdraw from this interview at any point, should you deem that to be necessary.
Questions
1. I would like to start by asking the honourable councillor to introduce himself just 
by saying his name and telling us how long he has been a regional councillor for; 
then we would like to hear him talk to us a bit about the experience of being a 
councillor and tell us something he likes about it.
2. Please share with me the level of young people’s participation in community issues 
that affect them. How do you connect and communicate with them? Do you find 
social media platforms such as Facebook useful when you attempt to communicate 
with your fellow councillors and with members of the community?
3. Now please share with me your understanding of the terms ‘political participation’ 
and ‘political engagement’. How would you define them? 
4. What motivates you, as a councillor, to get online? What experiences did you have? 
Above all, what is your view of new media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and the 
like? Do they help your political outreach to young people or not? Why? 
5. How do you respond to online protests on social issues that you are advocating (if 
you experienced any)? 
 Give examples of online positive or negative experience with the citizens 
6. Some research studies indicate that young people look at contemporary politicians 
as different from older ones, who were there to fulfil their mandates; and they feel 
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excluded, which alienates them from politics. How would you comment on this 
statement? Would you agree with it? Could you support your view with examples 
from your constituency? 
7. Suppose you have a few minutes to explain to the young the role of mobile phone 
as a tool of political engagement (we are still talking of politics at the regional and 
local level). What would you say to them?
8. What, in your view, are the socioeconomic and political challenges that your region 
is facing when adopting the policy of carrying out political discussions with young 
people online? What strategies do you think need to be developed to overcome 
these challenges?
 Topics to be covered here: digital illiteracy; skills barriers; infrastructure; linguistic 
factors; cultural factors; fixed broadband issues
9. Suppose that you were in charge of this region and could make one change 
that would encourage young people to participate in regional and local politics 
digitally, by using their mobile phones. What would you do? And how?
10. Do you think the mobile phone plays a key role in facilitating the interactive 
relationship between young citizens and political representatives? If so, in what 
way? 
 Probing questions: Do councillors have Facebook pages? Does the region or the 
constituency have a Facebook page? Is there a regional council forum Facebook 
page? How active is it?
11. Do you have any suggestions or comments? Can I contact you again with any 
follow up questions?
Thank you very much for taking part in this discussion. I am holding a number of interviews 
with your fellow Regional Councillors like this one and then will be feeding back my findings 
to people who live and work in this region by the end of the year.
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Appendix F
FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION WITH REPRESENTATIVE YOUTHS FROM THE 
OHANGWENA REGIONAL YOUTH FORUM
Introduction
I am Sadrag Panduleni Shihomeka, a PhD candidate in politics and digital media at Erasmus 
University Rotterdam in the Netherlands and I am currently conducting research for a study 
with the title ‘Citizen Engagement: Politics and Digital Media in Namibia’, for the completion 
of my doctoral degree. The main research question that guides my dissertation is: ‘How 
does the youth engage in politics through social media in Namibia?’ I am asking you to 
participate actively in this discussion, which will take place soon. Remember, there is no 
right or wrong answer to my questions; we are just trying to explore ideas on how best the 
youths can use mobile phones as a tool to engage in regional and local politics.
Kindly note that the information you supply here will be treated in the strictest 
confidence and will be used only for the purposes of this study. When you do not understand 
something, feel free to ask questions yourself, so that I can clarify. Also, please note that this 
is a focus group interview, hence you should feel free to interact with your classmates. You 
have the right to withdraw from this interview at any point, should you deem that to be 
necessary. 
Instructions: format and preliminaries
I will open the floor to a discussion in which you can interact with your colleagues. Please 
make full use of this opportunity.
We should allow others to state their points freely.
If there is anything you wish me to clarify, please ask me now, by way of preliminaries; 
otherwise I’ll assume that you are ready and we can start rightaway.
The questions
1. Researcher: Please share with me your understanding of the following two terms: 
‘political participation’ and ‘political engagement’. What do they mean to you?
 Respondent:
2. Researcher: Do citizens in your constituencies or region, especially the young ones, 
engage in regional and local governance politics – in decision-making processes, 
for instance – during their leisure hours? If so, how do they do it? Are they using 
social media for this purpose? 
 What effects does this type of engagement have on their political processes?
3. Researcher: Please explain to me what, in your view, makes some young citizens 
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participate in politics, while others don’t.
 Respondent: 
4. Researcher: What do you think the government needs to do to ensure that youths 
use mobile phones effectively to engage in local politics?
 Respondent:
5. Researcher: Do you think that youths in your area are preponderantly offline or 
preponderantly online? Please state the reasons why you think so.
 Respondent:
6. Researcher: Some research studies reached the conclusion that young people 
consider contemporary politicians to be different from older politicians, who were 
there in order to fulfil their mandates; young people feel excluded, and hence 
politics has a disengaging, distancing effect on them. Do you agree or do you 
disagree with this conclusion? Please offer a few examples from your constituency 
or region.
 Respondent:
7. Researcher: What factors do you think contribute to the high or low level of 
engagement in politics among the youths, via mobile phone?
 Respondent: 
8. Researcher: To what extent, would you say, does the playful use of new digital media 
technologies by citizens, especially young ones, increase (or maybe decrease?) 
active engagement in regional and local governance politics and in decision-
making processes? 
 Respondent:
9. Researcher: Suppose you have a few minutes to make young people aware of the 
importance of using the social media as a tool of political engagement (we are still 
talking of politics at the regional and local level). What would you say to them?
 Respondent:
10. Researcher: What, in your view, are the socioeconomic and political challenges that 
your region is facing when adopting the policy of carrying out political discussions 
with the youths online? What strategies do you think need to be developed to 
overcome these challenges?
 Topics to be covered here: digital illiteracy; skills barriers; infrastructure; linguistic 
factors; cultural factors; fixed broadband issues.
 Respondent:
11. Researcher: Suppose that you were in charge of this region and could make one 
change that would encourage young people to participate in regional and local 
politics digitally, through Facebook. What would that change be? And how would 
you implement it?
 Respondent: 
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12. Researcher: What influence do you think social media sites such as Facebook 
have on youth political participation in public affairs concerning their region, 
constituency, or village?
 Respondent:
13. Researcher: What are the challenges that hinder young Namibians’ usage of social 
media as a political engagement tool?
 Respondent:
14. Researcher: Do you think social media play a key role in facilitating the interactive 
relationship between young citizens and political representatives? If so, in what 
way? 
 Probing questions: Do councillors have social media pages? Does the region or 
the constituency has a Facebook page? Is there a regional youth forum Facebook 
page? If so, how active is it?
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Appendix G
LIST OF THE YOUNG PEOPLE INTERVIEWED
P
se
u
d
o
n
ym
O
cc
u
p
at
io
n
A
g
e
G
en
d
er
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t
M
em
b
er
sh
ip
 o
f/
fu
n
ct
io
n
 in
 y
o
u
th
 
fo
ru
m
C
o
n
st
it
u
en
cy
Moses none 19 male unemployed member Okongo
Eliaser none 30 male unemployed member Ondobe
Mart police officer 31 male employed member Engela
Jus teacher 29 male employed member Epembe
Ag nurse 36 male employed member Ondobe
Vesa none 31 female unemployed member Oshikango
Linga entrepreneur 30 female self-employed member Omundaungilo
Rega pastor 29 male employed member Omundaungilo
Mary shop owner 31 female employed member Ondobe
Lyd teacher 35 female employed member Ondobe
Lameck none 26 male unemployed member Ondobe
Gadana entrepreneur 26 male self-employed member Ondobe
Kamilo none 18 male unemployed member Ondobe
Simon youth officer 24 male employed member Ondobe
Edie none 23 female unemployed member Ondobe
Ndapu none 20 female unemployed member Ondobe
Anna none 26 female unemployed member Epembe
Lahya Shop assitant 29 female employed member Epembe
Ndeshi none 25 female unemployed member Epembe
Paulus none 27 male unemployed member Oshikunde
Tuhafeni none 25 male unemployed member Oshikunde
Ileka none 25 male unemployed member Oshikunde
Matias none 24 male unemployed member Oshikunde
Krista none 20 male unemployed member Oshikunde
Jack none 34 male unemployed member Ohangwena
Ndam teacher 26 female employed member Ohangwena
Sela administrator 35 male employed member Ohangwena
Martha security guard 33 female employed member Oshikango
Tim none 35 male unemployed member Oshikango
Emmy none 34 female unemployed member Oshikango
Sela none 23 male unemployed member Oshikango
Wilhem volunteer at a 
community garden
28 male unemployed member Oshikango
Malakia teacher 32 male employed member Omulonga
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John none 32 male self-employed member Omulonga
Caro car wash attendant 24 female employed member, 
vice-chair
Omulonga
Gabs none 24 male unemployed member Omulonga
Sed none 24 female unemployed member Eenhana
Claudia pastor 25 female employed member Oshikunde
Loide teacher 35 female employed member Omulonga
Kama banker 33 female employed member Omulonga
Fessy politician 50 male employed member Engela
Valo teacher 27 male employed member Okongo
Alferedo teacher 30 male employed member Ondobe
Nalo none 20 female unemployed member Ondobe
Hendrine none 29 female unemployed member Ondobe
Job labourer 20 male employed member Ondobe
Tatuu police officer 29 male employed member Oshikunde
Zulu mentor and HIV/
AIDS specialist
36 Male employed member Omundaungilo
Esta youth officer 27 female employed member Omundaungilo
Sig none 19 male self-employed member Omundaingilo
Mark teacher 33 male employed member Omundaungilo
Judo teacher 29 male employed member Ondobe
Ashu community 
development 
officer
36 male employed member Oshikunde
Peter school principal 36 male employed member Epembe
Sigo none 31 male unemployed member Eenhana
Indila none 27 female unemployed member Eenhana
Heys none 25 male unemployed member Oshikunde
Imms teacher 39 male employed member Eenhana
mane none 28 male unemployed member Ondobe
Lazy head of depart-
ment at a school
32 male employed member Oshikunde
Tangi none 25 male unemployed member Ohangwena
Henock teacher 37 male employed member Oshikango
Leo school principal 31 male employed member Ohangwena
sack none 22 male unemployed member Okongo
Henrich teacher 26 male employed member Epembe
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Appendix H
LIST OF THE REGIONAL AND LOCAL AUTHORITY COUNCILLORS 
INTERVIEWED
Pseudonym Age Gender Constituency
Councilor 1 N/A male Constituency A
Councilor 2 N/A male Constituency B
Councilor 3 N/A male Constituency C
Councilor 4 N/A male Constituency D
Councilor 5 N/A male Constituency D
Councilor 6 N/A male Constituency E
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Summary
In recent years, several studies indicated that there is a downward trend in youth 
participation in politics and civic activities, in both the global South and the global North. 
Most of these studies were conducted in the West – only a few in the global South; and 
not all their authors are agreed on the subject of youth participation. Yet the general view 
that emerges is that the majority of young people are not taking part in national elections 
and other civic activities, a situation often characterized as pathetic disengagement from 
political life. There are also reports that, in various countries, quite a large number of youths 
are not members of any political parties.
Namibia is no exception to this trend or to the corresponding claims. But an increase 
in mobile phone subscriptions in this country is perceived as a possible game changer: this 
gadget could switch on the right buttons for sparking an interest in political participation 
and civic engagement among the youth. This is the main idea to which the present study is 
dedicated.
Most governments in Africa have signed the Africa Youth Charter, and one of the main 
goals of this framework is precisely to increase youth participation in politics as well as in 
civil, collective–communitarian, and non-political activities by the year 2020. This emphasis 
is due to the worrisome nature of the decline in young people’s interest in such activities and 
of their increasing withdrawal from the political scene. At the same time negative reports 
have surfaced about engagement practices among leaders and politicians at regional and 
local level in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in Namibia. These people are accused of not 
making any effort to involve their citizens in public debates or to attract them to political 
activities and community projects. Citizens have complained that their government 
representatives do not make themselves accessible and are never there to listen to their 
needs and aspirations – needs and aspirations, that is, of members of communities under 
these politicians’ jurisdiction. Feelings and complaints like these prevail in spite of the 
government’s efforts to build regional councillors’ offices in all the constituencies around 
the country and to provide both political leaders and members of the general population 
with mobile phones, phone allowances, Internet connectivity, and, for the leaders, personal 
cars for reaching their communities regardless of the geographic location of the villages. 
And, indeed, it is not yet known whether young people and political leaders really use 
these and other facilities provided by the government in order to interact and strengthen 
inclusive democracy. Hence the inspiration and leading idea of this research: my primary 
aim was simply to explore how the members of the Ohangwena Regional Youth Forum use 
their mobile phones and how much of that usage revolves around politics. Do they use their 
mobiles to engage in regional and local politics? I was seeking answers to the following 
research questions: 
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RQ1 Which young people participate and what motivates them to engage in local 
politics using mobile phones?
RQ2 What is the nature of youth participation in politics through mobile phones?
RQ3 To what extent do young people connect with the government and other 
stakeholders through the use of their mobile phones?
I adopted an ethnographic qualitative research method to explore the attitudes, perceptions, 
feelings, and experiences of youths and political leaders (who participated in my study) 
towards the use of the mobile phone as a tool for participation and engagement in regional 
and local politics. Data were collected through participant observations obtained from 
youth forum meetings; through 65 semi-structured interviews carried out with selected 
participants (45 male and 20 female) from regional youth and constituency forums; through 
another six semi-structured interviews conducted with the regional councillors (regional 
politicians); through a content analysis of seven Facebook pages and two WhatsApp groups; 
and through two focus group discussions with the regional youth forum executive members 
in the Ohangwena region. 
The findings show that poor network connectivity and poor radio frequencies in 
some of the constituencies, a high rate of unemployment among the youths in the region, 
unfriendly staff members at constituencies’ offices, and difficulties in accessing or talking to 
political representatives in the region were the main factors that motivated the youths in 
my study to use their mobile phones to discuss issues, including political and civic ones, that 
deeply affected their lives. A key concern that this research unveiled is that, although most 
political leaders made their mobile phone numbers known to the public and encouraged 
citizens to contact them, almost invariably they could not be reached, and their mobiles 
were permanently answered by unfriendly assistants. So young people still found it difficult, 
if not impossible, to talk directly to these politicians; moreover, they felt that most councillors 
tended to make themselves available only during election and campaign times – which 
clearly sends the wrong message. 
My findings further highlight that youths generally prefer online platforms to real-life, 
physical situations of political participation and engagement – meeting spaces that are 
currently used by their political representatives. Most of the youths who participate (online 
or not) in political networks such as youth forums are school dropouts, youths who recently 
completed a university degree and are at an early stage in their career, and unemployed 
youths from various constituencies and villages. Youth forums serve as network political 
platforms for employment, for finding one’s political identity, for dialoguing, for getting 
re-energized and boosting one’s morale; and all this demonstrates that, for young people, 
politics is a complex matter. Apart from things clearly earmarked as ‘political’, it is also 
about social and sociopolitical issues such as unempowerment, teenage pregnancy, HIV/
AIDs, alcohol and drug abuse, and mobilization. In this context, in my study at least, the 
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mobile phone emerged as the main communication tool for sharing, making direct calls, 
and sending messages to friends, peers, and relatives.
According to the results of this research, although public radio remains popular, private 
and community radio stations have overtaken public ones, thanks to political news and 
programmes on mobiles. For rural and unemployed youths, the main factors that inhibit 
the use of mobile phones for catching radio programmes are access, availability, signals, and 
radio frequencies. Despite these obstacles, mobile media emerged as a preferred virtual 
platform for online political activity among the youth – not just in connection with the radio, 
but in general. Youths are less engaged in civic and political activities that unfold offline, in 
the physical world, because they view them as the predilect terrain of older generations. 
They are instead much more willing to be engaged online.
In an effort to practise inclusive democracy, some of the youths and political leaders 
at regional and local authority levels created WhatsApp groups and Facebook pages for 
their respective constituencies. These were designed as virtual platforms for engagement in 
public debates and political communication, in addition to the radio, mobile phone texting, 
and public or community meetings. However, the modest level of digital and social media 
literacy among community members inhibits the effective use of these platforms by both 
leaders and community members.
At the same time public town-hall meetings have emerged – alongside mobile social 
media platforms such as Facebook and WhatsApp – as the most widely used platforms of 
engagement that enabled citizens in all age groups to interact with politicians. But youth 
participation in such meetings remains pitifully low. In order to encourage it and raise the 
number of youths, both politicians and the few youths who usually turn up for these events 
started to integrate entertainment in the form of songs, drama and music in their political 
outreach programmes. And indeed, in this way they attracted more youths to public town-
hall meetings. The attempt has been a success. Therefore this study recommends that 
entertainment be strengthened as a component of political engagement activities, for the 
sake of enhancing participatory democracy and digital inclusiveness. 
My respondents indicated conclusively that, despite obstacles such as the poor network 
coverage in their part of the country, the high rate of unemployment among the young, and 
the absence of relevant infrastructure in rural areas, all youths, urban and rural alike, strongly 
believe that mobile social media created a virtual public sphere in which they can meet 
in order to discuss, strategize, and advise one another on issues that affect them deeply 
and immediately, and that the existence of such a sphere tends to trigger their interest and 
participation in politics, both regionally and locally.
Lastly, my findings show that both youths and political leaders use social media for 
digital skilling and literacy; for leisure and entertainment as well as for engagement (and 
sometimes these goals and activities merge into one); for interaction with an affective 
public; and for the promotion of ideals, beliefs, and models, including political ones related 
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to direct and indirect digital democracy. And it bears repeating that all this takes place 
despite network connectivity challenges and pervasive unemployment among the young.
On the basis of the material presented and analysed in this dissertation, I conclude 
that the use of mobile phones and, relatedly, of social media platforms such as Facebook 
has a very high potential for increasing youth participation in politics and in civic activities, 
as it creates a new public sphere for inclusive digital democracy. But there is a caveat: in 
a digitized society, the uncontrolled and unregulated use of social media can engender 
practices that, in turn, give birth to an exclusive democracy. We should do our best to 
prevent this and to mobilize our moral categories, judgement, and self-pride in the pursuit 
of a democracy for all.
Finally, it should be mentioned here that my study revisits the old media versus new 
media debate by suggesting how novel forms that emerge in the neglected context of rural 
Namibia can broaden our understanding of the nature of media hybridity and challenge our 
assumptions about participatory democracy. 
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Samenvatting
De afgelopen jaren hebben verschillende studies aangegeven dat er een dalende trend is 
in de betrokkenheid van jongeren bij de politiek en maatschappelijke activiteiten, zowel in 
het zuiden als in het noorden van de wereld. De meeste van deze studies zijn in het westen 
verricht – slechts een handvol in het zuiden van de wereld – en niet alle auteurs zijn het eens 
over het onderwerp van jongerenparticipatie. Het algemene beeld dat is ontstaan is dat de 
meeste jongeren niet aan landelijke verkiezingen en andere maatschappelijke activiteiten 
deelnemen, een situatie die vaak wordt afgeschilderd als een (betreurenswaardige) 
terugtrekking uit het politieke leven. Er wordt ook gemeld dat een vrij groot aantal jongeren 
in verschillende landen niet lid is van een politieke partij.
Namibië vormt op deze trend (en de bijbehorende gevolgtrekkingen) geen uitzondering. 
De stijging van het aantal mobiele telefoonabonnementen in dit land wordt echter gezien 
als een mogelijke gamechanger: dit ‘speeltje’ zou wel eens de aanzet kunnen geven tot het 
prikkelen van de belangstelling van jongeren voor politieke deelname en maatschappelijke 
betrokkenheid. Dat is de hoofdgedachte achter deze studie.
De meeste Afrikaanse staten hebben het Afrikaanse Jongerenhandvest ondertekend. 
Een van de belangrijkste doelstellingen van deze raamovereenkomst is juist om jongeren 
tegen het jaar 2020 meer bij de politiek en burgerlijke, collectieve communautaire en niet-
politieke activiteiten te betrekken. Deze nadruk is ingegeven door het zorgwekkende karakter 
van de afnemende belangstelling van jongeren voor deze activiteiten en het feit dat zij zich 
steeds vaker van de politiek afwenden. Tegelijkertijd zijn er negatieve berichten verschenen 
over de toenaderingswijze van lokale en regionale leiders en politici in Afrika ten zuiden 
van de Sahara, in het bijzonder Namibië. Het wordt hen verweten dat zij zich niet inzetten 
om hun onderdanen te betrekken bij politieke activiteiten en maatschappelijke discussies 
en projecten. Burgers hebben zich erover beklaagd dat hun regeringsvertegenwoordigers 
zichzelf niet beschikbaar stellen en dat zij er nooit zijn om naar hun behoeften en verlangens 
te luisteren, d.w.z. de behoeften en verlangens van leden van gemeenschappen die onder 
de bevoegdheid van deze politici vallen. Dergelijke gevoelens en klachten overheersen 
in weerwil van de inspanningen van de overheid om in alle kiesdistricten van het land 
regionale raadhuizen te bouwen en om zowel de algemene bevolking als politieke leiders te 
voorzien van mobiele telefoons, beltegoeden en internetverbindingen, en de leiders verder 
privéauto’s ter beschikking stellen zodat zij hun achterban kunnen bezoeken, ongeacht de 
geografische locatie van de dorpen. 
Het is nog niet bekend of jongeren en politieke leiders daadwerkelijk gebruik maken 
van deze en andere door de overheid ter beschikking gestelde voorzieningen om met 
elkaar van gedachten te wisselen en de inclusieve democratie te versterken. Dat verklaart 
de inspiratie voor en het leidmotief van deze studie: ik wilde inzicht krijgen in hoe de leden 
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van het Regionale Jongerenforum in Ohangwena hun mobiele telefoons gebruiken en in 
hoeverre dit gebruik een politieke achtergrond heeft. Gebruiken zij hun mobiele telefoons 
om zich in te laten met de regionale en lokale politiek? Ik zocht antwoorden op de volgende 
onderzoeksvragen: 
OV1 Welke jongeren nemen deel en wat beweegt hen om zich met hun mobiele 
telefoons in te laten met de lokale politiek?
OV2 Waarom laten jongeren zich met hun mobiele telefoons in met de politiek?
OV3 In hoeverre staan jongeren met hun mobiele telefoons in verbinding met de 
overheid en andere stakeholders?
Ik heb een etnografische kwalitatieve onderzoeksmethode toegepast om te onderzoeken 
hoe jongeren en politieke leiders (die aan mijn studie hebben deelgenomen) denken over het 
gebruik van de mobiele telefoon als middel om deel te nemen aan en betrokken te zijn bij de 
regionale en lokale politiek, en wat hun ervaringen daarmee zijn. De gegevens zijn als volgt 
verzameld: participerende observaties tijdens jongerenforums, 65 semigestructureerde 
interviews met zorgvuldig gekozen deelnemers (45 mannen en 20 vrouwen) afkomstig uit 
regionale jongerenforums en plaatselijke voorlichtingsbijeenkomsten, 6 semigestructureerde 
interviews met regionale raadsleden (regionale politici), een inhoudelijke analyse van 
7 Facebookpagina’s en 2 WhatsApp groepen, en 2 focusgroepbijeenkomsten met de 
uitvoerende leden van het regionale jongerenforum in de regio Ohangwena. 
Uit de studie is naar voren gekomen dat slechte netwerkverbindingen en 
radiofrequenties in een aantal van de kiesdistricten, de hoge jeugdwerkloosheid in de 
regio, de onvriendelijke bejegening op de kiesdistrictkantoren en de (bijna) onmogelijkheid 
om de politieke vertegenwoordigers in de regio te benaderen of spreken de belangrijkste 
redenen waren dat de jongeren in mijn studie hun mobiele telefoons gebruikten om zaken 
te bespreken (bv. politieke en maatschappelijke kwesties) die een grote impact hadden op 
hun leven. Een groot voorwerp van zorg dat deze studie aan het licht heeft gebracht, is dat, 
hoewel de meeste politieke leiders hun mobiele telefoonnummers aan het publiek hebben 
bekendgemaakt en burgers hebben aangemoedigd om contact met ze op te nemen, 
zij meestal onbereikbaar waren en hun mobiele telefoons steevast door onvriendelijke 
assistenten werden opgenomen. Jongeren vonden het dus nog steeds moeilijk, zo niet 
onmogelijk, om deze politici rechtstreeks te spreken. Verder vonden zij dat de meeste 
raadsleden geneigd waren om zichzelf alleen in verkiezings- en campagnetijd beschikbaar 
te stellen. Daarmee gaven zij onmiskenbaar de verkeerde boodschap af. 
Mijn bevindingen onderstrepen verder dat jongeren over het algemeen online 
platforms verkiezen boven manifestaties van politieke deelname en betrokkenheid in de 
echte, stoffelijke wereld – ontmoetingsplaatsen die op dit moment door hun politieke 
vertegenwoordigers worden benut. De meeste jongeren die (al dan niet online) aan politieke 
netwerken deelnemen, zoals jongerenforums, zijn voortijdige schoolverlaters, jongeren die 
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recentelijk een universitaire studie hebben afgerond en aan het begin van hun loopbaan 
staan en werkloze jongeren uit verschillende kiesdistricten en dorpen. Jongerenforums 
fungeren als politieke netwerkplatforms waar jongeren werk kunnen vinden, hun politieke 
voorkeur kunnen bepalen, dialogen kunnen voeren en zichzelf kunnen opladen en 
oppeppen. Een en ander toont aan dat de politiek voor jongeren een ingewikkelde zaak is. 
Naast zaken die duidelijk als ‘politiek’ zijn aan te merken, draait het ook om maatschappelijke 
en sociaal-politieke kwesties, zoals positieverzwakking, tienerzwangerschappen, hiv/aids, 
alcohol- en drugsmisbruik, en activering. In dit verband, althans in mijn studie, heeft de 
mobiele telefoon zich ontpopt als het belangrijkste medium waarmee ze met vrienden, 
leeftijdsgenoten en familieleden kunnen delen, bellen en sms’en.
De onderzoeksresultaten geven aan dat, hoewel nog steeds populair, de publieke 
omroep vanwege de op mobiele telefoons te ontvangen politieke nieuwsberichten en 
programma’s inmiddels door particuliere en lokale omroepen is ingehaald. Voor jongeren 
van het platteland en zonder werk zijn de grootste obstakels voor het gebruik van mobiele 
telefoons om radioprogramma’s te ontvangen toegang, beschikbaarheid, signalen en 
radiofrequenties. Ondanks deze obstakels hebben mobiele media zich ontpopt als het 
geprefereerde (virtuele) platform van jongeren voor online politieke activiteiten– niet 
alleen voor wat betreft de radio, maar in het algemeen. Jongeren zijn minder betrokken bij 
maatschappelijke en politieke activiteiten die offline worden ontplooid, in de echte wereld, 
omdat zij door hen worden gezien als het exclusieve domein van de oudere generaties. Ze 
zijn daarentegen veel meer bereid om zich er online mee bezig te houden.
In een poging om inclusieve democratie in de praktijk te brengen, heeft een aantal 
jongeren en politieke leiders op regionale en lokale gezagsniveaus voor hun respectievelijke 
kiesdistricten WhatsAppgroepen opgericht en Facebookpagina’s aangemaakt. Deze zijn 
bedoeld als virtuele platforms voor maatschappelijke discussies en politieke berichtgeving, 
naast de radio, sms-berichten en openbare of lokale bijeenkomsten. Het betrekkelijk lage 
kennis- en ervaringsniveau op het gebied van digitale en sociale media onder leden van de 
lokale gemeenschap staat het doelmatig gebruik van deze platforms door zowel leiders als 
leden van de lokale gemeenschap echter in de weg.
Tegelijkertijd hebben openbare vraag- en antwoordsessies zich ontpopt – naast 
mobiele sociale media platforms, zoals Facebook en WhatsApp – als de meest gangbare 
platforms voor engagement, die het voor burgers van alle leeftijden mogelijk maken om 
met politici van gedachten te wisselen. Jongerendeelname aan zulke bijeenkomsten is 
echter nog steeds bedroevend laag. Om dit te stimuleren, om meer jongeren aan te trekken, 
zijn politici en de weinige jongeren die gewoonlijk op deze evenementen komen opdagen, 
begonnen met het integreren van amusement (in de vorm van gezang, theater en muziek) 
in hun politieke contactprogramma’s. Het is ze aldus gelukt om meer jongeren over te halen 
om naar openbare vraag- en antwoordsessies te komen. Die poging is dus geslaagd. Een van 
de aanbevelingen van deze studie is dan ook om amusement op te nemen in activiteiten 
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op het gebied van politiek engagement, teneinde de participerende democratie en digitale 
inclusiviteit te versterken. 
Mijn respondenten gaven onomstotelijk aan dat ondanks de obstakels, zoals de slechte 
netwerkdekking in hun deel van het land, de hoge jeugdwerkloosheid en het ontbreken 
van de nodige infrastructuur in de landelijke gebieden, alle jongeren, zowel uit de stad als 
van het platteland, ervan overtuigd zijn dat de mobiele sociale media een virtuele openbare 
ruimte tot stand hebben gebracht waar zij met elkaar in gesprek kunnen gaan, strategieën 
kunnen uitstippelen en elkaar advies kunnen geven over zaken die hun rechtstreeks en ten 
diepste aangaan, en dat het bestaan van deze ruimte hun belangstelling voor en deelname 
aan het politieke leven veelal prikkelt en stimuleert, zowel op regionaal als lokaal niveau.
Tot slot, mijn bevindingen laten zien dat jongeren en politieke leiders de sociale media 
gebruiken om zich te bekwamen op digitaal gebied, om zich te ontspannen en vermaken 
en om hun betrokkenheid te tonen (soms vallen deze doelstellingen en activiteiten samen), 
om van gedachten te wisselen met een emotioneel betrokken publiek, en om idealen, 
overtuigingen en modellen uit te dragen, waaronder politieke idealen, overtuigingen en 
modellen die verband houden met de directe en indirecte digitale democratie. Het kan geen 
kwaad om hier nog eens te herhalen dat dit allemaal gebeurt in weerwil van de problemen 
met netwerkverbindingen en de wijdverbreide jeugdwerkloosheid.
Op grond van de in dit proefschrift gepresenteerde en geanalyseerde gegevens kom 
ik tot de conclusie dat (het gebruik van) mobiele telefoons en, daarmee samenhangend, 
sociale media platforms, zoals Facebook, de mogelijkheid met zich meebrengen om 
jongeren meer bij de politiek en maatschappelijke activiteiten te betrekken, aangezien ze 
een nieuwe openbare ruimte tot stand brengen voor een inclusieve digitale democratie. Er 
is echter één voorbehoud: in een gedigitaliseerde samenleving kan het ongecontroleerd 
gebruik van sociale media praktijken met zich meebrengen die op hun beurt tot een 
exclusieve democratie leiden. Wij moeten ons best doen om dit te voorkomen en om onze 
morele waarden, ons gezond verstand en onze eigenwaarde voor een inclusieve democratie 
in te zetten.
Ter afsluiting dient vermeld te worden dat mijn studie de discussie over oude versus 
nieuwe media opnieuw aanzwengelt, door te opperen dat nieuwe vormen die in de 
onderbelichte context van landelijk Namibië opkomen ons inzicht in het karakter van 
hybride media kunnen vergroten en onze veronderstellingen over de participerende 
democratie op de proef kunnen stellen. 
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